http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iGUnE_kKbQjDn1j5BLwIytAygrbQ
RAMALLAH, West Bank (AFP) — A new Palestinian government, again headed by Western-backed Salam Fayyad, was sworn in on Tuesday.
The new cabinet took the oath of office at the Palestinian Authority (PA) headquarters in the West Bank town of Ramallah.
Ten of the 23 ministers are Fatah members and the remainder belong to other groups, but none to Hamas, which said it would not recognise the new government. The ceremony came a day after the secular Fatah faction of Western-backed Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas and the rival Hamas adjourned a fifth round of talks in Egypt without agreeing on a unity deal.
The US-educated Fayyad announced on March 7 that he had submitted his resignation to pave the way for a "national consensus" between Fatah and Hamas.
The rival factions have been at loggerheads since Hamas forces ousted Abbas loyalists from the Gaza Strip in June 2007.
Since then, the Iranian-backed Hamas has run the Gaza Strip and the secular Abbas has been in charge of the West Bank.
Hamas on Tuesday accused Abbas of "deliberately sabotaging the Palestinian dialogue."
"This government is illegal and we will not recognise it," Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhum said in a statement.
Agreement between the two Palestinian factions is vital for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, devastated by Israel's 22-day offensive in December and January that killed more than 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis.
International donor countries pledged 4.5 billion dollars to the Palestinian Authority at a conference in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh in March, much of it for the reconstruction of Gaza.
But many donor countries refuse to channel their funds via Hamas, insisting the PA must supervise the spending.
Hamas swept Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006 and formed a government two months later, but the cabinet was boycotted by Israel and the West over the group's refusal to renounce violence and recognise Israel and past peace deals.
Tensions between Hamas and Fatah grew for months afterwards, often erupting into violent clashes, but the two sides managed to form a unity government in March 2007 after Saudi mediation.
That cabinet was short-lived however.
In June 2007, the tensions erupted into Gaza street clashes that saw unprecedented violence between the two factions and ended with Hamas in control of the impoverished territory of 1.5 million people.
Abbas then formed a new cabinet with Fayyad at the helm in July 2007.
Tuesday's swearing in ceremony was delayed by one hour amid internal disagreements as two Fatah deputies refused to join the cabinet. Fatah's parliamentary faction complained it had not been consulted over the formation of the government.
Fayyad is a former World Bank and International Monetary Fund employee who won accolades in the West for his anti-corruption measures during his stint as Palestinian finance minister between 2002 and 2005.
A fluent English speaker, Fayyad is a firm believer in the principles of transparency and accountability whom Israel's liberal Haaretz newspaper once dubbed "everyone's favourite Palestinian."
Riyad al-Malki will retain the foreign affairs portfolio in the new cabinet, and four ministries, including tourism and education, will be headed by women.
Copyright © 2009 AFP. All rights reserved
Aggie Comment: The term of Abbas as PM expired in Jan 2009. He says PA's Basic Law allows him to stay in power for another year. He has now formed a new govt--based on what? Has anyone read reports on any new parlimentary elections being held? Is this an entity that can be legally recognized to negotiate a peace agreement with Israel?
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
MK Eldad: U.S. Selling Us Down the River
Gil Ronen
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/131431
Published: 05/18/09
(IsraelNN.com) MK Aryeh Eldad (National Union party) said following the meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu that Israel has true cause for concern, because the U.S. is shaking off its historic commitment to vouch for Israel’s security. “Defining a deadline-free negotiating process vis-à-vis Iran means, in practice, that the U.S. is willing to accept a nuclear Iran and that Israel remains alone facing Iran,” Eldad said.
“Israel will have no choice but to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities with all the means at its disposal, be the price what it may be,” Eldad concluded.
MK Ophir Akunis, head of the Likud’s Media Responses Team, said that the predictions of a tense meeting between Obama and Netannyahu have proven untrue. “The Obama-Netanyahu meeting proved again the power of the deep bond between the U.S. and Israel,” he said.
MK Danny Danon (Likud) said that the Prime Minister deserves praise for standing firm in the face of pressures exerted upon him in the past weeks.
MK Ze’ev Boim (Kadima) said after the meeting, “It is too bad that the Number One expert in Israel on understanding American political culture stumbled when he tried to lure President Obama with meaningless verbiage.” Netanyahu “missed an opportunity to create real relations of trust, just as he is about to miss the historic opportunity mentioned by the President,” Boim added.
“Bibi should have known that verbal acrobatics will not persuade the President and it would have been better if he had arrived with a thought-out plan for dealing with the Palestinian issue in order to achieve American support for Israel’s approach on Iran,” Boim said.
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/131431
Published: 05/18/09
(IsraelNN.com) MK Aryeh Eldad (National Union party) said following the meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu that Israel has true cause for concern, because the U.S. is shaking off its historic commitment to vouch for Israel’s security. “Defining a deadline-free negotiating process vis-à-vis Iran means, in practice, that the U.S. is willing to accept a nuclear Iran and that Israel remains alone facing Iran,” Eldad said.
“Israel will have no choice but to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities with all the means at its disposal, be the price what it may be,” Eldad concluded.
MK Ophir Akunis, head of the Likud’s Media Responses Team, said that the predictions of a tense meeting between Obama and Netannyahu have proven untrue. “The Obama-Netanyahu meeting proved again the power of the deep bond between the U.S. and Israel,” he said.
MK Danny Danon (Likud) said that the Prime Minister deserves praise for standing firm in the face of pressures exerted upon him in the past weeks.
MK Ze’ev Boim (Kadima) said after the meeting, “It is too bad that the Number One expert in Israel on understanding American political culture stumbled when he tried to lure President Obama with meaningless verbiage.” Netanyahu “missed an opportunity to create real relations of trust, just as he is about to miss the historic opportunity mentioned by the President,” Boim added.
“Bibi should have known that verbal acrobatics will not persuade the President and it would have been better if he had arrived with a thought-out plan for dealing with the Palestinian issue in order to achieve American support for Israel’s approach on Iran,” Boim said.
Hamas sees "signals" Obama will talk to them
Why not? He doesn't seem to have any problem with them in government. "Hamas sees 'signals' Obama will talk: Islamist group believes president changing Mideast policy," By Aaron Klein for WorldNetDaily, May 19 (thanks to Maria): Hamas is hopeful President Obama will open dialogue with the Islamist group in spite of congressional restrictions on such talks, Ahmed Yousef, Hamas' chief political adviser in Gaza, told WND in an exclusive interview today.
Yousef, speaking from Gaza one day after Obama met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, said he believes Obama intends to "change" American policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
He called Obama a "smart and decent man."
"Obama will show some kind of a change of U.S. policy toward the region and toward the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. I do believe that he is still assessing the situation and is preparing for a (new) policy. He will meet with everyone in the region, and he will be crystal clear about his policy toward the peace process," Yousef said.
Yousef's comments were contrary to a well-circulated statement from a Hamas spokesman, Fawzi Barhoum, who was quoted by Israeli radio saying the goal of Obama's stance during his meeting with Netanyahu yesterday was to "mislead global public opinion and to ensure the continuation of Israel's existence as a racist state."
Yousef told WND he himself is a member of the Hamas government but that "you may here different statements coming from different people."
Asked if he believed Obama intends to open dialogue with Hamas, Yousef replied, "Yeah. Actually, there is (sic) signals."
"Yeah, I do believe this will take time," he said. "This is not an easy job since there is a restriction from the Congress, and there are laws and regulations that are preventing taking action without solving things with the Congress.
"So I know that he might himself believe that engaging with Hamas will help put an end to the conflict and also to enhance the American image all over the Arab and Muslim countries," Yousef said. "Hamas is the answer if Americans are serious about its image in the Arab and Muslim world."
Yousef said he expects Obama will make "strong statements" toward the Muslim world during a major address from Egypt next month.
"He will meet next month with the Egyptians, and I do believe he also will have a strong statement in Egypt and explain American attitudes," said Yousef.
A White House spokesman did not immediately return a call seeking comment on Yousef's remarks.
Hamas' official charter calls for the murder of Jews and the destruction of Israel. The Islamist group is responsible for scores of suicide bombings, shootings and rocket attacks aimed at Jewish civilians.
In March, it was reported a group of former senior American officials and one current top adviser to the Obama administration had petitioned the U.S. president to open talks with Hamas, believing the group can be part of the Palestinian peace process.
Paul Volcker, a former Federal Reserve chairman who was selected by Obama to head the president's new economic recovery advisory board, reportedly signed a letter advocating dialogue with Hamas. The letter was also signed by nine other Washington veterans, according to the Boston Globe.
Other signatories include Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President George H.W. Bush, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was President Jimmy Carter's security adviser. Brzezinski's pro-Hamas views have been aired publicly in newspaper opinion pieces and policy speeches.
"I see no reason not to talk to Hamas," Scowcroft told the Globe.
"The main gist (of the letter) is that you need to push hard on the Palestinian peace process," Scowcroft said. "Don't move it to the end of your agenda and say you have too much to do. And the U.S. needs to have a position, not just hold their coats while they sit down."
Also reportedly signing the letter were former House International Relations Committee chairman Lee Hamilton; former United Nations ambassador Thomas Pickering; former World Bank president James Wolfensohn; former U.S. trade representative Carla Hills; Theodore Sorensen, former special counsel to President John F. Kennedy; and former Republican Sens. Chuck Hagel and Nancy Kassebaum Baker.
Also in March, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the U.S. wants to work with all involved parties to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but she insisted Hamas must first abide by the preconditions for such talks.
"We are looking to work with all of the parties to try to help them make progress toward a negotiated agreement that would end the conflict," Clinton told reporters during a joint news conference with U.S. envoy to the Middle East George Mitchell.
"Hamas knows the conditions," she said. "They must renounce violence, they must recognize Israel, they must agree to abide by prior agreements."
"We are not able to look into the future to see whether there will be changes on the part of Hamas that [would] meet our conditions but, you know, certainly that would be a clear path for them to follow," Clinton added.
Comment: Legitimizing terrorists does not end terror-but the "smart guys" in the Obama administration know best-they completely refute what is known about terrorists-may G-D help us all.
Yousef, speaking from Gaza one day after Obama met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, said he believes Obama intends to "change" American policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
He called Obama a "smart and decent man."
"Obama will show some kind of a change of U.S. policy toward the region and toward the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. I do believe that he is still assessing the situation and is preparing for a (new) policy. He will meet with everyone in the region, and he will be crystal clear about his policy toward the peace process," Yousef said.
Yousef's comments were contrary to a well-circulated statement from a Hamas spokesman, Fawzi Barhoum, who was quoted by Israeli radio saying the goal of Obama's stance during his meeting with Netanyahu yesterday was to "mislead global public opinion and to ensure the continuation of Israel's existence as a racist state."
Yousef told WND he himself is a member of the Hamas government but that "you may here different statements coming from different people."
Asked if he believed Obama intends to open dialogue with Hamas, Yousef replied, "Yeah. Actually, there is (sic) signals."
"Yeah, I do believe this will take time," he said. "This is not an easy job since there is a restriction from the Congress, and there are laws and regulations that are preventing taking action without solving things with the Congress.
"So I know that he might himself believe that engaging with Hamas will help put an end to the conflict and also to enhance the American image all over the Arab and Muslim countries," Yousef said. "Hamas is the answer if Americans are serious about its image in the Arab and Muslim world."
Yousef said he expects Obama will make "strong statements" toward the Muslim world during a major address from Egypt next month.
"He will meet next month with the Egyptians, and I do believe he also will have a strong statement in Egypt and explain American attitudes," said Yousef.
A White House spokesman did not immediately return a call seeking comment on Yousef's remarks.
Hamas' official charter calls for the murder of Jews and the destruction of Israel. The Islamist group is responsible for scores of suicide bombings, shootings and rocket attacks aimed at Jewish civilians.
In March, it was reported a group of former senior American officials and one current top adviser to the Obama administration had petitioned the U.S. president to open talks with Hamas, believing the group can be part of the Palestinian peace process.
Paul Volcker, a former Federal Reserve chairman who was selected by Obama to head the president's new economic recovery advisory board, reportedly signed a letter advocating dialogue with Hamas. The letter was also signed by nine other Washington veterans, according to the Boston Globe.
Other signatories include Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President George H.W. Bush, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was President Jimmy Carter's security adviser. Brzezinski's pro-Hamas views have been aired publicly in newspaper opinion pieces and policy speeches.
"I see no reason not to talk to Hamas," Scowcroft told the Globe.
"The main gist (of the letter) is that you need to push hard on the Palestinian peace process," Scowcroft said. "Don't move it to the end of your agenda and say you have too much to do. And the U.S. needs to have a position, not just hold their coats while they sit down."
Also reportedly signing the letter were former House International Relations Committee chairman Lee Hamilton; former United Nations ambassador Thomas Pickering; former World Bank president James Wolfensohn; former U.S. trade representative Carla Hills; Theodore Sorensen, former special counsel to President John F. Kennedy; and former Republican Sens. Chuck Hagel and Nancy Kassebaum Baker.
Also in March, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the U.S. wants to work with all involved parties to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but she insisted Hamas must first abide by the preconditions for such talks.
"We are looking to work with all of the parties to try to help them make progress toward a negotiated agreement that would end the conflict," Clinton told reporters during a joint news conference with U.S. envoy to the Middle East George Mitchell.
"Hamas knows the conditions," she said. "They must renounce violence, they must recognize Israel, they must agree to abide by prior agreements."
"We are not able to look into the future to see whether there will be changes on the part of Hamas that [would] meet our conditions but, you know, certainly that would be a clear path for them to follow," Clinton added.
Comment: Legitimizing terrorists does not end terror-but the "smart guys" in the Obama administration know best-they completely refute what is known about terrorists-may G-D help us all.
