Israel's Election: A Preliminary Analysis

Barry Rubin As expected, Israel has once again made Benjamin Netanyahu its prime minister. The results were not as positive for him as they might have been but are good enough to reelect him. While some might find this paradoxical, the results show that Israelis have a basic consensus and yet have very different ways of  expressing their political positions. This isn’t surprising given the fact that 32 parties were on the ballot. First, though, a myth that has at times become a propaganda campaign should be exposed. There were numerous reports in the Western media that the Israeli electorate was going far to the right, didn’t want peace, and that Israeli democracy was in jeopardy. None of this had any real basis in fact and the election results show these claims to be false. The main story of the election was supposed to be the rise of the far right Ha-Bayit ha-Yahudi Party. In fact, though, it received only about 10 percent of the vote which is usual for that sector. In comparison, about one-third went to liberal or moderate left parties, and about one-quarter to centrist parties. According to reports which are not final but are close to the ultimate result, Netanyahu’s Likud-Beitaynu list received 31 of 120 seats. The Labor Party made some comeback with 17 but came in third. Labor’s hope that its showing would make Israel a mainly two-party system clearly failed. The big winner was Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid with 19 that became the second largest party, while Tsipi Livni’s party obtained 7.  The appeal of Lapid and Livni are precisely that nobody really knows what they stand for but it is certainly nothing to either extreme. In other words, 26 seats went to vaguely reformist somewhat centrist or mildly liberal parties that don’t have any clear or strong stands except to promise better government. On the far right, Ha-Bayit ha-Yehudi, led by Naftali Bennett, got 12. On the far left, Meretz obtained 7, better than it expected, while the Communists got 3, the Islamists 3, and the Arab nationalists 2. The last three parties depend mostly on Arab votes and it was a poor showing for that deeply divided sector. Finally, in the Jewish religious sector, Shas, representing Mizrahi (Middle East-origin and especially Moroccan-origin) Jews received 12 and the Askenazic (European-origin Jews) Yahadut ha-Torah party received 6. While socially conservative, these parties do not have strong stances on issues other than gaining government support for their communities. The bottom line is, then, that those mainstream forces that aren’t supporting Netanyahu (I’ll explain this point in a moment) hold 43 seats, more than he does. But their inability to unite and different orientations prevent them from emerging as a bloc.  Israeli politics cannot be understood by analogy with those of other countries. Neither class and economic nor even peace process issues are fundamental in Israeli politics. At present, the critical issue is who will or won’t form a coalition with Netanyahu’s party. Many voted for Lapid with the idea that he would go into a government with Netanyahu and be a moderate influence pushing for more attention to improving domestic infrastructure. The idea of Netanyahu as a rightist is outdated. It is precisely because he moved Likud to the center--albeit with a significant right-wing faction remaining--is the secret of his success in gaining two consecutive election victories. The failure of the peace process, the second intifada, the rise of Islamism, and the Palestinian abandonment of negotiations with Israel all have made his broad analysis of the situation acceptable to most Israelis. His opponents focus mainly on stressing dovish credentials rather than offering specific alternatives. Attention now turns to the question of how Netanyahu can put together a coalition that will hold 61 seats, a majority needed to form a government. Netanyahu was disappointed at only getting 31 seats rather than up to 35 or so. He will have to give more to coalition partners but he can work with the results. There are several possibilities. Netanyahu never wanted a right-wing government with Bennett. Even if he did, a combination with that party would only get him up to 43 and he would be hard-put to find partners who would join such a combination. In theory, pulling in the two religious parties would let him reach 61 but he knows that this is a situation that would both cause big international problems and create a situation in which he could be daily blackmailed by threats of his partners to walk out of the coalition.    