PolicyWatch 2272
Featuring Michael Knights, James F. Jeffrey, and Aaron Y. Zelin
Watch video or read this summary on our website:
http://washin.st/1on8ctf
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On June 13, Michael Knights, James Jeffrey, and Aaron Zelin addressed a
Policy Forum at The Washington Institute. Knights, a Lafer Fellow with
the Institute, has worked extensively with local military and security
agencies throughout Iraq. Jeffrey is the Institute's Philip Solondz
Distinguished Visiting Fellow and former U.S. ambassador to Iraq. Zelin
is the Institute's Richard Borow Fellow and an expert on the jihadist
groups currently waging war in Iraq and Syria. The following is a
rapporteur's summary of their remarks.
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MICHAEL KNIGHTS
The battlefield in Iraq is evolving in two important ways. First, the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has attained great strategic
depth in terms of the distance that reconstituted Iraqi forces would
need to travel to retake key areas -- namely, 350 kilometers of
contested terrain from Baghdad north to Mosul. Yet the jihadist group's
east-west strategic depth is as small as 10-30 kilometers in places,
underlining the major role that Kurds could play. Key ISIS strongpoints
are within striking distance of Kurdish forces, making it vital to bring
them fully into this fight. Accordingly, Baghdad must offer the
Kurdistan Regional Government a solution on at least some of the
revenue-sharing and oil issues that have divided them. The Kurds are
already taking casualties now that the Iraqi army has abandoned certain
areas. They have also suffered depredations at the hands of radical
Islamists in the past, and will not tolerate a major ISIS control center
within an hour's drive of Erbil, the KRG's economic capital.
Second, the ISIS offensive has created an acute morale problem that must
be addressed. Around 60 of 243 Iraqi army combat battalions cannot be
accounted for, and all of their equipment is lost. It will be a mammoth
task to put these units back together and rearm them. The United States
will once again become the arsenal of democracy, but this time Iraq will
likely have to foot the bill rather than the U.S. taxpayer. Just as
important, the defeated army needs to be turned around. The Iraqis have
many military achievements from which to draw inspiration, particularly
the defeat of al-Qaeda in 2008, but regrouping will still be
tremendously difficult. This is where the United States can play a key
role. It would not take many American advisors, inserted at the
divisional level and above, to help Iraqi forces pick themselves up and
dust themselves off. The key is to take baby steps -- win small, easy
battles first to rebuild confidence for the larger battles farther
north.
Although introducing U.S. airpower into the conflict would not be a
silver bullet, there are many instances in which a little bit of it
could go a long way in facilitating Iraqi operations and boosting
morale. This effect was seen in parts of Libya, where French airstrikes
turned the military situation around. Air operations in Iraq would also
require a Joint Special Operations Task Force on the ground.
At this stage, it is not difficult to imagine Iraq going the same way as
Syria, with northwestern Iraq coming to resemble Raqqa, Syria, where
ISIS is in control perhaps semipermanently. And if Washington does not
give the Iraqi government sufficient backing, Baghdad could turn to
another country with a recent track record of protecting its allies:
Iran. The Islamic Republic and its Hezbollah proxy have demonstrated
their capabilities by bolstering the Assad regime in Syria. Some in the
Iraqi government believe they need to use the same formula that Assad
has, and maybe some of the same helpers as well -- namely, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps and Shiite militias.
Accordingly, the United States needs to make a credible gesture of
military support immediately. Although U.S. officials should play
hardball with the Iraqis about coming to a political reconciliation deal
between the country's various Arab and Kurdish factions, Washington
must still make a baseline determination about what is needed to
stabilize the current crisis. America must commit to the defense of
Iraq, not leave it for ISIS or the Iranians.
JAMES JEFFREY
Last September, President Obama told the UN General Assembly that four
critical issues would require all elements of U.S. power to address in
the near term: securing oil lines, combating terrorism, standing by our
allies, and weapons of mass destruction. The first three are in play in
Iraq right now. The largest-ever concentration of al-Qaeda-style
jihadists is now operating in western Iraq and Syria, with ISIS the
nastiest of the bunch. Oil prices are spiking, and although Iraq's oil
fields in the Kurdish north and Shiite deep south are not directly
threatened at the moment, grave instability elsewhere in the country and
political deadlock in Baghdad will greatly inhibit its vast hydrocarbon
potential. In short, U.S. interests are very much at stake, and speed
is of the essence.
Six issues will be particularly crucial in the next few days. First and
most important is whether ISIS -- which has already seized almost all of
Iraq's Sunni Arab areas -- will now carry out its threat to move on
Karbala, Najaf, and Baghdad. The group certainly has the capability to
do so. Given its longstanding presence in the mixed Sunni-Shiite areas
north and south of Baghdad, it could cut off the city. U.S. forces faced
a similar situation in summer 2004 when they were fighting al-Qaeda and
Shiite militias. Even with large numbers of troops and overwhelming
airpower, it was a very tough situation.