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Obama on Iran: Have you been reading your intelligence briefings?
RubinReports
http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2009/05/obama-on-iran-have-you-been-reading.html
18 May 2009 03:54 PM PDT
Here's what President Obama said about Iran:
"Their elections will be completed in June, and we are hopeful that, at that point, there is going to be a serious process of engagement, first through the P5-plus-one process that's already in place, potentially through additional direct talks between the United States and Iran." Well, the Spiritual Guide has instructed people not to vote for candidates who aren't anti-Western. He has his own guy named Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who doesn't strike me as the shrinking violet type.
The top Iranian leadership has made Ahmadinejad their candidate not because they are preparing for serious compromise or meaningful talks but precisely because they aren't.
So the question is whether engagement is going to be:
A. For show followed eventually by a tougher U.S. policy.
B. Because Obama seriously thinks it might work but after he gets nothing will understand things better.
C. Obama wants to pretend that his engagement policy is a big success and so will assert that great progress has been made even when it hasn't.
There are U.S. officials who hold each of these views.
I'm tempted to say that after June the Iranian regime is going to P5 all over the West and especially the Obama administration.
But I won't.
Is Anyone Going to Do Anything that Obama Asks?
Posted: 18 May 2009 03:37 PM PDT
Here's an interesting way to look at things: Nobody does what America asks them to do.
The Europeans turned President Obama down flat on all his requests.
Pakistan is only fighting the Taliban to the minimal extent needed to avoid being overthrown. It doesn't fight that hard to wipe out al-Qaida and the country's intelligence services are probably helping both these groups.
Iran doesn't stop building nuclear weapons.
Syria doesn't stop sending terrorists across into Iraq or other countries.
Arab states don't help very much with the peace process.
Israel isn't going to risk its existence if the White House says to do so.
And so on. What we see here is a limit on U.S. power. It is no doubt exacerbated when people don't take the United States seriously as a tough, determined country. Even when the United States does act this way, they doubt its staying power.
One lesson is that multilateralism is not a magic wand for solving problems.
Another is that after you apologize for past use of power and leadership, insist you're going to listen to what everyone else wants, and put a priority on conciliating your enemies, other countries are not inclined to follow your lead.
In other words, Obama has been sabotaging his own effectiveness.
President Teddy Roosevelt memorably said, "Speak softly and carry a big stick." And he got the Panama Canal built and earned a Nobel Peace Prize for mediating an end to the Russo-Japanese war.
He didn't say, "Speak softly and apologize a lot."
Can the Obama administration even succeed in a very small, specific task, say to reform the UN human rights' committee?
On the other hand, though, how much can everyone want to play by Politically Correct rules when they look at Sri Lanka. The government finally defeated a long insurgency by taking off the gloves, launching a major offensive, ignoring civilian casualties, and following through--without foreign interference--to victory.
Countries wanting U.S. and European support aren't allowed to do things that way. Enemies are, or in the Sri Lankan case, countries that fall off the radar. We saw the same thing with the Algerian defeat of the Islamist insurgency there.
Contrary to what many think, we did not see that kind of thing in Israel's defensive wars against Hizballah in 2006 or Hamas in 2009. That's not all due to U.S. policy, of course, but these distinctions should be kept in mind.
As for the current U.S. government, the difference between domestic and foreign policies is that the government controls a lot more variables in the former category. No matter how much the "beautiful people" love Obama at home (and say they do so in Europe), doesn't make him more effective internationally.
http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2009/05/obama-on-iran-have-you-been-reading.html
18 May 2009 03:54 PM PDT
Here's what President Obama said about Iran:
"Their elections will be completed in June, and we are hopeful that, at that point, there is going to be a serious process of engagement, first through the P5-plus-one process that's already in place, potentially through additional direct talks between the United States and Iran." Well, the Spiritual Guide has instructed people not to vote for candidates who aren't anti-Western. He has his own guy named Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who doesn't strike me as the shrinking violet type.
The top Iranian leadership has made Ahmadinejad their candidate not because they are preparing for serious compromise or meaningful talks but precisely because they aren't.
So the question is whether engagement is going to be:
A. For show followed eventually by a tougher U.S. policy.
B. Because Obama seriously thinks it might work but after he gets nothing will understand things better.
C. Obama wants to pretend that his engagement policy is a big success and so will assert that great progress has been made even when it hasn't.
There are U.S. officials who hold each of these views.
I'm tempted to say that after June the Iranian regime is going to P5 all over the West and especially the Obama administration.
But I won't.
Is Anyone Going to Do Anything that Obama Asks?
Posted: 18 May 2009 03:37 PM PDT
Here's an interesting way to look at things: Nobody does what America asks them to do.
The Europeans turned President Obama down flat on all his requests.
Pakistan is only fighting the Taliban to the minimal extent needed to avoid being overthrown. It doesn't fight that hard to wipe out al-Qaida and the country's intelligence services are probably helping both these groups.
Iran doesn't stop building nuclear weapons.
Syria doesn't stop sending terrorists across into Iraq or other countries.
Arab states don't help very much with the peace process.
Israel isn't going to risk its existence if the White House says to do so.
And so on. What we see here is a limit on U.S. power. It is no doubt exacerbated when people don't take the United States seriously as a tough, determined country. Even when the United States does act this way, they doubt its staying power.
One lesson is that multilateralism is not a magic wand for solving problems.
Another is that after you apologize for past use of power and leadership, insist you're going to listen to what everyone else wants, and put a priority on conciliating your enemies, other countries are not inclined to follow your lead.
In other words, Obama has been sabotaging his own effectiveness.
President Teddy Roosevelt memorably said, "Speak softly and carry a big stick." And he got the Panama Canal built and earned a Nobel Peace Prize for mediating an end to the Russo-Japanese war.
He didn't say, "Speak softly and apologize a lot."
Can the Obama administration even succeed in a very small, specific task, say to reform the UN human rights' committee?
On the other hand, though, how much can everyone want to play by Politically Correct rules when they look at Sri Lanka. The government finally defeated a long insurgency by taking off the gloves, launching a major offensive, ignoring civilian casualties, and following through--without foreign interference--to victory.
Countries wanting U.S. and European support aren't allowed to do things that way. Enemies are, or in the Sri Lankan case, countries that fall off the radar. We saw the same thing with the Algerian defeat of the Islamist insurgency there.
Contrary to what many think, we did not see that kind of thing in Israel's defensive wars against Hizballah in 2006 or Hamas in 2009. That's not all due to U.S. policy, of course, but these distinctions should be kept in mind.
As for the current U.S. government, the difference between domestic and foreign policies is that the government controls a lot more variables in the former category. No matter how much the "beautiful people" love Obama at home (and say they do so in Europe), doesn't make him more effective internationally.
Shamrak's Insights
The Pope's Visit - Persistence of Bigotry
Although the pontiff has denounced anti-Semitism and said the Holocaust should never be forgotten, he failed to ask forgiveness for the Holocaust at the Yad Vashem memorial to the victims of the Nazi genocide. Parliamentary Speaker Reuven Rivlen was equally critical, saying he did not attend the Yad Vashem ceremony "just to hear historic descriptions or the fact that the Holocaust took place. I came as a Jew wishing to hear a request for forgiveness from those who caused our tragedy, and these include the Germans and the Church, but regretfully, I heard nothing of this." "All you had to do was to express regret. That's all we wanted to hear," wrote a columnist Hanoch Daum.
It was expected that the first visit by Pope Benedict would ease Jewish anger over Pope's decision in January to overturn the excommunication of a Holocaust-denying bishop. Jewish leaders are upset at the speech's failure to mention the toll of Jews in the Holocaust. The Pope referred to "millions" rather than six million and used the word "killed" rather than murdered. A Yad Vashem official, Avner Shalev, said "this is certainly no historical landmark".
Israeli historian Tom Segev wrote: "There is nothing easier than expressing real horror when talking about the Holocaust than identifying with its suffering, pain and grief. If that is not done, it is a sign there was a deliberate decision not to do so." (But from the moment Pope Benedict stepped onto Jewish soil his message was quite deliberate and disrespectful toward Israel, calling for the creation of a new state on Jewish land for the fake nation: "both peoples may live in peace in a homeland of their own". Later, he failed to condemn or confess the criminal silence and complicity of the Church and Christians in Holocaust!)
Enemies Must Leave Israel. 69% Arab citizens of Israel reject the country's right to exist as a Jewish state and nearly half reject Israel's right to any independence whatsoever. As many as 40.5 percent of Israeli Arab believe that the Holocaust never happened.
Coverage from Iran. Pope Benedict, who went to the West Bank on Wednesday, said a mini Palestinian state could be set up on a small part of the Zionist-usurped land of Palestine. He also issued a vague call for an end to Israel's embargo on the Gaza Strip. In Bethlehem, the leader of the catholic sect of Christianity met the self-styled President of the so-called Self-Rule Authority , Mahmoud Abbas. The Pope did not bother to meet any representatives of the popularly elected Hamas-run government. (and some people criticize me for being 'tough' with words :)
Obama-Netanyahu Meeting. Netanyahu said: "We don't want to govern the Palestinians. We want them to govern themselves". Obama called for a "two-state solution" - I also support the two-state solution, but not on Jewish land, it is called: Sinai Option: Road to Permanent Peace!
Quote of the Week: "There is a belief in some quarters that if only you can resolve the problems between Israel and Palestine, all the other problems in the Middle East, in a domino-like fashion, will fall into place. That is absolute nonsense." - Liam Fox, Member of UK Parliament, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence - Surprisingly, someone is honest in the British political establishment!
International Bigots are Pressuring Israel. Upgrading Israel's relations with the European Union is dependent upon the peace process with the Palestinian Authority and implementing the two-state solution, said EU envoy to Israel Ramiro Cibrian-Uzal. U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden said that Israel should back a two-state peace agreement and stop constructing new settlements in Yehuda and Samaria.
Syria is in a 'Peace' Game. 1) Syria has continued to transfer advanced weaponry to the Hizbullah terrorist group, even while working with the United States to improve relations. Syria seeks to raise Hizbullah's strength and capabilities to a level beyond what it had prior to the Second Lebanon War in July 2006. Such capabilities would enable Hizbullah to force a second front on Israel in case of a regional conflagration. 2) Israel must commit to returning the Golan Heights before Syria is willing to resume indirect peace negotiations brokered by Turkey, Syria's new ambassador to Turkey Nadil Kabalan announced. (Israel's response must be "Syria must end sponsoring terrorism and recognise the Jewish State, Eretz-Israel, in its entirety then we talk.") 3) Syrian President Bashar Assad believes that the peace of the Golan Heights is a condition for peace talks between his country and Israel, but at the same time does not foresee such negotiations happening in the near future. (Good! Let's postpone talks with Syria until "pigs fly".)
Concern? - 4 Months too Late. Last week President Barack Obama urged both sides in Sri Lanka's 25-year civil war to take measures to avert a humanitarian crisis and aid tens of thousands of people trapped in the war zone. The U.N. Security Council held its first formal session on Sri Lanka and voiced grave concern over civilian deaths in the conflict. (No 'urgency', resolutions or strong condemnation. After all, there are no Jews involved!)
There Are no Arab "Moderates." The universal goal of the Arab world is the destruction of America, Israel and Western civilization. The clever Arabs who pretend to be "moderate" when speaking to naive Christians and Jews are far more dangerous than the less clever Arabs who honestly and openly proclaim their Nazi genocidal goals. During Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977 wearing contemptuous tie with swastikas patterned as a sign of disrespect to Jewish state and the Camp David agreement.
Another Symptomatic 'Technical Error'. British airline BMI did not identify Israel on in-flight maps on its London-Tel Aviv service. The moving maps marked Islamic holy sites but showed only the city of Haifa in Israel, identified by its Arabic name, Khefa. Israeli transport ministry Director General Gideon Sitterman, said it was "unacceptable" that Israel had been "wiped off the map".
Quote of the Week: "We are being criticized by a new flow of left-wingers (and by international anti-Semitic bigotry). Those people, instead of building Israel as a sovereign state, want to give up our interests and national assets for totally foreign ideas." - Foreign Minister of Israel Avidgor Lieberman.
Solar Farm in Israel. Israeli scientists have discovered a way to harvest 50 percent of the sun's radiation, compared with the standard 10 percent. The technology has been put into use in the creation of the world's first commercial thermal-electric solar farm.
World Leaders Must Drop Slogans. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman kicked off a four-nation European tour by saying, "This government does not intend to produce slogans and pompous declarations but concrete results." the "main problem" in the Middle East is "Iran, which is going nuclear and is a destabilizing factor for the region and the entire world." The 'Palestinian' issue is "deadlocked" despite the best efforts of a series of dovish Israeli governments. "Israel has proved its good intentions, our desire for peace."
Iran Must be Stopped. The world's intelligence agencies and defence experts are quietly acknowledging that North Korea has become a full nuclear power, with the capacity to wipe out entire cities in Japan and South Korea. North Korea has miniaturised nuclear warheads to the extent they can be launched on medium-range missiles. "North Korea has nuclear weapons, which is a matter of fact," IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei said. ( This international failure is a direct result of ineffective negotiations, unenforceable economic sanctions and empty threats which are now being used against Iran with the same results!)
Do it, but not in Israel. Deputy (MK) Alex Miller from the Israel Beitenou Party, for people of Soviet Union origin, has submitted a draft law that would outlaw the celebration of the Naqba by Israeli Arabs. It would be punishable by up to three years in jail. "Those who want to support our enemies will do so from Gaza" (Compulsory deportation with the loss of Israeli citizenship would be a better punishment.)
Anti-Semitism: Religion of Power and Greed!
by Steven Shamrak
Contrary to common belief, the foundation of anti-Semitism was laid not by Christianity but during the Roman empire. Prevailing discrimination against Jews started during the Roman empire because Judea and Samaria were its most rebellious provinces and considered Jews atheists as they believed in one god only.