A coalition with Lapid would be far more attractive and bring him quickly to 50 seats. The problem is that Lapid doesn’t mix with the religious parties, especially Shas. While his party is less explicitly anti-Haredi (what is usually, but wrongly, called Ultra-Orthodox”) than his late father's similar party  he still wouldn’t be eager for such a combination. Since the far left is clearly not a coalition partner and both Labor and Livni have said they would not go into a coalition with him, unless they change that decision, Netanyahu has a problem. The irony is that if Netanyahu would ever be forced to go with Bennett it was because Labor and Livni left him no alternative.   The easiest way out would be to persuade Lapid—who is an unknown quantity—to sit with the religious parties. At any rate, tough weeks of negotiations lie ahead to create a coalition after President Shimon Peres designates Netanyahu as having the first option to form a government. He will then have three weeks to do so. One of Netanyahu's main arguments would be: Join me or I'll have to depend on the far right and you don't want that to happen. Note: This article is a work-in-progress trying to serve as a quick analysis of the election. The numbers cited above are not final results and even a small shift would be significant in coalition calculations. Advanced course: If you are really interested here are some details. A. Netanyahu's decision to combine with Avigdor Lieberman's party was probably a mistake, driving moderate liberal voters to Lapid. B.  On the right of Netanyahu's party, he lost probably to Bennett among those who wanted to express their harder-line views or believed that Bennett would pull Netanyahu to the right in a coalition. C. In the center-left, voters had to calculate whether to vote for Livni, Lapid, or Lapid's old party Kadima (which didn't win any seats). The fact that Lapid is an attractive candidate, seems like a nice guy, and has no record to turn people against him helped his cause. In contrast, Livni is not personally popular and has failed on several occasions. D. On the left, people had to decide whether they wanted to cast anti-Bibi votes with Labor or Meretz. A Meretz slogan, sniping at Labor, described the party as "your real voice against Bibi." Wanting to show a tougher opposition stance, a number of people voted for Meretz thus hurting Labor. (One might calculate that as involving two to four seats.) If Labor became the opposition leader, as seems likely, it cannot depend on the close, consistent cooperation of any other party. E. Short-lived centrist parties like Lapid's and Livni's have been a feature of Israeli politics since 1977. Every such party has ultimately failed after a promising start, with the latest example being Kadima itself which went from a government party to oblivion in less than a decade. Lapid's own father also headed such a party which fell apart without ever accomplishing anything. F. Arab voting was down and while this may express some dissatisfaction with Israel's existence, it also means that Arabs have little leeway to affect policies. This is a key reason why Arabs are about 20 percent of the population but only won about 7 percent of the seats, though another is that a lot vote for Zionist parties for various reasons. Arab disunity has also prevented them from becoming more of a political factor. In 2000, with a smaller proportion of the population, the Arab parties elected 12 parliamentarians as opposed to only 8 today.

Won't Syria Be Obama's Main Middle East Crisis in 2013? Posted: 22 Jan 2013 04:45 AM PST This article was published on PJMedia By Barry Rubin While President Barack Obama has been inaugurated for a second term and made his speech, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is still in power in Syria, making his own speeches saying he will not give in.  The Syrian civil war will go on until one side wins and the other loses. And a lot more people are going to die. The idea of some kind of compromise or diplomatic process has always been ridiculous. These two sides—the government and rebels—have nothing to talk about. On one hand, they thoroughly distrust each other with good reason. On the other hand, they both want power and that’s something which cannot be shared. Incidentally, please forgive me when I point out that in 2010 I said that Egypt would be the big story of 2011, and that in 2011 I said that the Muslim Brotherhood takeover of Egypt would be the big story of 2012. For those  asking why I'm not saying Iran will be the main crisis, that's possible, but 2013 is more likely to be a year of endless talk between the Washington and Tehran, punctuated mid-year by Iran's election of its own new president. Iran will buy time, the election of a new president alone will be good for about three months or so since he'll need to get into office, appoint his cabinet, and formulate his "new" policy. So 2014 is more likely to be the year of Iran.  