Alternatively, if ISIS decides to stay where it is, a classic
counterinsurgency will likely unfold. In that scenario, American troops
would not liberate the Sunni areas of Iraq -- the Kurds, Sunnis, and
Shiites would have to do so, or nobody. In theory, Washington could
provide logistics, training, and overwhelming firepower for that fight,
but it is unlikely to do so, nor should it. If the Iraqis will not fight
for their own country, America should not get involved. Yet President
Obama would face a very different decision if ISIS pushes toward
Baghdad.
Second, can the largely Shiite Iraqi army and Shiite militias hold
together? If they can maintain their cohesion, use their vastly superior
firepower and numbers effectively, and hold the territory where their
families live, Washington will not have to worry about ISIS besieging
Baghdad -- the Iraqis will be able to push the group back themselves and
keep the roads open. It will be messy, but they can do it. Their
ability to hold together sufficiently is still a big if, however.
Alternatively, if ISIS is able to reach Baghdad, Iraqi forces are strong
enough to avoid being overrun but may be unable to maneuver, use
firepower, or coordinate effectively, resulting in a de facto siege.
Third, the Kurds are now sitting on a new "Green Line," the boundary
demarcating their region of Iraq. They have two choices depending on how
events turn out: they can push ISIS back by exerting their considerable
military pressure on the group, or sit back and witness the potential
disintegration of Iraq, Iranian domination in the south, and a jihadist
threat at their doorstep.
Fourth, if Baghdad or other cities important to Shia Islam are besieged
and no other party intervenes, it is difficult to imagine Iran not
acting. The consequences of the Sunni-Shiite Gotterdammerung that could
emerge from such intervention are beyond calculation.
Fifth, Turkey is in a very awkward position given that eighty of its
citizens are hostages in Mosul, including its entire consulate. Yet the
Turks still have major military capabilities and very close ties with
the Kurds, so the possibility of their involvement cannot be discounted.
Sixth, the nature of the U.S. response will be crucial. The president
gave a somewhat mixed message in his June 13 remarks, pledging to first
consult with Congress about his options. While he ruled out ground
forces, what he meant were major ground forces, not forward
air-controller teams or trainers, for example. In fact, some military
advisors are already on the ground. As for airstrikes, the president did
not make a commitment one way or the other. Whatever the case, if ISIS
advances on Baghdad, potentially drawing in Iran, the United States will
need to act quickly. The president would also be wise to use the
prospect of U.S. intervention as leverage to push for an inter-Iraqi
political deal. Yet Washington has failed to get that deal done despite
four years of trying, so if the president intends to keep U.S. planes
grounded until reconciliation is achieved even as ISIS moves forward,
then other actors will shape the playing field.
AARON ZELIN
The ISIS takeover of Mosul did not come out of nowhere. The group has
been reemerging since April 2013, when it officially broke away from
al-Qaeda and began expanding from Iraq into Syria. While the 2008 U.S.
surge and Iraqi sahwa (awakening) movement pushed ISIS back, it was not
defeated. Because of its new operational space in Syria, it acquired new
manpower and resources to pour southward, and foreign jihadists who
originally came to fight in Syria have been deploying to Iraq for about
six months. Since April 2013, the rate of violence in Iraq has been
three-and-a-half times higher than in the previous four-and-a-half
years. ISIS has gained additional manpower from jailbreaks, such as the
estimated 500 prisoners who escaped from Abu Ghraib last July. Many were
veterans of the fight against the surge/sahwa, and their experience has
raised the competency level of ISIS operations, as seen in this year's
takeover of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi.
Another new ISIS tactic is the use of hearts-and-minds strategies to
make itself more acceptable to locals. To be sure, ISIS views the
territory it has seized in Iraq and Syria as part of its "Islamic
state," forcing residents to pledge bayat (allegiance) or suffer the
consequences. On June 15, it released a charter in Mosul detailing new
rules and punishments (e.g., the obligation to pray five times a day)
and declaring that it would destroy shrines and graves that it considers
polytheistic. In fact, the group has already provided a case study for
such behavior via its rule in Raqqa, Syria, where it began by putting up
billboards highlighting pietistic themes. At the same time, however, it
reached out to notable tribal figures to stave off a popular backlash.
ISIS also has a highly sophisticated bureaucracy: it operates sharia
courts, carries out public works, provides religious schooling and
services such as food kitchens, and maintains a vigilante force. Parts
of Iraq may soon look like this as well.
Going forward, ISIS will likely consolidate its strength using the
estimated $425 million it seized from Mosul's central bank, buying
people off and reinforcing the Syrian front. Even so, key questions
remain regarding its capabilities. First, is the group stretched too
thin? ISIS has around 7,000-10,000 members, but they are now spread out
from the Aleppo countryside to Mosul. Can they hold that much territory,
particularly when so many locals resent them? Tribal leaders in Ramadi
and Mosul have stated that they intend to resist the jihadists.
These questions aside, the group's Islamic state is already a reality.
ISIS members can now readily crisscross provinces within this "state,"
which could make it difficult to completely dislodge them from Iraq and
Syria or prevent them from consolidating control. Meanwhile, steady
victories are raising the group's prestige and attracting more foreign
fighters. ISIS is a sophisticated and well-organized force, and it will
be much more difficult to dislodge than any previous movement.
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This summary was prepared by Kelsey Segawa.
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