A
ceasefire ending this round of the Hamas-Israel fighting went into
effect at 9 PM local time, November 21, 2012. There were reports—still
unconfirmed—of more rockets being fired from Gaza at Israel after the
ceasefire was to be implemented. Hamas immediately claimed victory.
The
brief agreement provides that both sides will stop all hostilities. For
Israel, that included the targeted killings of terrorists and Hamas
leaders. For the Palestinian side, the phrase, “All Palestinian
factions,” was used. That means the Hamas regime is responsible for any
attacks by Islamic Jihad, al-Qaida affiliates, and other small Salafist
groups. According to the text, at least, Hamas cannot hide behind
allowing or encouraging such groups to attack and then disclaiming
responsibility.
Another
provision is that Israel will reopen the crossings and let people (a
small number of Gazans seeking medical attention in Israel) and supplies
to return to normal levels.
Egypt—not the United States, which isn’t mentioned in the agreement--is the sponsor of the ceasefire.
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On
Hamas's side, the decision to reach a ceasefire was motivated by the
damage the organization was suffering and fear of a massive Israeli
ground attack. Perhaps most important, however, was that Hamas found it
was not receiving strong support from Egypt and other states, especially
because Cairo is now ruled by a Muslim Brotherhood government. Hamas is
an independent branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Apparently,
Hamas did not consult with Egypt before escalating attacks against
Israel, the factor that set off large-scale Israeli retaliation. In
turn, Egypt, along with Qatar, the Hamas regime's main Arab funder,
pressured the regime to stop the fighting.
The
timing for a crisis could not be worse for the new Egyptian regime. It
has not yet tamed its army, finished writing its constitution, or
established the legitimacy of the parliament it dominates. At the
precise time the war started, the Egyptian government was completing
negotiations that can be expected to bring it almost $10 billion in aid
from the European Union, International Monetary Fund, and United
States.
Whatever
Egypt does in future, it does not want trouble from Israel at present.
Israel had also earlier reassured the Cairo regime that it would support
an amendment in their thirty-year-old peace treaty that would allow
Egypt to station more troops in the eastern Sinai. The number wouldn't
be enough to threaten Israel but enough to help control the Salafist
groups there that have targeted Israel several times in cross-border
raids. That is, if Egypt wants to stop them from doing so. At any rate,
Egypt faces attacks on itself from some of these groups as well.
Israel's
motives included ending attacks on its civilian population which caused
few fatalities but had a tremendously disrupting psychological and
economic effect. The truth is that Israel's population, while
overwhelmingly supporting the war, evinced more fear about the attacks
than in earlier conflicts. The ability of Hamas to fire missiles toward
Tel Aviv and Jerusalem--though this was partly a bluff since these
missiles were almost emptied of explosives to get a longer range--set
off concerns, especially in Tel Aviv. The Iron Dome system worked very
well in shooting down a high percentage of the rockets outside the far
south.
But
Israel was also affected by international, and especially U.S.,
pressure to reach a ceasefire and avoid a ground attack. Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu wants to develop the best possible relationship with
newly reelected President Barack Obama, with whom he will probably be
dealing with--assuming Netanyahu's reelection on January 22--for the
next four years. Equally important was that Israeli leaders--and public
opinion generally agrees--know that a temporary ceasefire is the best
outcome that can be obtained. A very large portion of Hamas's weapons,
especially longer-range missiles, has been destroyed and it will take
Hamas time to rebuild. While people can come up with ideal
solutions in their heads the problem is that Israel does not want to
return to rule the Gaza Strip (which would involve armed battles almost
daily) and does not have international support for overthrowing Hamas.
In
a reasonable world, the international community would support, even
join, in bringing down the current regime and replacing it with the
Palestinian Authority. After all, Hamas staged an armed coup and chased
out its Fatah rivals, killing many of them brutally. It then openly
declared its intentions to commit genocide against Israel and Jews
generally; staged a constant series of terror attacks; forced out the
small Christian population; let al-Qaida affiliated groups operate; and
systematically taught children to grow up to be terrorists and suicide
bombers.
Instead,
however, the international community is determined to protect the
survival of the Hamas regime and the Palestinian Authority would not
take back rule over the Gaza Strip, either by its own efforts to
overthrow Hamas or at the hands of a victorious Israeli army. If the war
continued, some more Hamas leaders would be killed and munitions would
be destroyed. But that additional benefit would be limited. At the same
time, more civilians would be killed on both sides
and the relatively positive international support and mild media
criticism--by the usual standards, of course--would dissipate.
Of
course, everyone knows that this ceasefire won't last. The key to
anything more durable is if the Egyptian government decides that it
wants to avoid another war because of its own interests. In other words,
despite its hard line toward Israel, would the Brotherhood regime
decide that it wanted to consolidate its rule over Egypt--totally
transform the army; Islamize the society; and suppress Christians, women
and secularist--before taking on Israel. Can it create a repressive
regime and fight a
jihad simultaneously or does it need to take on these tasks one at a
time? By helping to broker the ceasefire, the Egyptian regime has also
won points with the Obama Administration that should bring it benefits
in future.
Thus, is the twisted situation characterizing contemporary Middle East politics and U.S. policy.
Barry
Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his
blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
Professor Barry Rubin, Director, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center http://www.gloria-center.org
The Rubin Report blog http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/
He is a featured columnist at PJM http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/.
Editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal http://www.gloria-center.org
Editor Turkish Studies,http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713636933%22
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