Meanwhile, 2013 will be a year of continuous battle in Syria, at some point punctuated by either the government's collapse or retreat. The rebels have been advancing, especially in the north and in Aleppo. But the regime still has a pretty strong hold on Damascus and in the Alawite stronghold in the northwest. The idea that Syria will fragment into two or more countries is ridiculous. Nobody is declaring independence. Both sides maintain they are the legitimate rulers of Syria and that will continue to the end. Yet it is highly likely that there will be two zones of control for some time. The following scenario seems realistic. And nothing said below should be interpreted as my personal preferences but merely an analysis of the reality on the ground. In several months the rebels will be eating away at Damascus. If and when the day comes that most of Damascus is captured, the rebels will set up a government. That new regime will quickly be recognized by the UN, Europe, and the United States. Regional states will be more diverse in their response, with Islamist-ruled Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey along with pro-Islamist Qatar  will be enthusiastic; Saudi Arabia and other anti-Islamist Arabs reluctant; the pro-Assad, Islamist-dominated Lebanese government and Iran rejecting this option. Of course, a critical question will be: Who will lead on the rebel side? The negotiations will be very complex and quarrelsome but, with American help, the Muslim Brotherhood will probably emerge with a disproportionately strong showing. Here is a good point to ridicule the idea that the United States has little influence. Of course, America isn’t going to decide everything or control events. But for the Brotherhood and other Islamists, having U.S. backing will make them a lot stronger than if they faced U.S. opposition. And remember the context will be shaped by all those arms and money the United States (through Qatar, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) gave the Islamist side. The moderates certainly view the United States as pro-Islamist and while they themselves have a lot of weaknesses, being demoralized by this fact adds another one to the fatal mix. Sometime in 2013 there will be big choices for each side. For the current regime, will it retreat when necessary to a redoubt in the predominantly Alawite sector of the northeast? How quickly will the rebels assault that center as compared to consolidating their control over the rest of the country? And finally, how many ethnic massacres will there be, of Christians and Alawites in rebel-held territory and of Sunni Muslims in regime-held territory? There is no doubt that such murders will take place by the Salafis even if the better-disciplined Muslim Brotherhood refrains from revenge killings. But will they reach the level that will shake up Western thinking and perhaps force a reluctant Obama Administration to do something serious about it. Why will the Obama Administration be reluctant to act and the Western media at least a little slow to recognize what’s happening? Because both are wedded to the rebels and the proposition that Islamists are ready to moderate. The way out is to blame the killings on the Salafis—probably true—and on al-Qaida, the all-purpose scapegoat for everything bad that Islamists say and do.  Remember the notion of “responsibility to protect?” But once the rebels start consolidating rule, as happened in Egypt, there will be increasing examples to be ignored of radical Islamist control, repression, the defeat of the moderates, the persecution of Christians, and the reduction of women’s status. It is a waste of time to discuss which side is better or who one wants to win. The answer is simple: the best thing would be for moderates on the rebel side to win and create some semblance of democracy and human rights. That possibility is still open but things are looking grim. And here is where Western responsibility comes in. Helping the Islamists, and the Brotherhood in particular, makes Western governments complicit in their future crimes, not only against real regime supporters but also on communities identified with the regime (Alawites and Christians), against moderates on the rebel side, and perhaps one day in attempts to crush the emerging Kurdish autonomy in the northeast. So Assad won’t give in. The war will go on. And just as Egypt was the big continuing story of 2011-2012, the agony of Syria is likely to be the big story of 2013. Please be subscriber 31,146  (among more than 50,000 total readers). Put email address in upper right-hand box: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com  We’d love to have your support. Why not make a tax-deductible donation (instead of giving your money to pay for Senator Harry Reid's Cowboy Poetry Festival and U.S. aid for the Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhoods) to the GLORIA Center by PayPal: click here. By credit card: click here. Checks: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line and send to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Fl., NY, NY 10003. For tax-deductible donations in Canada and the UK, write us here. -------------------- Bear with me while I quote the introduction of my book, The Truth about