Those who have read the New Testament closely and studied the political and religious situation in the Roman-occupied Jewish provinces of Judea and Samaria know that area was inflamed by rebellion against occupation. Religiously and politically motivated rebels, the Zealots, were the leading force of the Jewish resistance. Studying the actions of Jesus described in the Christian Bible, rather than the politically motivated commentaries of the writers, it would be easy to come to the conclusion that the Jesus' group was, most likely, part of the resistance!
...Even 60 years after Israel's declaration of independence, this plague of anti-Semitism is still prevailing and spreading. It has moved to the Muslim world and Africa. Almost 60% of all resolutions of the United Nations adopted since 1948 are against Israel. No other country is disallowed to defend itself and stop the suffering of its own people from enemy terror like Israel.
The Jewish principles of "Love", "Forgiveness" or "Repentance" of sins, which were adopted by Christianity, have never been applied by mainstream Christianity toward Jews! But greed for the wealth of others and thirst for power, in order to control and keep the general population in fear, were always the driving factors behind anti-Semitism! Even now the words of the Nazi propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, are still applicable to the international anti-Israel hypocrisy: "The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie."
Although the pontiff has denounced anti-Semitism and said the Holocaust should never be forgotten, he failed to ask forgiveness for the Holocaust at the Yad Vashem memorial to the victims of the Nazi genocide. Parliamentary Speaker Reuven Rivlen was equally critical, saying he did not attend the Yad Vashem ceremony "just to hear historic descriptions or the fact that the Holocaust took place. I came as a Jew wishing to hear a request for forgiveness from those who caused our tragedy, and these include the Germans and the Church, but regretfully, I heard nothing of this." "All you had to do was to express regret. That's all we wanted to hear," wrote a columnist Hanoch Daum.
It was expected that the first visit by Pope Benedict would ease Jewish anger over Pope's decision in January to overturn the excommunication of a Holocaust-denying bishop. Jewish leaders are upset at the speech's failure to mention the toll of Jews in the Holocaust. The Pope referred to "millions" rather than six million and used the word "killed" rather than murdered. A Yad Vashem official, Avner Shalev, said "this is certainly no historical landmark".
Israeli historian Tom Segev wrote: "There is nothing easier than expressing real horror when talking about the Holocaust than identifying with its suffering, pain and grief. If that is not done, it is a sign there was a deliberate decision not to do so." (But from the moment Pope Benedict stepped onto Jewish soil his message was quite deliberate and disrespectful toward Israel, calling for the creation of a new state on Jewish land for the fake nation: "both peoples may live in peace in a homeland of their own". Later, he failed to condemn or confess the criminal silence and complicity of the Church and Christians in Holocaust!)
Enemies Must Leave Israel. 69% Arab citizens of Israel reject the country's right to exist as a Jewish state and nearly half reject Israel's right to any independence whatsoever. As many as 40.5 percent of Israeli Arab believe that the Holocaust never happened.
Coverage from Iran. Pope Benedict, who went to the West Bank on Wednesday, said a mini Palestinian state could be set up on a small part of the Zionist-usurped land of Palestine. He also issued a vague call for an end to Israel's embargo on the Gaza Strip. In Bethlehem, the leader of the catholic sect of Christianity met the self-styled President of the so-called Self-Rule Authority , Mahmoud Abbas. The Pope did not bother to meet any representatives of the popularly elected Hamas-run government. (and some people criticize me for being 'tough' with words :)
Obama-Netanyahu Meeting. Netanyahu said: "We don't want to govern the Palestinians. We want them to govern themselves". Obama called for a "two-state solution" - I also support the two-state solution, but not on Jewish land, it is called: Sinai Option: Road to Permanent Peace!
Quote of the Week: "There is a belief in some quarters that if only you can resolve the problems between Israel and Palestine, all the other problems in the Middle East, in a domino-like fashion, will fall into place. That is absolute nonsense." - Liam Fox, Member of UK Parliament, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence - Surprisingly, someone is honest in the British political establishment!
International Bigots are Pressuring Israel. Upgrading Israel's relations with the European Union is dependent upon the peace process with the Palestinian Authority and implementing the two-state solution, said EU envoy to Israel Ramiro Cibrian-Uzal. U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden said that Israel should back a two-state peace agreement and stop constructing new settlements in Yehuda and Samaria.
Syria is in a 'Peace' Game. 1) Syria has continued to transfer advanced weaponry to the Hizbullah terrorist group, even while working with the United States to improve relations. Syria seeks to raise Hizbullah's strength and capabilities to a level beyond what it had prior to the Second Lebanon War in July 2006. Such capabilities would enable Hizbullah to force a second front on Israel in case of a regional conflagration. 2) Israel must commit to returning the Golan Heights before Syria is willing to resume indirect peace negotiations brokered by Turkey, Syria's new ambassador to Turkey Nadil Kabalan announced. (Israel's response must be "Syria must end sponsoring terrorism and recognise the Jewish State, Eretz-Israel, in its entirety then we talk.") 3) Syrian President Bashar Assad believes that the peace of the Golan Heights is a condition for peace talks between his country and Israel, but at the same time does not foresee such negotiations happening in the near future. (Good! Let's postpone talks with Syria until "pigs fly".)
Concern? - 4 Months too Late. Last week President Barack Obama urged both sides in Sri Lanka's 25-year civil war to take measures to avert a humanitarian crisis and aid tens of thousands of people trapped in the war zone. The U.N. Security Council held its first formal session on Sri Lanka and voiced grave concern over civilian deaths in the conflict. (No 'urgency', resolutions or strong condemnation. After all, there are no Jews involved!)
There Are no Arab "Moderates." The universal goal of the Arab world is the destruction of America, Israel and Western civilization. The clever Arabs who pretend to be "moderate" when speaking to naive Christians and Jews are far more dangerous than the less clever Arabs who honestly and openly proclaim their Nazi genocidal goals. During Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977 wearing contemptuous tie with swastikas patterned as a sign of disrespect to Jewish state and the Camp David agreement.
Another Symptomatic 'Technical Error'. British airline BMI did not identify Israel on in-flight maps on its London-Tel Aviv service. The moving maps marked Islamic holy sites but showed only the city of Haifa in Israel, identified by its Arabic name, Khefa. Israeli transport ministry Director General Gideon Sitterman, said it was "unacceptable" that Israel had been "wiped off the map".
Quote of the Week: "We are being criticized by a new flow of left-wingers (and by international anti-Semitic bigotry). Those people, instead of building Israel as a sovereign state, want to give up our interests and national assets for totally foreign ideas." - Foreign Minister of Israel Avidgor Lieberman.
Solar Farm in Israel. Israeli scientists have discovered a way to harvest 50 percent of the sun's radiation, compared with the standard 10 percent. The technology has been put into use in the creation of the world's first commercial thermal-electric solar farm.
World Leaders Must Drop Slogans. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman kicked off a four-nation European tour by saying, "This government does not intend to produce slogans and pompous declarations but concrete results." the "main problem" in the Middle East is "Iran, which is going nuclear and is a destabilizing factor for the region and the entire world." The 'Palestinian' issue is "deadlocked" despite the best efforts of a series of dovish Israeli governments. "Israel has proved its good intentions, our desire for peace."
Iran Must be Stopped. The world's intelligence agencies and defence experts are quietly acknowledging that North Korea has become a full nuclear power, with the capacity to wipe out entire cities in Japan and South Korea. North Korea has miniaturised nuclear warheads to the extent they can be launched on medium-range missiles. "North Korea has nuclear weapons, which is a matter of fact," IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei said. ( This international failure is a direct result of ineffective negotiations, unenforceable economic sanctions and empty threats which are now being used against Iran with the same results!)
Do it, but not in Israel. Deputy (MK) Alex Miller from the Israel Beitenou Party, for people of Soviet Union origin, has submitted a draft law that would outlaw the celebration of the Naqba by Israeli Arabs. It would be punishable by up to three years in jail. "Those who want to support our enemies will do so from Gaza" (Compulsory deportation with the loss of Israeli citizenship would be a better punishment.)
Anti-Semitism: Religion of Power and Greed!
by Steven Shamrak
Contrary to common belief, the foundation of anti-Semitism was laid not by Christianity but during the Roman empire. Prevailing discrimination against Jews started during the Roman empire because Judea and Samaria were its most rebellious provinces and considered Jews atheists as they believed in one god only.
Those who have read the New Testament closely and studied the political and religious situation in the Roman-occupied Jewish provinces of Judea and Samaria know that area was inflamed by rebellion against occupation. Religiously and politically motivated rebels, the Zealots, were the leading force of the Jewish resistance. Studying the actions of Jesus described in the Christian Bible, rather than the politically motivated commentaries of the writers, it would be easy to come to the conclusion that the Jesus' group was, most likely, part of the resistance!
...Even 60 years after Israel's declaration of independence, this plague of anti-Semitism is still prevailing and spreading. It has moved to the Muslim world and Africa. Almost 60% of all resolutions of the United Nations adopted since 1948 are against Israel. No other country is disallowed to defend itself and stop the suffering of its own people from enemy terror like Israel.
The Jewish principles of "Love", "Forgiveness" or "Repentance" of sins, which were adopted by Christianity, have never been applied by mainstream Christianity toward Jews! But greed for the wealth of others and thirst for power, in order to control and keep the general population in fear, were always the driving factors behind anti-Semitism! Even now the words of the Nazi propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, are still applicable to the international anti-Israel hypocrisy: "The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie."
Obama: Billions for jihad, zero for Israel
$17 million for counterterror operations. Billions to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Iraq, Gaza. What guarantee does Obama have that that money will not pass to Islamic jihadists who are determined to destroy America and her allies? Why, none. None at all. "Obama’s Supplemental Bill Passes, Gives Billions to Enemies?," from Creeping Sharia, May 13 (thanks to Pamela):
Barack Obama’s 2009 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Pandemic Flu was revised and “passed by the full committee”. Not sure what the next step is, but based on the summary, it gives billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars to countries and entities that support sharia law and/or harbor, hide and support those who want to destroy the U.S. and our allies.
Read the summary from David Obey’s office that was quietly released last week with nary a word from any media.
• $3.6 billion, matching the request, to expand and improve capabilities of the Afghan security forces
• $400 million, as requested, to build the counterinsurgency capabilities of the Pakistani security forces
• Afghanistan: $1.52 billion, $86 million above the request
• West Bank and Gaza: $665 million in bilateral economic, humanitarian, and security assistance for the West Bank and Gaza
• Jordan: $250 million, $250 million above the request, including $100 million for economic and $150 million for security assistance
• Egypt: $360 million, $310 million above the request, including $50 million for economic assistance, $50 million for border security, and $260 million for security assistance
• Pakistan: $1.9 billion, $591 million above the request
• Iraq: $968 million, $336 million above the request
• Oversight: $20 million, $13 million above the request, to expand oversight capacity of the State Department, USAID, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan to review programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq
• Israel: $555 million of the $2.8 billion 2010 request for security assistance, $555 million above the supplemental request. (Note: that means Obama’s original request did not include any money for Israel in 2009)
• Lebanon: $74 million [...]
• Refugee Assistance: $343 million, $50 million above the request, …including humanitarian assistance for Gaza. Funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency programs in the West Bank and Gaza is limited to $119 million (Note: Gaza = Hamas) [...]
• Department of Justice: $17 million, matching the request, for counter-terrorism activities and to provide training and assistance for the Iraqi criminal justice system...
Thanks Jihad Watch
Barack Obama’s 2009 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Pandemic Flu was revised and “passed by the full committee”. Not sure what the next step is, but based on the summary, it gives billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars to countries and entities that support sharia law and/or harbor, hide and support those who want to destroy the U.S. and our allies.
Read the summary from David Obey’s office that was quietly released last week with nary a word from any media.
• $3.6 billion, matching the request, to expand and improve capabilities of the Afghan security forces
• $400 million, as requested, to build the counterinsurgency capabilities of the Pakistani security forces
• Afghanistan: $1.52 billion, $86 million above the request
• West Bank and Gaza: $665 million in bilateral economic, humanitarian, and security assistance for the West Bank and Gaza
• Jordan: $250 million, $250 million above the request, including $100 million for economic and $150 million for security assistance
• Egypt: $360 million, $310 million above the request, including $50 million for economic assistance, $50 million for border security, and $260 million for security assistance
• Pakistan: $1.9 billion, $591 million above the request
• Iraq: $968 million, $336 million above the request
• Oversight: $20 million, $13 million above the request, to expand oversight capacity of the State Department, USAID, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan to review programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq
• Israel: $555 million of the $2.8 billion 2010 request for security assistance, $555 million above the supplemental request. (Note: that means Obama’s original request did not include any money for Israel in 2009)
• Lebanon: $74 million [...]
• Refugee Assistance: $343 million, $50 million above the request, …including humanitarian assistance for Gaza. Funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency programs in the West Bank and Gaza is limited to $119 million (Note: Gaza = Hamas) [...]
• Department of Justice: $17 million, matching the request, for counter-terrorism activities and to provide training and assistance for the Iraqi criminal justice system...
Thanks Jihad Watch
Obama statements encourage Palestinian jihadists
Jihad Watch
Why shouldn't they be encouraged? PLO Ambassador to Lebanon Abbas Zaki said this last month: "With the two-state solution, in my opinion, Israel will collapse, because if they get out of Jerusalem, what will become of all the talk about the Promised Land and the Chosen People? What will become of all the sacrifices they made - just to be told to leave? They consider Jerusalem to have a spiritual status. The Jews consider Judea and Samaria to be their historic dream. If the Jews leave those places, the Zionist idea will begin to collapse. It will regress of its own accord. Then we will move forward."
