JCPA
1. Wouldn't American troops, or even a NATO contingent,
perform better than UN forces? Americans won't run like the UN
soldiers if they are fired upon.
The Jerusalem Center video on international forces actually
addresses a number of scenarios, from UN forces to Western units and
even the deployment of a U.S. contingent. Clearly a UN force is the
weakest in the minds of Israelis. But Western military units have also
posed problems for Israelis who want a force they can rely on.
For example, after the Second Lebanon War in 2006, UNIFIL
was reinforced with Western military units and officers, making it
closer in composition to a NATO force. The idea was to deploy more
reliable forces than those that had been deployed in southern Lebanon
previously. However, these European units, which continue to patrol
southern Lebanon today, have not prevented Hizbullah from rearming.
The video also refers to the deployment of multinational forces
in Beirut in 1983, which included British, French, Italian, and U.S.
units. Hizbullah targeted the U.S. and French headquarters of this
force on October 23, 1983, with two truck bombs; the Americans and the
French withdrew their forces from Lebanon within six months. What this
case shows is that terrorist organizations seek to target Western
military forces in order to break the will of the state that dispatched
them and cause them to withdraw from the Middle East.
In another pertinent example: al-Qaeda struck in Madrid,
Spain, in 2004, and in doing so got the Spanish government to withdraw
from Iraq. In other words, it is not only UN forces that are
unreliable, but NATO forces as well.
As for the issue of U.S. troops in particular, Israel has been
extremely reluctant to ask the United States to risk the lives of its
troops for Israel’s defense. Israel is proud of the fact that it was
never like West Germany and South Korea in the Cold War, where the
United States put its forces on the front lines for their defense. If
Israel were to alter that dynamic, the U.S.-Israel relationship would
fundamentally change. Israel wants to defend itself by itself.
2. Israel has signed peace agreements with Egypt and
Jordan. The Iraqi military is no longer a threat. Isn't the Israeli
demand to retain control of the Jordan Valley based on an outdated
threat assessment?
True, Jordan is not a threat to Israel, and the two
countries have a peace treaty dating back to 1994. But no one can
predict what will happen to the Middle East in three or five years from
now. In any event, Jordan never posed a primary strategic problem for
Israel. In fact, Israel’s real concern was the states to Jordan’s east
and north that have sought to use Jordanian territory as a platform for
attacking Israel. The Iraqi-Jordanian border is only 210 miles from
the Jordan River – about as far apart as New York and Washington, D.C.
In 1948 and 1967, Iraqi ground forces passed through Jordan on
their way to attack Israel. In 1973, an Iraqi expeditionary army
crossed Syria and engaged Israel on the Golan Heights. Israel must not
base its defense concept on a snapshot of its present security
problems, but rather it must take into account that the threats of the
past could return, once the instability of the Arab Spring passes.
Granted, today the conventional threat to Israel has
diminished, for now, but there is a growing terrorist threat that must
be addressed. Iran is actively seeking to convert Iraq into a satellite
state. Iran has imported Hizbullah units from Lebanon in order to
train Iraqi Shia militias. Israel must take into account this Hizbullah
challenge to the east in upcoming years. It is difficult to predict
what will happen to the militias currently fighting in Syria, but
Israel would be short-sighted if it ignored the threat of al-Qaeda
elements, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, operating against it from the east.
If Israel withdraws its military from the Jordan Valley,
terrorist groups will increase their efforts to smuggle advanced weapons
through the area in order to reinforce Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the
West Bank. Without the Israeli army presence to stop them, the Jordan
Valley could become a new "Philadelphi Route" – the corridor along the
Gaza-Sinai border through which missiles and other weaponry have been
smuggled. The Jordanian army will try to thwart these operations from
its territory, but with a new vacuum emerging in the Jordan Valley
after an Israeli withdrawal, Jordan would have a difficult time dealing
with the massive increase in smuggling activity.
It’s not only Islamist sympathizers who will participate in
weapons smuggling, but anybody who is looking to profit from arms
sales. If Israel were to pull out of the Jordan Valley, then many of
the weapons that are now present in the Gaza Strip, such as
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, would make their way into the
West Bank.