Syria, written six years ago: “Syria…provides the best case study of what has happened in the Arab world, and thus in the Middle East, during the last half-century. When it gained independence, Syria was a democratic country with a seemingly bright future. Blessed with fertile land and ample resources, Syria boasted good relations with the West as well as an energetic, entrepreneurial middle class. Yet a combination of radical intellectuals, militant ideologies, and ambitiously politicized military officers pushed Syria down a different path which has led to turmoil and disaster…. “A professed republic, it has been long ruled by one family, passed down like a hereditary sinecure. A self-described progressive state, it is largely controlled by a small group that enriches itself at the expense of the great majority of its people. A supposed secular regime, it avidly courts radical Islamists abroad and has become increasingly Islamized at home. “No other country in the Middle East is as much of a cauldron of religious and ethnic groups—Muslims, Alawites, Druze, Christians, and Kurds—which compete for power. No place in the region has seen such a collision of contending ideologies—Arab nationalism, Syrian nationalism, Islamism, Communism, reformist liberalism, and more—which have battled it out for decades…. "Once the archetypal leftist, Arab nationalist regime, Syria is now the test case for the battle—whose outcome has the most serious implications for America--between Arab nationalist dictators, radical Islamist revolutionaries, and liberal reformers over the fate of the Arab and Muslim worlds. In our era, this contest is the most important struggle determining the direction of the entire world.” The Obama Administration, especially now with Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, and CIA director John Brennan will maintain a consistent policy of helping to create an Islamist-dominated regime in Syria, believing that this is a great idea since the Muslim Brotherhood is moderate and will restrain the "real" extremists. To paraphrase what a former U.S.  intelligence official said: So, they tell us they're going to take over; they tell us exactly how they're going to do it; then they do it. Now we watch the results playing out in front of our eyes and there's still some question out there that this threat even exists!    Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center  and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia. "

Algerian Hostage Crisis Ends with Military Assault: So How is Al-Qaida Dead? Posted: 20 Jan 2013 05:36 AM PST This article is published on PJMedia. Algerian Hostage Crisis Ends with Military Assault: So How is Al-Qaida Dead? By Barry Rubin One of the main themes of President Barack Obama in discussing his foreign policy is to claim the success of having destroyed al-Qaida. The fact that this organization has just pulled off the seizure of more than 800 hostages at an Algerian oilfield is only the biggest out of dozens of examples that shows this claim is untrue.  The number of hostages killed is still unclear after Algerian soldiers stormed the oil installation on January 19 and killed all of the terrorists.  Certainly, Algeria has had a long civil war with Islamists, including the local al-Qaida affiliate, but this was an international operation headed by a Nigerian. Moreover, al-Qaida has been very active in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Mali, while showing continued capability to wage attacks elsewhere. How, then, are we to understand al-Qaida’s survival and that fact’s relationship to U.S. policy? There are two key points to be made. First, al-Qaida was not designed to take over state power in countries. It is the Islamist equivalent of an anarchist group, that is, one focused more on destroying existing institutions than on staging a revolution, becoming the government, and fundamentally transforming states. That is, of course, the function of the Muslim Brotherhood, the contemporary equivalent of the Russian Bolsheviks who took over Russia in 1917. There is nothing surprising in al-Qaida popping up, staging some attacks, and then becoming less visible or being repressed. That is the nature of such groups and their strategies. It is thus easy to claim victory over them.  The historic role of al-Qaida and the September 11 attacks on America helped set the stage for the domination of Middle East politics by Islamists today.  That’s pretty significant. Moreover, al-Qaida operates more by inspiring others to launch attacks rather than directly organizing them, which also makes wiping out the group a rather difficult thing to do. But claiming to defeat al-Qaida is like claiming to have definitively won a whack-a-mole game. The mole keeps popping up all over the place but never actually dominates the board. What is especially worrisome here is that while the Obama Administration’s approach can be attributed to opportunism—We won! Our policy is going well!