"Palestinians see Obama statehood comments encouraging," from Reuters, May 18:
...After meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, Obama said it was in the interests of both Israel and the Palestinians "to achieve a two-state solution".
Netanyahu, in his remarks after the meeting, reiterated that he supported self-government for the Palestinians but made no mention of a state, a position underscoring a rare rift in U.S.-Israeli relations.
"The statements by Mr. Obama are encouraging while those by Prime Minister Netanyahu are disappointing," Senior Abbas aide Nabil Abu Rdainah said.
Why shouldn't they be encouraged? PLO Ambassador to Lebanon Abbas Zaki said this last month: "With the two-state solution, in my opinion, Israel will collapse, because if they get out of Jerusalem, what will become of all the talk about the Promised Land and the Chosen People? What will become of all the sacrifices they made - just to be told to leave? They consider Jerusalem to have a spiritual status. The Jews consider Judea and Samaria to be their historic dream. If the Jews leave those places, the Zionist idea will begin to collapse. It will regress of its own accord. Then we will move forward."
"Palestinians see Obama statehood comments encouraging," from Reuters, May 18:
...After meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, Obama said it was in the interests of both Israel and the Palestinians "to achieve a two-state solution".
Netanyahu, in his remarks after the meeting, reiterated that he supported self-government for the Palestinians but made no mention of a state, a position underscoring a rare rift in U.S.-Israeli relations.
"The statements by Mr. Obama are encouraging while those by Prime Minister Netanyahu are disappointing," Senior Abbas aide Nabil Abu Rdainah said.
"He Didn't Cave!"
The meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Obama is over. The two leaders first met privately, with their discussions going beyond scheduled time. They were then joined by advisors -- Netanyahu by top aide Ron Dermer and National Security Advisor Uzi Arad. Obama by US National Security Advisor James Jones. Much has been made of the need for positive personal chemistry to be established between the two, as the human relationship is said to be important in greasing the wheels of diplomacy. (As press here has put it, inexplicably to me, trust has to be established. ) I don't know to what degree the chemistry was positive -- and undoubtedly more will follow on this.
At a press conference after the meeting, the two declared that they would work together to meet the challenges of the Middle East, including Iran. But what is clear is that there was no meeting of the minds.
Obama reiterated his two previously stated positions: That the dialogue with Iran should have no artificial time limit put on it and will be open-ended, although he would like to see progress by the end of the year and will consider other options such as sanctions in due course if necessary (no mention of a military option). And that his goal is two states living side by side in peace, which he hopes to achieve before the end of his term.
Netanyahu, for his part, repeated his previous position: that he would like to see the Palestinians govern themselves. But he has in mind some sort of autonomy, less than a full state. He referred to economic development and other assistance for the Palestinian Authority, but -- Baruch Hashem! -- he did not speak either of a Palestinian state or a two-state solution.
His emphasis, we were told before the meeting, was to be on Iran and the need for strong action. As would be expected, whatever was determined in terms of US sanction of/or refusal to sanction Israeli military action against Iran is not being shared. Interestingly, Netanyahu seemed to turn the Obama claim about the need to solve the Palestinian conflict first on its head, saying that more Arab nations need to get involved because of the instability generated by Iran.
Undoubtedly more news -- major analysis -- on the meeting will be forthcoming in the days ahead.
~~~~~~~~~~
There's a tough time ahead for us (see below), whatever may have been said in private or established today in terms of personal relationship between the two leaders. And, just as I suggested that we ask Netanyahu to stay strong before his meeting with Obama, I would like to suggest that now we applaud his strength, let him know we're behind him, and ask him to retain his resolve.
Fax: 02-670-5369 (From the US: 011-972-2-670-5369)
Phone: 03-610-9898 (From the US: 011-972-2-610-9898)
E-mail: pm_eng2@it.pmo.gov.il (underscore between pm and eng)
~~~~~~~~~~
UN-related issues that require our attention:
Anne Bayefsky, of Eye on the UN, has written a piece called "Obama's UN Mistake," in which she describes the move Obama has made to further empower the UN.
http://article.nationalreview.com:80/?q=MmE3ZmUwZDY0ZmFiMzllYTJiY2UwOTllNjBjYTY2MGQ=
The Security Council, Bayefsky tells us, just a little over a week ago, adopted what is called a "presidential statement." This one says:
“The Security Council supports the proposal of the Russian Federation to convene, in consultation with the Quartet and the parties, an international conference on the Middle East peace process in Moscow in 2009.”
This statement, while it has no legal status, does require a unanimous vote. This means Obama could have vetoed it, but chose not to.
You'll note that the statement alludes to consultation with "the parties." Israel has been working to convince Russia not to hold such a conference this year -- and our government is not pleased. Bayefsky sees the 22 nations of the Arab League as being among "the parties" -- which squeezes Israel badly.
Israeli UN ambassador Gabriella Shalev issued a statement putting forth Israel’s position:
“Israel does not believe that the involvement of the Security Council contributes to the political process in the Middle East. This process should be bilateral and left to the parties themselves."
What is more, Shalev expressed dissatisfaction with the timing of this, when she had shared with the Security Council the fact that Netanyahu, in preparation for his meeting with Obama, was working on his approach to dealing with the Palestinians.
~~~~~~~~~~
The American UN ambassador, Susan Rice, took a very different approach, when she announced to the Security Council that “we intend to integrate the Arab Peace Initiative into our own approach.”
To reporters she said:
"We welcome Foreign Minister Lavrov’s initiative to convene the Council, and we’re very pleased with the constructive and comprehensive statement that will be issued by the president of the Council on the Council’s behalf. This was a product of really collaborative, good-faith efforts by all members of the Council, and we’re pleased with the outcome.”
And worst of all: “The United States cannot be left to do all the heavy lifting by itself, and other countries... must do all that they can to shore up our common efforts.”
This positively screams a warning. Obama has set up a situation in which he doesn't have to put the screws to Netanyahu himself, he can get the international community to help.
Bayefsky believes Obama has set this up as a "good-cop/bad cop" routine, so that he can rescue Israel, for a price. It's possible. It's also possible that he hopes he won't have as much to answer for with his pro-Israel constituents, if the UN is doing the dirty work.
~~~~~~~~~~
And we're not done.
This past week the US formally joined the UN Human Rights Council. This anti-democratic group is virulently anti-Israel. It has adopted more resolutions and decisions condemning Israel than condemning all of the 191 other UN members combined; has held ten regular sessions on human rights, and five special sessions to condemn only Israel; and has insisted on an investigator with an open-ended mandate to condemn Israel, while all other investigators must be regularly renewed.
What is more, the US, along with the four other Western nations sitting on the Council, can expect to be outvoted by nations from other geographic areas, including Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Djibouti, Bahrain, Qatar, Russia, and China. Actually, the balance of power lies with the Organization of the Islamic States, which has members on the Council from both the African and Asian groupings.
This means the influence the US can have on Council decisions is minimal if not non-existent.
Great situation, is it not?
~~~~~~~~~
In the course of the research I'm doing on UNRWA, I came across the following information, which I believe it is valuable to share. It provides a more accurate perspective in the face of the "awfulizing" that is routinely done regarding the situation of the Arabs in Gaza. This comes from an article by Justus Weiner, an international lawyer with the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
"...Gaza's offshore gas deposits are worth an estimated $4 billion. This natural resource could be accessed to improve the lives of residents of Gaza once the anarchy and violence of Hamas is curtailed. Second, the population of Gaza is comparatively healthy and well educated. Life expectancy in the Gaza Strip is more than 72 years, which is higher than in Russia, the Bahamas, India, Ukraine and Glasgow East (Scotland).
"Third, Gaza has a much lower infant mortality rate than Angola, Iran, India, Egypt and Brazil...
"Likewise, despite the ceaseless repetition by journalists that 'the Gaza Strip is the most densely populated place on Earth,' it is in fact markedly less densely populated than an array of other locales, including a number of economic success stories such as Monaco, Hong Kong, Singapore and Gibraltar."
Surprised? Save this and refer to it as necessary.
~~~~~~~~~~
According to Fox News, American intelligence sources are saying that a secret commando unit under the Joint Special Operations Command is prepared to infiltrate Pakistan and secure its mobile arsenal of nuclear weaponry if it appears that the country is about to fall to the Taliban or Al Qaida. This is significant because Islamic forces have taken territory not far from Islamabad, Pakistan's capital.
This is good news. It indicates a readiness to deal with an emergency realistically, and not with pie-in-the-sky approaches.
~~~~~~~~~~
MK Alex Miller (Yisrael Beiteinu) has submitted a bill that would make it illegal to celebrate the Nakba, which means "catastrophe" in Arabic, and is how the Arabs refer to the founding of Israel.
It is unlikely to pass, as it infringes on freedom of speech and right of protest. But none-the-less, this highlights a serious problem in this country. As Miller put it in a statement to the Post:
From my perspective, it very much harms me, as a citizen, when citizens… mourn the establishment of the State of Israel when they themselves have equal rights in this country.
"If we really want to achieve coexistence, the time has come that we stop this absurd theater."
~~~~~~~~~~
A new settlement is scheduled to be built in the Jordan Valley, for the first time in 26 years. To be called Maskiot, it will be established on the ruins of a settlement abandoned years ago.
At the same time we are seeing this: Four years ago, as part of the expulsion from Gush Katif, there were four communities in northern Samaria that were demolished as well. One of those was Homesh.
Last week, in a demonstration approved by the IDF, 1,500 people returned to the site of Homesh; they are working towards the re-building of the community.
Those rallying carried letters of support from members of the current government written for the event:
"I want to bless the participants and support them in the realization of the Zionist way," wrote Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Yaalon (Likud).
Minister of Information and Diaspora Yuli Edelstein (Likud), said, "I have the utmost respect for the (former) Homesh settlers and all those who work to resettle the community as part of the settlement enterprise in the Land of Israel."
Fantastic! This brings hope.
~~~~~~~~~~
see my website www.ArlenefromIsrael.info
At a press conference after the meeting, the two declared that they would work together to meet the challenges of the Middle East, including Iran. But what is clear is that there was no meeting of the minds.
Obama reiterated his two previously stated positions: That the dialogue with Iran should have no artificial time limit put on it and will be open-ended, although he would like to see progress by the end of the year and will consider other options such as sanctions in due course if necessary (no mention of a military option). And that his goal is two states living side by side in peace, which he hopes to achieve before the end of his term.
Netanyahu, for his part, repeated his previous position: that he would like to see the Palestinians govern themselves. But he has in mind some sort of autonomy, less than a full state. He referred to economic development and other assistance for the Palestinian Authority, but -- Baruch Hashem! -- he did not speak either of a Palestinian state or a two-state solution.
His emphasis, we were told before the meeting, was to be on Iran and the need for strong action. As would be expected, whatever was determined in terms of US sanction of/or refusal to sanction Israeli military action against Iran is not being shared. Interestingly, Netanyahu seemed to turn the Obama claim about the need to solve the Palestinian conflict first on its head, saying that more Arab nations need to get involved because of the instability generated by Iran.
Undoubtedly more news -- major analysis -- on the meeting will be forthcoming in the days ahead.
~~~~~~~~~~
There's a tough time ahead for us (see below), whatever may have been said in private or established today in terms of personal relationship between the two leaders. And, just as I suggested that we ask Netanyahu to stay strong before his meeting with Obama, I would like to suggest that now we applaud his strength, let him know we're behind him, and ask him to retain his resolve.
Fax: 02-670-5369 (From the US: 011-972-2-670-5369)
Phone: 03-610-9898 (From the US: 011-972-2-610-9898)
E-mail: pm_eng2@it.pmo.gov.il (underscore between pm and eng)
~~~~~~~~~~
UN-related issues that require our attention:
Anne Bayefsky, of Eye on the UN, has written a piece called "Obama's UN Mistake," in which she describes the move Obama has made to further empower the UN.
http://article.nationalreview.com:80/?q=MmE3ZmUwZDY0ZmFiMzllYTJiY2UwOTllNjBjYTY2MGQ=
The Security Council, Bayefsky tells us, just a little over a week ago, adopted what is called a "presidential statement." This one says:
“The Security Council supports the proposal of the Russian Federation to convene, in consultation with the Quartet and the parties, an international conference on the Middle East peace process in Moscow in 2009.”
This statement, while it has no legal status, does require a unanimous vote. This means Obama could have vetoed it, but chose not to.
You'll note that the statement alludes to consultation with "the parties." Israel has been working to convince Russia not to hold such a conference this year -- and our government is not pleased. Bayefsky sees the 22 nations of the Arab League as being among "the parties" -- which squeezes Israel badly.
Israeli UN ambassador Gabriella Shalev issued a statement putting forth Israel’s position:
“Israel does not believe that the involvement of the Security Council contributes to the political process in the Middle East. This process should be bilateral and left to the parties themselves."
What is more, Shalev expressed dissatisfaction with the timing of this, when she had shared with the Security Council the fact that Netanyahu, in preparation for his meeting with Obama, was working on his approach to dealing with the Palestinians.
~~~~~~~~~~
The American UN ambassador, Susan Rice, took a very different approach, when she announced to the Security Council that “we intend to integrate the Arab Peace Initiative into our own approach.”
To reporters she said:
"We welcome Foreign Minister Lavrov’s initiative to convene the Council, and we’re very pleased with the constructive and comprehensive statement that will be issued by the president of the Council on the Council’s behalf. This was a product of really collaborative, good-faith efforts by all members of the Council, and we’re pleased with the outcome.”
And worst of all: “The United States cannot be left to do all the heavy lifting by itself, and other countries... must do all that they can to shore up our common efforts.”
This positively screams a warning. Obama has set up a situation in which he doesn't have to put the screws to Netanyahu himself, he can get the international community to help.
