INSS Insight No. 480
The Syrian conflict has
long since descended into a protracted and bloody civil war, with the regime
and the diverse groups that comprise the opposition locked in a painful
stalemate, unable to tip the military balance of power in anyone’s favor. The
Geneva 2 negotiations, reportedly scheduled to take place in late November
2013, should be seen in light of this reality, underscoring the importance of
ending the conflict through a political deal. Indeed, the notion of renewing
the efforts launched in Geneva in June 2012 has gained additional traction in
the weeks following the US-Russia entente on Syria’s chemical weapons, with the
UN Security Council endorsing the implementation of the June 2012 plan in
Resolution 2128 on Syria’s chemical arsenal. But even with these renewed
international efforts, the challenges ahead are monumental.
Topics:
The Syrian conflict has long since
descended into a protracted and bloody civil war, with the regime and the
diverse groups that comprise the opposition locked in a painful stalemate,
unable to tip the military balance of power in anyone’s favor. The irony of the
situation is that given the deep internal polarization, the ever-elusive
military victory that all the warring parties seek cannot easily be translated
into a political solution. A meaningful victory that ensures a halt to
violence, preserves Syria’s territorial integrity, and reinstitutes a measure
of central control requires the main parties to make a political deal. At the
very minimum, such agreement must provide mutual security guarantees while ensuring some
degree of inclusion for all the main parties in a new political arrangement.
Representatives of the Syrian opposition in talks with the "London 11," October 22, 2013, Image Bank / Getty Images
The notion of renewing the efforts launched
in Geneva in June 2012 has gained additional traction in the weeks following
the US-Russia entente on Syria’s chemical weapons, with the UN Security Council
endorsing the implementation of the June 2012 plan in Resolution 2128 on
Syria’s chemical arsenal. But even with these renewed international efforts,
the challenges ahead are monumental.
First, with the parties lacking
mutual trust and perceiving the conflict in zero-sum terms, finding a common
denominator will prove extremely complicated. At the moment, the most basic,
minimum demand of the opposition – namely that Bashar al-Assad not take
part in the transitional government – goes beyond the realm of concessions
the regime is willing to make. The 2012 Geneva plan was deliberately ambiguous
on this crucial issue, calling for an arrangement based on “mutual consent” but
lacking specific reference to replace Bashar al-Assad, either as a precondition
or as a predetermined result of the talks. This ambiguous wording was itself
the result of a diplomatic bargain between the United States and Russia. Even
so, following the October 22, 2013 meeting between the National Coalition and the
“London 11,” [1] the
main international backers of the opposition openly supported the request by
the anti-Assad forces that neither Assad nor his closest allies be involved in
the interim government. Not surprisingly, this interpretation clashes with that
offered by Syrian government. Commenting on the Geneva 2 initiative, Syrian
Vice-Premier Qadri Jamil provided the regime’s take on the “transition
government clause” by emphasizing that "the key idea of the Geneva-2
conference is to create an expanded coalition government, which represents all
circles of the society."
Second, the current self-perceived
strength of the Syrian regime further complicates attempts to strike a deal.
Assad’s position has improved in the past weeks with increased international
acceptance, if not legitimacy, due to his cooperation with the Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Domestically, the regime is politically
stronger after averting an American military operation, and is benefitting from
both recent military victories on the ground as well as the ongoing infighting
within the opposition ranks. The Syrian regime can also still count on the
steadfast support of its international cheerleaders in Moscow and Tehran. In
this context, Assad is unlikely to soften his hard bargaining strategy with
respect to the opposition. Indeed, after hearing about the upcoming peace
talks, the Syrian President was quick to declare that he does not see how the
conference could succeed, while declaring that he sees “no obstacle” to running
again for office in the May 2014 presidential elections.
Third, the opposition displays a similar level of distrust toward
the regime: George Sabra, president of the Syrian National Council (SNC), one
of the main factions in the National Coalition, has stated that the SNC
does not want to participate in the Geneva 2 talks
and has threatened to leave the Coalition. The head of Free Syrian Army,
General Salim Idriss, also reportedly said, “We
support every political solution, but under one condition: Assad must be
brought before a court,” a precondition that is also unlikely to be met in
Geneva . In turn, the general level of skepticism and hesitancy of the
opposition –
already deflated after the threat of international military action
subsided and following the decline in US support – further complicates the political
process.
This
is especially the case since the National Coalition,
while being the main internationally recognized political representative of the
Syrian opposition, has been experiencing both internal tensions as well as a
decline in its grass roots support. Indeed, within Syria, infighting between
opposition groups has increased, while in the past few weeks prominent
anti-Assad groups from the Salafi camp have openly denounced the Coalition and
denied its role as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. Moreover,
on the battlefield the Free Syrian Army has long stopped being the main
military challenger of the Assad regime, with competing groups from the
jihadist and Salafist camp gaining in terms of both military victories and
territorial and political control of the liberated areas.
The current divisions undermine the chances of a political
solution because they make the opposition even more wary about making
concessions, while also raising doubts about whether the National Coalition has
the power to implement a political deal and guarantee that other factions uphold
it.
Fourth, in order to succeed, the Geneva 2 talks need the
international community to coordinate policy. Specifically, a united
international community would require both Iran and Saudi Arabia to accept the
political process and play a positive role in pushing both sides to make
concessions. At the moment, while Russia and the United Nations
envoy on Syria Lakhdar Barhimi have invited Tehran to Geneva, the Saudis have
been ambivalent over the notion of having Iran sitting at the table in Geneva. Coordination
and unity of purpose is also lacking when it comes to the external players
supporting the Syrian opposition, and this is even more the case considering
the Saudi-American fallout over Syria.
When
taking these challenges into consideration, it is clear that the odds are not
in Geneva 2’s favor. Furthermore, the weeks preceding the negotiations may lead
to an escalation in the level of violence within Syria as both parties try to
improve their military position to increase their bargaining power in Geneva.
Given this grim prospect, the international community should unite and put
significant diplomatic and political pressure on all parties to find a
compromise – an
option as desirable as it is improbable.
________________________________________
[1] This group includes the core “Friends of Syria”
supporters: Britain, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States.
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