—it also appears to be based on a misunderstanding about the nature of groups like al-Qaida. It was designed to be decentralized and thus even the killing of Usama bin Ladin does not decapitate it. There has been a real achievement: it is much harder for al-Qaida to attack on American soil. But, of course, part of the credit for this must also go to the Bush Administration, especially regarding the group’s strongest operations, in Afghanistan and Iraq. “Wiping out” al-Qaida, however, can be (falsely) claimed as a unique Obama achievement. Please be subscriber 31,146  (among more than 50,000 total readers). Put email address in upper right-hand box: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com We’d love to have your support. Why not make a tax-deductible donation to the GLORIA Center by PayPal: click here. By credit card: click here. Checks: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line and send to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Fl., NY, NY 10003. For tax-deductible donations in Canada and the UK, write us here. -------------------- At a time when Communist revolutions were on the upsurge Che Guevara called for a policy of "Two, three, many Vietnams." Today, Islamists in general and al-Qaida in particular are trying to do the same thing. Second, and far more worrisome, is the Obama Administration’s concept of Islamism and terrorism. Under the Obama Administration concept, authored by CIA director-designate John Brennan, al-Qaida is bad because it attacks Americans but literally all other “mainstream” Islamists—including the Afghan Taliban, which helped in the September 11 operation—are basically good because they can be moderated and will keep the radicals from seizing power. In other words, runs the message, we will be saved by the Muslim Brotherhood. And if al-Qaida and a few similar groups are the enemy, explain the policymakers, then the “moderate” Islamists are our friend. Yet this approach misses the point: --In power, revolutionary Islamists will control not just a few gunmen but the full resources and armed forces of entire states. --They can thus do far more strategic damage. --Even under a “mainstream” Islamist government, Salafists can continue to operate—for example, attacking Christians in Egypt—and even (with Brotherhood approval) attacking the U.S. embassy. --The U.S. government has even facilitated the arming of non-al-Qaida Salafist groups in Syria. And when its attempts to isolate the al-Qaida affiliate there failed because of the opposition of those same groups, the White House just shrugged its shoulders and did nothing different. And let’s not forget the killing of American officials in Benghazi, Libya, where, the Obama Administration essentially argued, it couldn’t act decisively to save them because it would have hurt the feelings and status of a U.S.-implanted government.  Note, too, that this moderate, non-Islamist government is incapable of catching or punishing those responsible. Before Iran’s revolution, for instance, there were revolutionary groups that sometimes attacked Americans in Iran. During the transition, when the regime needed to consolidate power, it seized those in the American embassy as hostages. And there have always been even more extreme Islamist forces in Iran that don’t run the government. So is having a “mainstream” Islamist regime in Iran better? In other words, to summarize the situation, what if you have both radical Islamist governments and ongoing terrorism from al-Qaida? Isn’t that disastrous? An organization that can seize about 1,000 hostages in the middle of Algeria, a country whose regime has been so tough on radical Islamists, is not dead. And who needs the rag-tag gunmen of al-Qaida when people with the same basic worldview run all of Egypt and soon Syria as well? To a greater or lesser extent, all of the people of Iran, Egypt, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and probably soon Syria are hostages. Turkey, too, has gone down this road. There has been a debate based on the image of Islamists “hijacking” Islam. Well, the Obama Administration sees nothing wrong with Islamists hijacking entire countries, an action that will do a great deal to ensure that their interpretation of Islam becomes hegemonic as well, spreading their influence to more states as well. Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center  and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