Bayefsky believes Obama has set this up as a "good-cop/bad cop" routine, so that he can rescue Israel, for a price. It's possible. It's also possible that he hopes he won't have as much to answer for with his pro-Israel constituents, if the UN is doing the dirty work.
~~~~~~~~~~
And we're not done.
This past week the US formally joined the UN Human Rights Council. This anti-democratic group is virulently anti-Israel. It has adopted more resolutions and decisions condemning Israel than condemning all of the 191 other UN members combined; has held ten regular sessions on human rights, and five special sessions to condemn only Israel; and has insisted on an investigator with an open-ended mandate to condemn Israel, while all other investigators must be regularly renewed.
What is more, the US, along with the four other Western nations sitting on the Council, can expect to be outvoted by nations from other geographic areas, including Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Djibouti, Bahrain, Qatar, Russia, and China. Actually, the balance of power lies with the Organization of the Islamic States, which has members on the Council from both the African and Asian groupings.
This means the influence the US can have on Council decisions is minimal if not non-existent.
Great situation, is it not?
~~~~~~~~~
In the course of the research I'm doing on UNRWA, I came across the following information, which I believe it is valuable to share. It provides a more accurate perspective in the face of the "awfulizing" that is routinely done regarding the situation of the Arabs in Gaza. This comes from an article by Justus Weiner, an international lawyer with the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
"...Gaza's offshore gas deposits are worth an estimated $4 billion. This natural resource could be accessed to improve the lives of residents of Gaza once the anarchy and violence of Hamas is curtailed. Second, the population of Gaza is comparatively healthy and well educated. Life expectancy in the Gaza Strip is more than 72 years, which is higher than in Russia, the Bahamas, India, Ukraine and Glasgow East (Scotland).
"Third, Gaza has a much lower infant mortality rate than Angola, Iran, India, Egypt and Brazil...
"Likewise, despite the ceaseless repetition by journalists that 'the Gaza Strip is the most densely populated place on Earth,' it is in fact markedly less densely populated than an array of other locales, including a number of economic success stories such as Monaco, Hong Kong, Singapore and Gibraltar."
Surprised? Save this and refer to it as necessary.
~~~~~~~~~~
According to Fox News, American intelligence sources are saying that a secret commando unit under the Joint Special Operations Command is prepared to infiltrate Pakistan and secure its mobile arsenal of nuclear weaponry if it appears that the country is about to fall to the Taliban or Al Qaida. This is significant because Islamic forces have taken territory not far from Islamabad, Pakistan's capital.
This is good news. It indicates a readiness to deal with an emergency realistically, and not with pie-in-the-sky approaches.
~~~~~~~~~~
MK Alex Miller (Yisrael Beiteinu) has submitted a bill that would make it illegal to celebrate the Nakba, which means "catastrophe" in Arabic, and is how the Arabs refer to the founding of Israel.
It is unlikely to pass, as it infringes on freedom of speech and right of protest. But none-the-less, this highlights a serious problem in this country. As Miller put it in a statement to the Post:
From my perspective, it very much harms me, as a citizen, when citizens… mourn the establishment of the State of Israel when they themselves have equal rights in this country.
"If we really want to achieve coexistence, the time has come that we stop this absurd theater."
~~~~~~~~~~
A new settlement is scheduled to be built in the Jordan Valley, for the first time in 26 years. To be called Maskiot, it will be established on the ruins of a settlement abandoned years ago.
At the same time we are seeing this: Four years ago, as part of the expulsion from Gush Katif, there were four communities in northern Samaria that were demolished as well. One of those was Homesh.
Last week, in a demonstration approved by the IDF, 1,500 people returned to the site of Homesh; they are working towards the re-building of the community.
Those rallying carried letters of support from members of the current government written for the event:
"I want to bless the participants and support them in the realization of the Zionist way," wrote Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Yaalon (Likud).
Minister of Information and Diaspora Yuli Edelstein (Likud), said, "I have the utmost respect for the (former) Homesh settlers and all those who work to resettle the community as part of the settlement enterprise in the Land of Israel."
Fantastic! This brings hope.
~~~~~~~~~~
see my website www.ArlenefromIsrael.info
Erekat: Israel shouldn't receive rewards
May. 19, 2009
brenda gazzar , THE JERUSALEM POST
Israel should not receive any rewards if it agrees to halt illegal settlement expansion or takes other steps to advance the peace process, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said on Monday. "Israel doesn't deserve rewards. Israel is in violation of international law and is an occupying power," Erekat told The Jerusalem Post. "I think when people make mistakes and they correct them, they are usually not rewarded."
He was responding to recent reports that several Arab states - with US prompting - are considering offering incentives to Israel if Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu commits himself to a total freeze on settlement expansion as part of a comprehensive peace plan.
Israel should stop expanding settlements "because it's an obligation," Erekat said.
Anonymous sources told London's Financial Times in a report published on Monday that several Arab states were discussing a plan that could include stepped up contacts, telecommunications links and airline access with the Jewish state if the US could get Israel to freeze settlement construction.
However, any Arab gestures would only be granted after the new US administration detailed a plan to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with steps required by both sides, the sources said.
The United States, too, is hopeful that Arab states will open direct telephone connections with Israel and allow Israeli commercial aircraft to fly over their territory, according to a Washington Post report published on Sunday.
A US official in Tel Aviv could not confirm the press reports on Monday and said that things would likely become clearer following Monday's meeting between Netanyahu and President Barack Obama in Washington.
Earlier this month, US Vice President Joe Biden urged Arab states to take steps that would demonstrate their sincerity to Israel.
"Now is the time for Arab states to make meaningful gestures to show the Israeli leadership and the people the promise of ending Israel's isolation in the region is real and genuine," he told attendees at an AIPAC conference.
However, a spokesman for the Arab League said the 22-member organization already had offered a large incentive to Israel - the 2002 Arab peace initiative.
"Normalization in return for peace, that's the essence of the initiative," Abdel Aleem al-Abayad told the Post. "We think the initiative is more than an adequate incentive for peace between Israel and the Arab countries and for peace between Israel and the Palestinians."
Similarly, a senior Jordanian official told the Post on Monday that such press reports were based on speculation.
Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas is scheduled to meet with Obama on May 28, while Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is scheduled to meet with the US leader on May 26.
Obama has a choice between continuing a policy of double standards - "and push the region toward extremism and violence" - or telling Netanyahu to honor all his obligations stemming from the road map, Erekat said.
"Israel's obligations are very clear-cut," he said.
An Egyptian official said his country's position vis-à-vis the peace process was clear and would be conveyed to Obama.
The Egyptians support "the restart of [Israeli-Palestinian] negotiations, but with a clear political target, which is a two-state solution," he said Sunday on the condition of anonymity. "Not just negotiations for the sake of negotiations."
American support "is crucial" for peace to take hold in the region, he said.
This article can also be read at http://www.jpost.com /servlet/Satellite?cid=1242212408495&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull
brenda gazzar , THE JERUSALEM POST
Israel should not receive any rewards if it agrees to halt illegal settlement expansion or takes other steps to advance the peace process, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said on Monday. "Israel doesn't deserve rewards. Israel is in violation of international law and is an occupying power," Erekat told The Jerusalem Post. "I think when people make mistakes and they correct them, they are usually not rewarded."
He was responding to recent reports that several Arab states - with US prompting - are considering offering incentives to Israel if Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu commits himself to a total freeze on settlement expansion as part of a comprehensive peace plan.
Israel should stop expanding settlements "because it's an obligation," Erekat said.
Anonymous sources told London's Financial Times in a report published on Monday that several Arab states were discussing a plan that could include stepped up contacts, telecommunications links and airline access with the Jewish state if the US could get Israel to freeze settlement construction.
However, any Arab gestures would only be granted after the new US administration detailed a plan to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with steps required by both sides, the sources said.
The United States, too, is hopeful that Arab states will open direct telephone connections with Israel and allow Israeli commercial aircraft to fly over their territory, according to a Washington Post report published on Sunday.
A US official in Tel Aviv could not confirm the press reports on Monday and said that things would likely become clearer following Monday's meeting between Netanyahu and President Barack Obama in Washington.
Earlier this month, US Vice President Joe Biden urged Arab states to take steps that would demonstrate their sincerity to Israel.
"Now is the time for Arab states to make meaningful gestures to show the Israeli leadership and the people the promise of ending Israel's isolation in the region is real and genuine," he told attendees at an AIPAC conference.
However, a spokesman for the Arab League said the 22-member organization already had offered a large incentive to Israel - the 2002 Arab peace initiative.
"Normalization in return for peace, that's the essence of the initiative," Abdel Aleem al-Abayad told the Post. "We think the initiative is more than an adequate incentive for peace between Israel and the Arab countries and for peace between Israel and the Palestinians."
Similarly, a senior Jordanian official told the Post on Monday that such press reports were based on speculation.
Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas is scheduled to meet with Obama on May 28, while Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is scheduled to meet with the US leader on May 26.
Obama has a choice between continuing a policy of double standards - "and push the region toward extremism and violence" - or telling Netanyahu to honor all his obligations stemming from the road map, Erekat said.
"Israel's obligations are very clear-cut," he said.
An Egyptian official said his country's position vis-à-vis the peace process was clear and would be conveyed to Obama.
The Egyptians support "the restart of [Israeli-Palestinian] negotiations, but with a clear political target, which is a two-state solution," he said Sunday on the condition of anonymity. "Not just negotiations for the sake of negotiations."
American support "is crucial" for peace to take hold in the region, he said.
This article can also be read at http://www.jpost.com /servlet/Satellite?cid=1242212408495&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull
Monday, May 18, 2009
Obama and the Middle East
Hussein Agha, Robert Malley
New York Review of Books
Volume 56, Number 10 · June 11, 2009
1.
By virtually every measure—name, race, origins, and upbringing—Barack Hussein Obama was a revolutionary presidential candidate. In Mideast policy at least, there is little reason to imagine that he will be a revolutionary president. The radical break with traditional US policy came with the Bush administration, during which the US invaded and then occupied Iraq, shunned Syria, and engaged in an effort, at once ambitious and irresponsible, to reshape the region. Bush's presidency represented an upheaval because it was both guided and blinded by a rigid ideological outlook and because of its uncommon proclivity to choose military over diplomatic means. Obama's first step will be to close that stormy parenthesis. It will be no small achievement.
His own agenda for the Middle East is at the center of greater speculation, and at the heart of that speculation is the question of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. There are signs—the fact that they are taking their time, reviewing their policies, consulting broadly—that the President and his team are committed to pragmatism and patience, qualities they found wanting in Bush's rash attempt to impose a new order on the Middle East but also in Bill Clinton's impetuous efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement. Their focus, at the outset at least, likely will be on improving conditions on the ground, including the West Bank economy, curbing if not halting Israeli settlement construction, pursuing reform of Palestinian security forces, and improving relations between Israel and Arab countries.
Little Bookroom / Savoir Fare London
But there also are hints of a grand ambition biding its time. Obama has not staked his presidency on resolving the conflict, but he has not shied away from the challenge either. Judging by what the new president and his colleagues have suggested, attending to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a matter of US national interest. The administration seems prepared to devote considerable diplomatic, economic, and, perhaps, political capital to that end. And the goal, once the ground has been settled, will be to achieve a comprehensive, two-state solution.
At first glance, there's more reason to be confounded than convinced. If such is the President's objective, it will be pursued under unusually inauspicious circumstances. In Israel, a prime minister, Ehud Olmert, who never tired of reiterating his commitment to a Palestinian state has been replaced by one, Benjamin Netanyahu, who can barely bring himself to utter the words. His coalition partners—a mix of right-wing, xenophobic, and religious parties—make matters worse. Even the participation of Ehud Barak and his Labor party in the coalition is of scant comfort. Barak was prime minister when Israeli–Palestinian negotiations collapsed at the Camp David summit in 2000; the principal lesson he seems to have drawn is to distrust all things Palestinian. As defense minister under Olmert, he barely concealed his disdain for the talks the Palestinians conducted with his own government, dismissing them as an "academic seminar." It is hard to imagine this new coalition going further than its predecessor, which, in Palestinian eyes, didn't go far enough.
On the Palestinian side, intense Egyptian-mediated reconciliation talks between Hamas and Fatah have so far failed to stitch the national movement together. The price of their divisions, costly under any circumstances, has inflated several-fold as a result of the war in Gaza in December and January between Israel and Hamas. The conflict proved, if proof were still needed, that President Mahmoud Abbas cannot continue to talk peace with Israel when Israel is at war with Palestinians and that Palestinians cannot make peace with Israel when they are at war with themselves. Hamas possesses the power to spoil any progress and will use it. It can act as an implacable opponent against any potential Palestinian compromise. Bilateral negotiations that failed when Olmert was prime minister and Hamas was a mere Palestinian faction are unlikely to succeed with Netanyahu at the helm and Hamas having grown into a regional reality.
If, despite this desolate landscape, the Obama administration nonetheless is determined to push for a final agreement, it could be because the President has something else in mind. At some point, he might intend to bypass negotiations between the parties and, with support from a broad international coalition including Arab countries, Russia, and the European Union, present them with a detailed two-state agreement they will be hard-pressed to reject. The concept stems from the notion that, left to their own devices, the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships are incapable of reaching an accord and that they will need all the pressure and persuasion the world can muster to take the last, fateful steps.
It is one option. But before jumping toward it, basic issues should be explored. Getting the leaders to endorse a peace deal will be no mean feat, but it is not the only and perhaps not the most substantial challenge. The other question is how in the current climate the Israeli and Palestinian people would welcome a two-state solution. Would they view it as authentic or illegitimate? Would they see it as ending their conflict or merely opening its next round? Would it be more effective at mobilizing supporters or at galvanizing opponents? What, in short, would a two-state solution actually solve?
2.