3. How relevant is controlling territory, given that
the main threats facing Israel today are asymmetrical in nature –
i.e., terrorist groups and guerrilla warfare, or from missiles that can
fly over any strategic terrain?
Conventional armies still play the decisive role in winning
wars in modern times. The United States only defeated Saddam Hussein
in 1991 and 2003 when its armies moved into Iraq, not by the bombing of
Iraqi targets with cruise missiles.
Israeli forces have been deployed in the Jordan Valley with
the idea that a small Israeli standing force can use the steep terrain
in order to hold off an invading army while Israel's reserve forces are
being mobilized. If Israel is faced with ballistic missile attacks,
the IDF reserves will take longer to mobilize, and the small standing
force on the front lines would have to fight for an extended period of
time without reinforcements. Advantageous terrain would be vital for
such a defensive campaign. Therefore, even in the missile era, Israel
still requires the Jordan Valley for its defense, should it face a
restoration of the conventional military threat to the east.
4. If Israel retains control of the Jordan Valley, how is a two-state solution possible?
Israel has been seeking ways to protect its vital security
interests while at the same time still allowing for a political
solution. For that reason, Israel has spoken about deploying Israeli
forces in the Jordan Valley without necessarily demanding Israeli
sovereignty in the area. Many countries accept foreign forces in their
midst, such as Germany, where U.S. forces are deployed to this day.
With creativity at the negotiating table, Israel and the Palestinians
can reach an agreement that addresses their political needs, while
leaving Israel secure.
5. I thought that al-Qaeda operates in Pakistan or in
Yemen, but does it actually have a presence in Gaza, as the video
asserts? How likely is al-Qaeda to become a factor in Israel’s
security?
Back on February 26, 2008, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas told the Arabic daily al-Hayat
that al-Qaeda was present in Gaza. One such al-Qaeda affiliate in Gaza
is Jaish al-Islam which, the Egyptians charged, was involved in a
January 2011 attack on a Coptic Church in Alexandria. Letters found by
the Navy SEAL team that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan,
revealed that Jaish al-Islam was in fact in communication with the
al-Qaeda leadership since 2006.
The main al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, has published a book entitled Regional War Strategy for the Land of the Levant.
The book clearly states that the organization is not focused on Syria
alone: “Syria is the key to a change on the Arab world and afterwards
the Islamic world.”
- See more at: http://jcpa.org/faq_why-israel-opposes-international-forces-in-the-jordan-valley/#sthash.VKaESfgM.dpuf
1. Wouldn't American troops, or even a NATO contingent,
perform better than UN forces? Americans won't run like the UN soldiers if they
are fired upon.
The Jerusalem Center video on international forces actually addresses a number
of scenarios, from UN forces to Western units and even the deployment of a U.S.
contingent. Clearly a UN force is the weakest in the minds of Israelis. But
Western military units have also posed problems for Israelis who want a force
they can rely on.
For example, after the Second Lebanon War in 2006, UNIFIL was reinforced with
Western military units and officers, making it closer in composition to a NATO
force. The idea was to deploy more reliable forces than those that had been
deployed in southern Lebanon previously. However, these European units, which
continue to patrol southern Lebanon today, have not prevented Hizbullah from
rearming.
The video also refers to the deployment of multinational forces in Beirut in
1983, which included British, French, Italian, and U.S. units. Hizbullah
targeted the U.S. and French headquarters of this force on October 23, 1983,
with two truck bombs; the Americans and the French withdrew their forces from
Lebanon within six months. What this case shows is that terrorist organizations
seek to target Western military forces in order to break the will of the state
that dispatched them and cause them to withdraw from the Middle East.
In another pertinent example: al-Qaeda struck in Madrid, Spain, in 2004, and in
doing so got the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq. In other words, it
is not only UN forces that are unreliable, but NATO forces as well.
As for the issue of U.S. troops in particular, Israel has been extremely
reluctant to ask the United States to risk the lives of its troops for Israel’s
defense. Israel is proud of the fact that it was never like West Germany and
South Korea in the Cold War, where the United States put its forces on the
front lines for their defense. If Israel were to alter that dynamic, the
U.S.-Israel relationship would fundamentally change. Israel wants to defend
itself by itself.