White House Confronting--Sort of--Egyptian President's Frothing Hatred of Jews Reveals Its Deeper Policy Thinking Posted: 18 Jan 2013 06:54 AM PST This article is published on PJMedia. By Barry Rubin When it came to light that Egypt’s new president had made blatantly antisemitic (in the Western context today they could also be called racist) remarks, it finally became necessary--albeit only when the New York Times covered a story (putting it in the most apologetic light, by the way) that's been evident during many years--for the U.S. government to reluctantly and grudgingly remark on these statements, through the medium of spokesman Jay Carney. A State Department statement said that Mursi's saying he is against intolerance was an important first step and expected him to show that he believed in religious tolerance. My problem in dealing with such statements is that they are seen as  isolated acts. As I’ve been writing now for about 30 years, the Muslim Brotherhood has always talked this way as do Hamas, Hizballah, the Ba’th Party, the Iranian regime, and many—though not all—Arab intellectuals, journalists, politicians, and journalists  in living memory. In fact, already a new Mursi statement has surfaced, "We must nurse children on hatred towards Jews."  Note he did not add, until I become president and then we can start teaching them to live in peace with others of different faiths. It isn't just pathetic but also weird that educated Euro-North Americans who are eager to destroy the career of anyone who has ever uttered a single sentence that was or can be portrayed as hate speech will accept those who issue whole reams of the stuff. What is truly ridiculous about this kind of controversy is the outrage or apologia over one statement. In fact, Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood leadership including leading figures in the ruling party have made hundreds of radical statements. They are either ignored or explained away as insignificant. Here are just two from the very top of the organization. First, Khairat El Shater, the Brotherhood’s Deputy General Guide said in April 2012: “Our main and overall mission as Muslim Brothers is to empower God’s Religion on Earth…and to [establish] the subjugation of people to God on Earth.” Second, Muhammad Badi, the Brotherhood’s head, explained in his September 2010 speech which virtually announced the launching of the revolution to overthrow the Mubarak regime: “…the factors that will lead to the collapse of the United States are much more powerful than those that led to the collapse of the Soviet empire….The United States is now experiencing the beginning of its end, and is heading towards its demise...."  Yet people who point to the Brotherhood's radical history, extremist statements, and intolerant behavior now in a systematic way are ridiculed. We aren't even hearing the pragmatic-sounding argument: "Of course, these people are extremist, totalitarian, and anti-American but we have to deal with them. " No, what we are getting instead is: "They aren't really extremist, totalitarian, or anti-American and we prefer to deal with them because they are moderate and a bulwark against the Salafists." All three of the top foreign policy appointments just made by President Barack Obama--John Kerry as secretary of state; Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense, and John Brennan as CIA director--strongly endorse that latter stance. Indeed, Brennan practically created it. The White House's response to Mursi's remarks was in the framework of that approach, condemning the language of one particular statement while praising Mursi for some things he's done. He is praised for not abrogating the Egypt-Israel peace treaty--yet--and for helping get a ceasefire in the latest Israel-Hamas war. It is good that Mursi helped U.S. goals in that case but since he was, in effect, doing even more to help his ally Hamas, one should be entitled to a certain element of cynicism. The Egyptian regime is apparently blocking some--not all--of the weapons going into Gaza because a direct confrontation with Israel is not in its interests. Of course, direct confrontation with Israel (after 1973) wasn't in Egyptian, Syrian, or Iraqi interests either. That's why they used terrorist group clients to do the job. But the main problem with the White House response is not that it was too weak but that it deals with calling Jews the offspring of pigs and monkeys against whom eternal war must be waged as entirely isolated from any analysis or policy consideration. None of these factors are considered as part of the Egyptian president's and Muslim Brotherhood's ideology and worldview.  This kind of hate speech is not equivalent to an American politician making a gaffe--many such examples can be given--but as a core aspect of the Islamist and Brotherhood ideology from which its policy behavior will flow.  