The challenge of ending the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has, of late, almost entirely revolved around tinkering with the details of a two-state agreement. Efforts toward a settlement, whether official or unofficial, focused on adjusting percentages of territorial annexation and land exchange; dividing and defining forms of sovereignty over Jerusalem; describing the attributes of a Palestinian state; and, more often as afterthought than central concern, finding technical ways to resettle and compensate the refugees. Successive failures and the repeated inability to satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian needs have been vexing. So far at least, these difficulties have not called into question the assumption that an equilibrium of interests exists or that it can be fully found within a two-state agreement. It's just been seen as a matter of trying harder.
That President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert were incapable of reaching a settlement in 2008 following the goals set at the Annapolis conference might not be conclusive. But it gives reason to doubt the premise that more of the same can yield something different. Abbas is widely hailed as among the Palestinians' most pragmatic leaders. Olmert took a more circuitous route to the peace camp, but he exhibited the faith of the late convert, intense and profound. After months of talks, Abbas declined a far more concessive Israeli proposal—on the size of the territory for Palestinians, for example—than the one Yasser Arafat turned down eight years ago and for which the then Palestinian leader was excoriated as an implacable enemy of peace. There is little reason to believe that more tweaking of the accord would have made a difference.
A workable two-state agreement would address a large share of the two sides' aspirations. It would preserve Israel's Jewish character and majority, provide it with final and recognized borders, and maintain its ties to Jewish holy sites. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would live free of Israeli occupation, they would govern Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, and refugees would have the opportunity to choose normal lives through resettlement and compensation. If meeting those goals were sufficient, why have the parties proved incapable of settling the dispute?
Aspirations reflect historical experience. For Israel's Jewish population, this includes displacement, persecution, the life of the ghetto, and the horrors of the Holocaust; and the long, frustrated quest for a normal, recognized, and accepted homeland. There is a craving for a future that will not echo the past and for the kind of ordinary security—the unquestioned acceptance of a Jewish presence in the region—that even overwhelming military superiority cannot guarantee. There is, too, at least among a significant, active segment of the Israeli population, a deep-seated attachment to the land, all of it, that constitutes Eretz Israel.
For Palestinians, the most primal demands relate to addressing and redressing a historical experience of dispossession, expulsion, dispersal, massacres, occupation, discrimination, denial of dignity, persistent killing off of their leaders, and the relentless fracturing of their national polity.
These Israeli and Palestinian yearnings are of a sort that, no matter how precisely fine-tuned, a two-state deal will find it hard to fulfill. Over the years, the goal gradually has shifted from reaching peace to achieving a two-state agreement. Those aims might sound the same, but they are not: peace may be possible without such an agreement just as such an agreement need not necessarily lead to peace. Partitioning the land can, and most probably will, be an important means of achieving a viable, lasting, peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. But it is not the end.
3.
The idea of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel has an unusually interesting, troubled, and—from the British plan of the 1930s to the United Nations partition plan of 1947—mainly foreign pedigree. What it is not and, save for a brief period in the recent past, has not been is an indigenous Palestinian demand. Partition meant accepting less than the whole of the area of the British Mandate of Palestine; it also came to mean barring the return of refugees who were expelled or fled in 1948. For most of its history, the Palestinian national movement would have nothing to do with it. Israelis were no more enthralled. It took them even longer to warm up to the concept of Palestinian statehood, which they saw as both artificial, insofar as no such entity had existed in the past, and dangerous, because most Arabs and Palestinians denied Israelis the reciprocal right to a Jewish homeland.
Palestinians came to accept the two-state solution by the late 1980s, though that acceptance was always somewhat grudging. Statehood acquired the trappings of a national cause but it never truly matched national aspirations. For most, it appealed more to the head than to the heart; it was an arguably useful way of achieving greater goals but never the objective in and of itself. Unlike Zionism, for whom statehood was the central objective, the Palestinian fight was primarily about other matters. The absence of a state was not the cause of all their misfortune. Its creation would not be the full solution either.
Palestinian embrace of the idea of statehood essentially was the handiwork of a single man. With time, cunning, and shrewd politics, and because few dared challenge his militant credentials, Yasser Arafat fundamentally altered his movement's position. His efforts were not without ambiguity. He toyed with Palestinians and worried Israelis by presenting a Palestinian state both as a solution and as a way station toward one. He made compromise—the acceptance of an Israeli state within the 1967 borders—feel like conquest and he managed to pack into partition feelings of historical vindication, dignity, and honor. When it came to persuading the West and Israel that he genuinely believed in a two-state solution, his past record of militancy was a burden. But when it came to selling a two-state solution to his people, that record was his greatest asset.
Among Palestinians, the concept of statehood has not aged well. It has suffered several punishing blows, mainly at the hands of those who purported to buttress it. This is not chiefly related to its substance, which, through a series of formal and informal Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, has not varied much and, if anything, has come closer to mirroring what the Palestinians could live with. It has everything to do with who is promoting it, for what reason, in what way, and in what domestic and regional context. Palestinians do not judge the idea of a state on its merits. They judge it by the company it keeps.
4.
The new millennium began with the near-universal acceptance of the idea of a Palestinian state, which is precisely when its support among Palestinians began to slip. President Bush, the first US president to have ardently endorsed it, framed it as the answer to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and then hurriedly narrowed the challenge to the mundane task of building state institutions. Gone was the revolutionary aura with which Arafat imbued the idea; the struggle, no longer about freedom and the end of occupation, became about erecting responsible structures of government.
One of Bush's least noticed but most profound and pernicious legacies in the region might well turn out to have been this transformation of the concept of Palestinian statehood from among the more revolutionary to the more conservative, from inspiring to humdrum. A small fraction of Palestinians, mainly members of the Palestinian Authority's elite, saw the point of building state institutions, had an interest in doing so, and went to work. For the majority, this kind of project could not have strayed further from their original political concerns.
Today, the idea of Palestinian statehood is alive, but mainly outside of Palestine. Establishing a state has become a matter of utmost priority for Europeans, who see it as crucial to stabilizing the region and curbing the growth of extremism; for Americans, who hail it as a centerpiece in efforts to contain Iran as well as radical Islamists and to forge a coalition between so-called moderate Arab states and Israel; and even for a large number of Israelis who have come to believe it is the sole effective answer to the threat to Israel's existence posed by Arab demographics. Those might all be good reasons, though none is of particular relevance to Palestinians; and each only further alienates them from the vision of statehood, the purported object of their struggle.
Universal endorsement has its downside. The more the two-state solution looks like an American or Western, not to mention Israeli, interest, the less it appeals to Palestinians. It is hard to generate excitement among Palestinians for a project explicitly aimed at protecting the interests of their historic foe (Israel), defeating one of their political organizations (Hamas), or rescuing pro-Western Arab regimes for which they evince little sympathy. Many Palestinians feel that the notion of statehood has been hijacked by their historic detractors who rejected it when it was briefly a Palestinian idea only to endorse it when they made it their own. The process of legitimizing a state in international eyes has helped discredit it in those of its intended beneficiaries.
The two-state concept has been further tarnished by what has become of its Palestinian promoters. Today, many Palestinians no longer see their leaders as carrying out a national project but rather as instruments of foreign designs aimed at bolstering one faction of Palestinians against another. When the Palestinian Authority seeks guidance, it appears to look outward: to the US to judge whether the program of a putative national unity government would pass muster or to help devise a security plan; to Israel for assistance coping with the Islamist challenge; to Egypt and the rest of the world for how to deal with Gaza.
In all this, the PA's policy choices pose less of a problem than the method through which they seem to be reached—based not on an indigenous Palestinian notion of national self- interest, but rather on a foreign concept of what it ought to be. On their own, Palestinian leaders might opt for confrontation with Hamas, for unity, or for something else. The decision might work or it might backfire. At least it would be theirs. Instead, they currently speak and act as if they are at the head of some Palestinians—the more respectable ones—while leaving it to others to handle the more troublesome lot. All of which diminishes the PA's standing, even in the eyes of many otherwise most prone to support its program, and inflates its opposition, even among many who share nothing in common with the Islamists' agenda.
None of this was preordained. Abbas came to power in 2005 with the historic legitimacy of forty years of arduous struggle; with authority that neither Fatah nor Hamas dared to challenge; and with a then-credible vision, the two-state solution, which had long formed the core of his beliefs. These could have been put to good use to fulfill his original plan, which was to moderate Hamas's policies by gaining the cooperation of the Islamist movement and turning the Palestinian president into the necessary intermediary between Palestinians—all of them—and the international community for the achievement of a peace agreement with Israel. That was not to be.
Abbas's legitimacy was eroded by the West's suffocating embrace—a bear hug made worse for its being American, and worse yet for coming from President Bush. His authority was blunted by intrusive US meddling as Palestinians questioned whether decisions were made by their president or imposed by others. And his vision was blurred by the two-state solution's metamorphosis from a national idea to a foreign one.
Abbas's predicament stems from the help he has been denied as well as from the support he has been ill-advisedly given by those who claim to wish him well, the US and Europeans in particular. Time and again, they have pushed him in directions his instincts initially resisted but to which, bereft of a support team and the instruments of power needed to stand firm, he ultimately succumbed—away from national unity and toward greater reliance on foreign benefactors. Condescendingly justifying their actions by alleging that he was powerless, the US and the Europeans only made him appear more so. Abbas is an opportunity that has never ceased to be missed.
5.
Statehood was and could at some point again be a Palestinian achievement, but for now it has become somebody else's prize. That is not necessarily fatal. Obama has what no US president before him had and, one could venture, few following him will possess: an ability to speak to a foreign audience and, without in any way diminishing America's dignity, elevate theirs. His appar- ent etermination to broaden Israeli– Palestinian talks so as to involve in one way or another tens of Arab and Muslim states might give American diplomacy a further, notable lift. With time and tenacity, a strategy predicated on building an international coalition, pressing the two sides to make necessary compromises, and presenting them with a final two-state solution might succeed. A state packaged by Bush is one thing. Wrapped up by Obama, it would be something else altogether.
Then again, it would be a gamble. Should a significant number of Palestinians or Israelis construe such a solution as promoted by the wrong people for the wrong reasons in the wrong way, they will not see it as a solution at all. They will object and seek to mobilize those without whose support a deal would stand on tenuous grounds. For some time at least, the benefits of a deal will be less evident than the concessions it requires. For opponents, that time will be precious. An agreement that is not implemented or that does not last would produce a radicalizing effect that no absence of agreement could ever accomplish.
There may be another way. Its starting point would be less of an immediate effort to achieve a two-state agreement or propose US ideas to that effect. Rather, it would be an attempt to transform the political atmosphere and reformulate the diplomatic process. This would entail, first, identifying and recognizing fundamental Israeli and Palestinian concerns and aspirations and then placing them at the core of the process. In turn, this would involve altering how a US-supported solution is conceived and presented to both sides so that Palestinians see it as the outcome of their national struggle and Israelis as the culmination of their historic quest rather than as the byproduct of others' strategic pursuits. The end result might well be the same—two states, living side by side. But the journey would be more authentic and its destination more acceptable.
The task, in other words, would not be to polish up answers to questions of borders, security, Jerusalem, or how to compensate refugees. That approach increasingly is becoming a sideshow, chiefly of interest to official negotiators. Nor would talk center on creating Palestinian institutions or extolling a two-state solution's value in combating extremism or reshaping the region. When Israel's foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, calls for dropping timeworn slogans—land for peace, two-state solution—he has a political purpose. He also has a point. Endless repetition has not brought realization of these goals closer, and it has chipped away at their credibility. America's discourse can reconnect with both sides' hopes and needs if it addresses them and reverts to basics—namely, acknowledging and redressing injustices suffered by Palestinians and providing Israelis with the recognition and normalcy historically denied them.
A new language would help; so too would a broader audience. Peace camps on both sides have long been sold on the two-state idea. They cannot sell it any longer. The more they are identified with the proposal, the less appealing it will be. The US should reach out to skeptical constituencies that would make a difference but are left indifferent by current talk of a two-state agreement. One example is the settlers, an active and dynamic Israeli group yet one that the outside world typically treats as modern-day lepers. A more inclusive political process could recognize their views and concerns, consider their interests, and invite them to take part in discussions.
Another such case, certainly, is the Palestinian diaspora, whose opinions have defined national aspirations from the outset and will shape the collective response into the future. Walter Russell Mead puts it well in a recent article: "Any deal," he writes, "must address the issues of greatest concern to the dispossessed refugees, who best embody Palestinian nationalism and remain the ultimate source of political legitimacy in Palestinian politics."[*]
President Obama will give a speech in Cairo, though in view of the state of Arab polarization, it carries equal risk of dividing as of uniting public opinion; he also likely will make the traditional pilgrimage to Ramallah. But why not consider a speech that will make even the most cynical pause—one that addresses the Palestinian refugees' concerns, is delivered to refugees, and given in a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon? President Obama, flanked by President Abbas, surrounded by refugee leaders, speaking to a cheering crowd of thousands hailing from camps across Lebanon and, through them, to millions of Palestinians scattered across the globe: the sight, powerful and stirring, could do more than any US plan to change the mood, minds, and emotions.
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict will have to be tackled within the 1967 boundaries. But it can be resolved only if it deals candidly with its 1948 genesis. In fact, the more the refugees' plight is openly acknowledged by the US, the easier it will become to end the indecent prolongation of their current misery on the dubious pretext that if their lives could be improved, this would eradicate their cause and obliterate their rights.
It will be equally important for the United States to modify its dealings with domestic Palestinian politics and, in particular, the Palestinian president. Abbas is a man in desperate need of being left alone. If his actions are to be seen as legitimate and his endorsement of an agreement is to carry weight, he cannot appear as the president of only some Palestinians but must appear as the president of all; he cannot hand over, under pressure, critical decisions to outside parties but must assume them himself. He must be allowed to do what he considers right. Washington need not openly promote Palestinian unity. But it could stop standing in the way by signaling its acceptance of any reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah to which the Palestinian president lent his name. The US should continue to support Abbas. But it could stop placing him in that politically confining and damaging position where the fate of his people seems to be decided by others. If the goal is to strengthen Abbas, there is no better way.