Please be subscriber 31,123  (among more than 50,000 total readers). Put email address in upper right-hand box: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com  We’d love to have your support. Why not make a tax-deductible donation (instead of giving your money to pay for Senator Harry Reid's Cowboy Poetry Festival and U.S. aid for the Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhoods) to the GLORIA Center by PayPal: click here. By credit card: click here. Checks: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line and send to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Fl., NY, NY 10003. For tax-deductible donations in Canada and the UK, write us here. -------------------- Carney's government-crafted statement also reflects a strong hint that Mursi is now older and wiser so the things he said before becoming president don't matter any more. He's being disciplined by the requirements of wielding power. Such concepts have failed repeatedly in the Middle East--Arab nationalists did not become moderate, neither did Islamists in Iran, or Yasir Arafat in the Palestinian Authority--and other parts of the world. Indeed, hate speech is more significant when it doesn't just feature a banned ethnic slur word but is followed up by stirring up violent hatreds among millions of people that are likely--as they have in the past--to lead to war and terrorism. It is ridiculous that such disproved, mistaken ideas form the basis for U.S. policy in 2013. The response to Mursi's rants is like condemning some nasty anti-capitalist statements made by Lenin before the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia but implying that this is merely a problem of intemperate language, of hate speech, that will probably go away now that he is facing the responsibilities of power.   Carney adds, "This type of rhetoric is not acceptable or productive in a democratic Egypt." That is correct diplomatic language but those who use it are supposed to know that such sentiments are also ridiculous. Acceptable? That type of rhetoric is the norm now. And whatever Mursi says about keeping the treaty with Israel his view of Jews, as sub-humans who should be wiped out, may have something to do with his behavior as president in future. Note, too, that Mursi and his colleagues believe that to think that way is a direct command from God, a personage in whom they place a high level of respect.  The White House did not respond on the fact that Mursi's statement is based on key Islamic texts. There was no need for the White House to say that--and it wasn't asked. But it is vital that the White House understands that fact. Islamist ideas are interpretations that are not inevitable but the fact that they are quite arguably proper interpretations of the proper Islamic religious worldview makes them far more powerful than behaving as if they are the zany misinterpretations of marginal would-be hijackers of Islam. It isn't easy to deal with this situation. The problem, though, is that it needed to be managed before it got to this point. Consider the question of whether the U.S. government should supply Egypt with advanced military equipment. How's this for a joke: The reason why America has been giving Egypt arms for the last 30-plus years is to use them against the people who are now in power in Egypt. Of course, it isn't that simple but the weapons were also provided to keep the existing regime in power, to keep it at peace with Israel, and to ensure a close relationship with the United States. Only the last of these points still applies. Yet that, too, is compromised. The premise now is that military officers will constrain the Brotherhood regime. But, of course, they won't, at least not short of the direct launching of a war on Israel. Many officers sympathize with the Brotherhood and radical Islamism. Besides, the regime will pick and choose the generals it will put in charge of those weapons to ensure they will follow its orders. We know, of course, that congressional efforts will fail to stop the arms' supply, that any conditions placed upon it can be easily disregarded, and that the transfer of weaponry will go through. Another issue is the U.S. insistence that Mursi show he opposes religious intolerance. It is safe to say that during each month of 2013 there will be several anti-Christian actions--church burnings, prohibitions on building, attacks on Christians, kidnapping of Christian women and their forcible "conversion" to Islam, etc--in which the Egyptian government will do nothing and the U.S. government will say nothing.   So to sum up, the U.S. government will provide arms, money, and diplomatic support to a regime whose ruling forces openly evince hysterical antisemitism and call for genocide against its neighbor based on the belief that they don't really mean it. Perhaps one day somebody in the American mass media will publish some of the things Muslim Brotherhood leaders say in Arabic about the United States, including explicit support for anti-American terrorism. No doubt, Carney could explain that away as well. Footnotes: Check out Samuel Tadros's excellent analysis of Muslim Brotherhood strategy here and Eric Trager's excellent lecture on the Brotherhood's structure.  The New York Times also ran an op-ed from Ayaan Hirsi Ali about how many or most Middle East Muslims are raised with the kind of beliefs Mursi evinces.    Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center  and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.