How a peace initiative is received also will be a function of the regional climate. The more it is polarized between so-called moderates and radicals and the more the purpose appears to be to bolster the former while harming the latter, the more opposition will be energized. Militancy will find sympathetic ears. Among Palestinians, the sense will grow that the US is waging a battle in their name but not for their sake.
6.
From the first day of his presidency, which began as the Gaza war that traumatized the region and radicalized it further came to an end, Obama's Middle East challenge has been plain. He must win over the large pool of disaffected Arabs and Muslims who have ceased believing in the United States.
The climb will be steep. His election was a beginning, raising questions where not long before had reigned near-undivided, and negative, conviction. The new president can rely on more stirring rhetoric; he will enjoy a more receptive audience and will be looked at in a fresh light. That will take him only so far. He will be given the benefit of the doubt, but the doubt will remain colossal.
For the new president, the starting point should be recognition of some uncomfortable, brutal realities. These include the depth of inherited anti-American animus; of cynicism toward old plans and tired formulas; of popular estrangement from the regional leaders on whom Washington has come to depend; and of popular attraction to militant activists, militant behavior, and a radical worldview.
The consequence is that some well-worn recipes cannot work. Claiming eagerness to end the Arab–Israeli conflict or reach a two-state solution has become stale by dint of sterile repetition. President Bush did so, possibly more passionately and fervently than any predecessor. Yet few listened because few believed in what he said, least of all the Palestinians who were his supposed audience. Relying upon and bestowing aid to traditional Arab allies or seeking to improve their ties with Israel will not help much either. It would be preaching to the choir, burdening the Obama administration with the weight of unpopular figures and entrenching the notion that, at least in this respect, America is content with prolonging the past.
The time will come for the US to unfurl a grand diplomatic initiative. Not now. The most urgent task is to prepare the way for that day by countering the skepticism that has greeted and torpedoed every recent American idea, good or bad—from Secretary of State William Roger's 1969 plan to the road map. The time is for a clean break, in words, style, and approach.
For many in the US, the notion of such radical change often is reduced to the question of whether or not to talk to Hamas. That is a diversion. The challenge is whether Obama can speak to those for whom Hamas speaks. They are the people who have lost faith in America, its motivations, and every proposal it promotes.
The broader point is this: a window exists, short and subject to abrupt closure, during which President Obama can radically upset Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim preconceptions and make it possible for his future plan, whatever and whenever it might be, to get a fair hearing—for American professions of seriousness to be taken seriously. It won't be done by repackaging the peace process of years past. It won't be done by seeking to strengthen those leaders viewed by their own people as at best weak, incompetent, and feckless, at worst irresponsible, careless, and reckless. It won't be done by perpetuating the bogus and unhelpful distinction between extremists and moderates, by isolating the former, reaching out to the latter, and ending up disconnected from the region's most relevant actors.
It won't be done by trying to perform better what was performed before. President Bush's legacy was, in this sense, doubly harmful: he did the wrong things poorly, which now risks creating the false expectation that, somehow, they can be done well.
—May 14, 2009
Notes
[*]Walter Russell Mead, "Change They Can Believe In," Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009.
New York Review of Books
Volume 56, Number 10 · June 11, 2009
1.
By virtually every measure—name, race, origins, and upbringing—Barack Hussein Obama was a revolutionary presidential candidate. In Mideast policy at least, there is little reason to imagine that he will be a revolutionary president. The radical break with traditional US policy came with the Bush administration, during which the US invaded and then occupied Iraq, shunned Syria, and engaged in an effort, at once ambitious and irresponsible, to reshape the region. Bush's presidency represented an upheaval because it was both guided and blinded by a rigid ideological outlook and because of its uncommon proclivity to choose military over diplomatic means. Obama's first step will be to close that stormy parenthesis. It will be no small achievement.
His own agenda for the Middle East is at the center of greater speculation, and at the heart of that speculation is the question of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. There are signs—the fact that they are taking their time, reviewing their policies, consulting broadly—that the President and his team are committed to pragmatism and patience, qualities they found wanting in Bush's rash attempt to impose a new order on the Middle East but also in Bill Clinton's impetuous efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement. Their focus, at the outset at least, likely will be on improving conditions on the ground, including the West Bank economy, curbing if not halting Israeli settlement construction, pursuing reform of Palestinian security forces, and improving relations between Israel and Arab countries.
Little Bookroom / Savoir Fare London
But there also are hints of a grand ambition biding its time. Obama has not staked his presidency on resolving the conflict, but he has not shied away from the challenge either. Judging by what the new president and his colleagues have suggested, attending to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a matter of US national interest. The administration seems prepared to devote considerable diplomatic, economic, and, perhaps, political capital to that end. And the goal, once the ground has been settled, will be to achieve a comprehensive, two-state solution.
At first glance, there's more reason to be confounded than convinced. If such is the President's objective, it will be pursued under unusually inauspicious circumstances. In Israel, a prime minister, Ehud Olmert, who never tired of reiterating his commitment to a Palestinian state has been replaced by one, Benjamin Netanyahu, who can barely bring himself to utter the words. His coalition partners—a mix of right-wing, xenophobic, and religious parties—make matters worse. Even the participation of Ehud Barak and his Labor party in the coalition is of scant comfort. Barak was prime minister when Israeli–Palestinian negotiations collapsed at the Camp David summit in 2000; the principal lesson he seems to have drawn is to distrust all things Palestinian. As defense minister under Olmert, he barely concealed his disdain for the talks the Palestinians conducted with his own government, dismissing them as an "academic seminar." It is hard to imagine this new coalition going further than its predecessor, which, in Palestinian eyes, didn't go far enough.
On the Palestinian side, intense Egyptian-mediated reconciliation talks between Hamas and Fatah have so far failed to stitch the national movement together. The price of their divisions, costly under any circumstances, has inflated several-fold as a result of the war in Gaza in December and January between Israel and Hamas. The conflict proved, if proof were still needed, that President Mahmoud Abbas cannot continue to talk peace with Israel when Israel is at war with Palestinians and that Palestinians cannot make peace with Israel when they are at war with themselves. Hamas possesses the power to spoil any progress and will use it. It can act as an implacable opponent against any potential Palestinian compromise. Bilateral negotiations that failed when Olmert was prime minister and Hamas was a mere Palestinian faction are unlikely to succeed with Netanyahu at the helm and Hamas having grown into a regional reality.
If, despite this desolate landscape, the Obama administration nonetheless is determined to push for a final agreement, it could be because the President has something else in mind. At some point, he might intend to bypass negotiations between the parties and, with support from a broad international coalition including Arab countries, Russia, and the European Union, present them with a detailed two-state agreement they will be hard-pressed to reject. The concept stems from the notion that, left to their own devices, the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships are incapable of reaching an accord and that they will need all the pressure and persuasion the world can muster to take the last, fateful steps.
It is one option. But before jumping toward it, basic issues should be explored. Getting the leaders to endorse a peace deal will be no mean feat, but it is not the only and perhaps not the most substantial challenge. The other question is how in the current climate the Israeli and Palestinian people would welcome a two-state solution. Would they view it as authentic or illegitimate? Would they see it as ending their conflict or merely opening its next round? Would it be more effective at mobilizing supporters or at galvanizing opponents? What, in short, would a two-state solution actually solve?
2.
The challenge of ending the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has, of late, almost entirely revolved around tinkering with the details of a two-state agreement. Efforts toward a settlement, whether official or unofficial, focused on adjusting percentages of territorial annexation and land exchange; dividing and defining forms of sovereignty over Jerusalem; describing the attributes of a Palestinian state; and, more often as afterthought than central concern, finding technical ways to resettle and compensate the refugees. Successive failures and the repeated inability to satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian needs have been vexing. So far at least, these difficulties have not called into question the assumption that an equilibrium of interests exists or that it can be fully found within a two-state agreement. It's just been seen as a matter of trying harder.
That President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert were incapable of reaching a settlement in 2008 following the goals set at the Annapolis conference might not be conclusive. But it gives reason to doubt the premise that more of the same can yield something different. Abbas is widely hailed as among the Palestinians' most pragmatic leaders. Olmert took a more circuitous route to the peace camp, but he exhibited the faith of the late convert, intense and profound. After months of talks, Abbas declined a far more concessive Israeli proposal—on the size of the territory for Palestinians, for example—than the one Yasser Arafat turned down eight years ago and for which the then Palestinian leader was excoriated as an implacable enemy of peace. There is little reason to believe that more tweaking of the accord would have made a difference.
A workable two-state agreement would address a large share of the two sides' aspirations. It would preserve Israel's Jewish character and majority, provide it with final and recognized borders, and maintain its ties to Jewish holy sites. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would live free of Israeli occupation, they would govern Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, and refugees would have the opportunity to choose normal lives through resettlement and compensation. If meeting those goals were sufficient, why have the parties proved incapable of settling the dispute?
Aspirations reflect historical experience. For Israel's Jewish population, this includes displacement, persecution, the life of the ghetto, and the horrors of the Holocaust; and the long, frustrated quest for a normal, recognized, and accepted homeland. There is a craving for a future that will not echo the past and for the kind of ordinary security—the unquestioned acceptance of a Jewish presence in the region—that even overwhelming military superiority cannot guarantee. There is, too, at least among a significant, active segment of the Israeli population, a deep-seated attachment to the land, all of it, that constitutes Eretz Israel.
For Palestinians, the most primal demands relate to addressing and redressing a historical experience of dispossession, expulsion, dispersal, massacres, occupation, discrimination, denial of dignity, persistent killing off of their leaders, and the relentless fracturing of their national polity.
These Israeli and Palestinian yearnings are of a sort that, no matter how precisely fine-tuned, a two-state deal will find it hard to fulfill. Over the years, the goal gradually has shifted from reaching peace to achieving a two-state agreement. Those aims might sound the same, but they are not: peace may be possible without such an agreement just as such an agreement need not necessarily lead to peace. Partitioning the land can, and most probably will, be an important means of achieving a viable, lasting, peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. But it is not the end.
3.
The idea of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel has an unusually interesting, troubled, and—from the British plan of the 1930s to the United Nations partition plan of 1947—mainly foreign pedigree. What it is not and, save for a brief period in the recent past, has not been is an indigenous Palestinian demand. Partition meant accepting less than the whole of the area of the British Mandate of Palestine; it also came to mean barring the return of refugees who were expelled or fled in 1948. For most of its history, the Palestinian national movement would have nothing to do with it. Israelis were no more enthralled. It took them even longer to warm up to the concept of Palestinian statehood, which they saw as both artificial, insofar as no such entity had existed in the past, and dangerous, because most Arabs and Palestinians denied Israelis the reciprocal right to a Jewish homeland.
Palestinians came to accept the two-state solution by the late 1980s, though that acceptance was always somewhat grudging. Statehood acquired the trappings of a national cause but it never truly matched national aspirations. For most, it appealed more to the head than to the heart; it was an arguably useful way of achieving greater goals but never the objective in and of itself. Unlike Zionism, for whom statehood was the central objective, the Palestinian fight was primarily about other matters. The absence of a state was not the cause of all their misfortune. Its creation would not be the full solution either.
Palestinian embrace of the idea of statehood essentially was the handiwork of a single man. With time, cunning, and shrewd politics, and because few dared challenge his militant credentials, Yasser Arafat fundamentally altered his movement's position. His efforts were not without ambiguity. He toyed with Palestinians and worried Israelis by presenting a Palestinian state both as a solution and as a way station toward one. He made compromise—the acceptance of an Israeli state within the 1967 borders—feel like conquest and he managed to pack into partition feelings of historical vindication, dignity, and honor. When it came to persuading the West and Israel that he genuinely believed in a two-state solution, his past record of militancy was a burden. But when it came to selling a two-state solution to his people, that record was his greatest asset.
Among Palestinians, the concept of statehood has not aged well. It has suffered several punishing blows, mainly at the hands of those who purported to buttress it. This is not chiefly related to its substance, which, through a series of formal and informal Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, has not varied much and, if anything, has come closer to mirroring what the Palestinians could live with. It has everything to do with who is promoting it, for what reason, in what way, and in what domestic and regional context. Palestinians do not judge the idea of a state on its merits. They judge it by the company it keeps.
4.
The new millennium began with the near-universal acceptance of the idea of a Palestinian state, which is precisely when its support among Palestinians began to slip. President Bush, the first US president to have ardently endorsed it, framed it as the answer to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and then hurriedly narrowed the challenge to the mundane task of building state institutions. Gone was the revolutionary aura with which Arafat imbued the idea; the struggle, no longer about freedom and the end of occupation, became about erecting responsible structures of government.
One of Bush's least noticed but most profound and pernicious legacies in the region might well turn out to have been this transformation of the concept of Palestinian statehood from among the more revolutionary to the more conservative, from inspiring to humdrum. A small fraction of Palestinians, mainly members of the Palestinian Authority's elite, saw the point of building state institutions, had an interest in doing so, and went to work. For the majority, this kind of project could not have strayed further from their original political concerns.
Today, the idea of Palestinian statehood is alive, but mainly outside of Palestine. Establishing a state has become a matter of utmost priority for Europeans, who see it as crucial to stabilizing the region and curbing the growth of extremism; for Americans, who hail it as a centerpiece in efforts to contain Iran as well as radical Islamists and to forge a coalition between so-called moderate Arab states and Israel; and even for a large number of Israelis who have come to believe it is the sole effective answer to the threat to Israel's existence posed by Arab demographics. Those might all be good reasons, though none is of particular relevance to Palestinians; and each only further alienates them from the vision of statehood, the purported object of their struggle.
Universal endorsement has its downside. The more the two-state solution looks like an American or Western, not to mention Israeli, interest, the less it appeals to Palestinians. It is hard to generate excitement among Palestinians for a project explicitly aimed at protecting the interests of their historic foe (Israel), defeating one of their political organizations (Hamas), or rescuing pro-Western Arab regimes for which they evince little sympathy. Many Palestinians feel that the notion of statehood has been hijacked by their historic detractors who rejected it when it was briefly a Palestinian idea only to endorse it when they made it their own. The process of legitimizing a state in international eyes has helped discredit it in those of its intended beneficiaries.
The two-state concept has been further tarnished by what has become of its Palestinian promoters. Today, many Palestinians no longer see their leaders as carrying out a national project but rather as instruments of foreign designs aimed at bolstering one faction of Palestinians against another. When the Palestinian Authority seeks guidance, it appears to look outward: to the US to judge whether the program of a putative national unity government would pass muster or to help devise a security plan; to Israel for assistance coping with the Islamist challenge; to Egypt and the rest of the world for how to deal with Gaza.
In all this, the PA's policy choices pose less of a problem than the method through which they seem to be reached—based not on an indigenous Palestinian notion of national self- interest, but rather on a foreign concept of what it ought to be. On their own, Palestinian leaders might opt for confrontation with Hamas, for unity, or for something else. The decision might work or it might backfire. At least it would be theirs. Instead, they currently speak and act as if they are at the head of some Palestinians—the more respectable ones—while leaving it to others to handle the more troublesome lot. All of which diminishes the PA's standing, even in the eyes of many otherwise most prone to support its program, and inflates its opposition, even among many who share nothing in common with the Islamists' agenda.
None of this was preordained. Abbas came to power in 2005 with the historic legitimacy of forty years of arduous struggle; with authority that neither Fatah nor Hamas dared to challenge; and with a then-credible vision, the two-state solution, which had long formed the core of his beliefs. These could have been put to good use to fulfill his original plan, which was to moderate Hamas's policies by gaining the cooperation of the Islamist movement and turning the Palestinian president into the necessary intermediary between Palestinians—all of them—and the international community for the achievement of a peace agreement with Israel. That was not to be.
Abbas's legitimacy was eroded by the West's suffocating embrace—a bear hug made worse for its being American, and worse yet for coming from President Bush. His authority was blunted by intrusive US meddling as Palestinians questioned whether decisions were made by their president or imposed by others. And his vision was blurred by the two-state solution's metamorphosis from a national idea to a foreign one.
Abbas's predicament stems from the help he has been denied as well as from the support he has been ill-advisedly given by those who claim to wish him well, the US and Europeans in particular. Time and again, they have pushed him in directions his instincts initially resisted but to which, bereft of a support team and the instruments of power needed to stand firm, he ultimately succumbed—away from national unity and toward greater reliance on foreign benefactors. Condescendingly justifying their actions by alleging that he was powerless, the US and the Europeans only made him appear more so. Abbas is an opportunity that has never ceased to be missed.
5.
Statehood was and could at some point again be a Palestinian achievement, but for now it has become somebody else's prize. That is not necessarily fatal. Obama has what no US president before him had and, one could venture, few following him will possess: an ability to speak to a foreign audience and, without in any way diminishing America's dignity, elevate theirs. His appar- ent etermination to broaden Israeli– Palestinian talks so as to involve in one way or another tens of Arab and Muslim states might give American diplomacy a further, notable lift. With time and tenacity, a strategy predicated on building an international coalition, pressing the two sides to make necessary compromises, and presenting them with a final two-state solution might succeed. A state packaged by Bush is one thing. Wrapped up by Obama, it would be something else altogether.
Then again, it would be a gamble. Should a significant number of Palestinians or Israelis construe such a solution as promoted by the wrong people for the wrong reasons in the wrong way, they will not see it as a solution at all. They will object and seek to mobilize those without whose support a deal would stand on tenuous grounds. For some time at least, the benefits of a deal will be less evident than the concessions it requires. For opponents, that time will be precious. An agreement that is not implemented or that does not last would produce a radicalizing effect that no absence of agreement could ever accomplish.
There may be another way. Its starting point would be less of an immediate effort to achieve a two-state agreement or propose US ideas to that effect. Rather, it would be an attempt to transform the political atmosphere and reformulate the diplomatic process. This would entail, first, identifying and recognizing fundamental Israeli and Palestinian concerns and aspirations and then placing them at the core of the process. In turn, this would involve altering how a US-supported solution is conceived and presented to both sides so that Palestinians see it as the outcome of their national struggle and Israelis as the culmination of their historic quest rather than as the byproduct of others' strategic pursuits. The end result might well be the same—two states, living side by side. But the journey would be more authentic and its destination more acceptable.
The task, in other words, would not be to polish up answers to questions of borders, security, Jerusalem, or how to compensate refugees. That approach increasingly is becoming a sideshow, chiefly of interest to official negotiators. Nor would talk center on creating Palestinian institutions or extolling a two-state solution's value in combating extremism or reshaping the region. When Israel's foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, calls for dropping timeworn slogans—land for peace, two-state solution—he has a political purpose. He also has a point. Endless repetition has not brought realization of these goals closer, and it has chipped away at their credibility. America's discourse can reconnect with both sides' hopes and needs if it addresses them and reverts to basics—namely, acknowledging and redressing injustices suffered by Palestinians and providing Israelis with the recognition and normalcy historically denied them.
A new language would help; so too would a broader audience. Peace camps on both sides have long been sold on the two-state idea. They cannot sell it any longer. The more they are identified with the proposal, the less appealing it will be. The US should reach out to skeptical constituencies that would make a difference but are left indifferent by current talk of a two-state agreement. One example is the settlers, an active and dynamic Israeli group yet one that the outside world typically treats as modern-day lepers. A more inclusive political process could recognize their views and concerns, consider their interests, and invite them to take part in discussions.
Another such case, certainly, is the Palestinian diaspora, whose opinions have defined national aspirations from the outset and will shape the collective response into the future. Walter Russell Mead puts it well in a recent article: "Any deal," he writes, "must address the issues of greatest concern to the dispossessed refugees, who best embody Palestinian nationalism and remain the ultimate source of political legitimacy in Palestinian politics."[*]
President Obama will give a speech in Cairo, though in view of the state of Arab polarization, it carries equal risk of dividing as of uniting public opinion; he also likely will make the traditional pilgrimage to Ramallah. But why not consider a speech that will make even the most cynical pause—one that addresses the Palestinian refugees' concerns, is delivered to refugees, and given in a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon? President Obama, flanked by President Abbas, surrounded by refugee leaders, speaking to a cheering crowd of thousands hailing from camps across Lebanon and, through them, to millions of Palestinians scattered across the globe: the sight, powerful and stirring, could do more than any US plan to change the mood, minds, and emotions.
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict will have to be tackled within the 1967 boundaries. But it can be resolved only if it deals candidly with its 1948 genesis. In fact, the more the refugees' plight is openly acknowledged by the US, the easier it will become to end the indecent prolongation of their current misery on the dubious pretext that if their lives could be improved, this would eradicate their cause and obliterate their rights.
It will be equally important for the United States to modify its dealings with domestic Palestinian politics and, in particular, the Palestinian president. Abbas is a man in desperate need of being left alone. If his actions are to be seen as legitimate and his endorsement of an agreement is to carry weight, he cannot appear as the president of only some Palestinians but must appear as the president of all; he cannot hand over, under pressure, critical decisions to outside parties but must assume them himself. He must be allowed to do what he considers right. Washington need not openly promote Palestinian unity. But it could stop standing in the way by signaling its acceptance of any reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah to which the Palestinian president lent his name. The US should continue to support Abbas. But it could stop placing him in that politically confining and damaging position where the fate of his people seems to be decided by others. If the goal is to strengthen Abbas, there is no better way.
How a peace initiative is received also will be a function of the regional climate. The more it is polarized between so-called moderates and radicals and the more the purpose appears to be to bolster the former while harming the latter, the more opposition will be energized. Militancy will find sympathetic ears. Among Palestinians, the sense will grow that the US is waging a battle in their name but not for their sake.
6.
From the first day of his presidency, which began as the Gaza war that traumatized the region and radicalized it further came to an end, Obama's Middle East challenge has been plain. He must win over the large pool of disaffected Arabs and Muslims who have ceased believing in the United States.
The climb will be steep. His election was a beginning, raising questions where not long before had reigned near-undivided, and negative, conviction. The new president can rely on more stirring rhetoric; he will enjoy a more receptive audience and will be looked at in a fresh light. That will take him only so far. He will be given the benefit of the doubt, but the doubt will remain colossal.
For the new president, the starting point should be recognition of some uncomfortable, brutal realities. These include the depth of inherited anti-American animus; of cynicism toward old plans and tired formulas; of popular estrangement from the regional leaders on whom Washington has come to depend; and of popular attraction to militant activists, militant behavior, and a radical worldview.
The consequence is that some well-worn recipes cannot work. Claiming eagerness to end the Arab–Israeli conflict or reach a two-state solution has become stale by dint of sterile repetition. President Bush did so, possibly more passionately and fervently than any predecessor. Yet few listened because few believed in what he said, least of all the Palestinians who were his supposed audience. Relying upon and bestowing aid to traditional Arab allies or seeking to improve their ties with Israel will not help much either. It would be preaching to the choir, burdening the Obama administration with the weight of unpopular figures and entrenching the notion that, at least in this respect, America is content with prolonging the past.
The time will come for the US to unfurl a grand diplomatic initiative. Not now. The most urgent task is to prepare the way for that day by countering the skepticism that has greeted and torpedoed every recent American idea, good or bad—from Secretary of State William Roger's 1969 plan to the road map. The time is for a clean break, in words, style, and approach.
For many in the US, the notion of such radical change often is reduced to the question of whether or not to talk to Hamas. That is a diversion. The challenge is whether Obama can speak to those for whom Hamas speaks. They are the people who have lost faith in America, its motivations, and every proposal it promotes.
The broader point is this: a window exists, short and subject to abrupt closure, during which President Obama can radically upset Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim preconceptions and make it possible for his future plan, whatever and whenever it might be, to get a fair hearing—for American professions of seriousness to be taken seriously. It won't be done by repackaging the peace process of years past. It won't be done by seeking to strengthen those leaders viewed by their own people as at best weak, incompetent, and feckless, at worst irresponsible, careless, and reckless. It won't be done by perpetuating the bogus and unhelpful distinction between extremists and moderates, by isolating the former, reaching out to the latter, and ending up disconnected from the region's most relevant actors.
It won't be done by trying to perform better what was performed before. President Bush's legacy was, in this sense, doubly harmful: he did the wrong things poorly, which now risks creating the false expectation that, somehow, they can be done well.
—May 14, 2009
Notes
[*]Walter Russell Mead, "Change They Can Believe In," Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009.
Mitchell associate: Obama won't rush to press Bibi
Close associate of Special Mideast Envoy Mitchell conveys reassuring message ahead of Netanyahu-Obama meeting; former Deputy National Security Advisor Abrams: First few minutes will determine chemistry between Israeli, US leaders
Yitzhak Benhorin
Israel News
YNET News
WASHINGTON - US President Barack Obama will not rush to press Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in their upcoming meeting, a close associate of Special Mideast Envoy George Mitchell said Sunday. "No winning strategy begins with a punch in the nose," the source said, adding that Netanyahu can expect a "business-like meeting, highlighting the common" between the two countries.
Meanwhile, former Bush Administration official Elliott Abrams estimated that the first minute or two of Monday's meeting may determine the chemistry between both leaders.
"This isn't the first meeting between the two, but it is Netanyahu's first meeting as Israel's prime minister with Obama as president of the United States," he told journalists, adding that there are many issues on the agenda and that Netanyahu will aim to understand Obama's real attitude on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and to Iran.
Pragmatic steps
Abrams noted that President Bush Jr. placed great emphasis on personal relations, yet it is too early to say how important such meetings are for Obama.
"It is unclear how important this specific meeting is for him" and whether it will change the way he conducts US Policy, Abrams said.
The former deputy national security advisor believes that even if both leaders fail to agree on diplomatic issues, it would be enough for them to agree on "pragmatic steps" that would enable President Obama to talk about progress during his speech in Egypt next month.
"That way he would be able to give George Mitchell something to work with in his next trip to the area," Abrams said.
Roni Sofer contributed to the report
Sunday, May 17, 2009
Realism Must be Realistic: Why So Many People Who Should Know Better Don’t Understand Middle East Politics
RubinReports
http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2009/05/realism-must-be-realistic-why-so-many.html
Barry Rubin
I’m a Realist. In international affairs, Realists are people who believe that countries act according to their interests. But who decides the interests in dictatorships? Answer: The ruling regimes. And those interests are defined according to the regime’s interests: what keeps it in power, what allows it to mobilize support and keep down opponents, what profits the ruling class and its allies in material terms? Here’s where much misunderstanding arises. Many academics, journalists, and diplomats can’t help but assume that radicalism and regional instability are against the national interests of Middle East countries. Since these things exist to a high degree, there must be something wrong with the situation, something that can be fixed, something—most important of all—that the regimes want to fix.
And that brings them to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The view is that continuation of the conflict is against the interests of the regimes and therefore, according to their national interests, they want to fix it as soon as possible.
Why, then, hasn’t the problem been solved? If such thinkers conclude that the villain is a group of extremists and terrorists taking advantage of the conflict or simple gridlock based on a lack of creative thinking, or various other things, they believe that a vigorous peace process is needed and can work fairly quickly and easily.
But in that case, how come previous peace processes have failed? This is explained by saying that the practitioners weren’t good enough--“I’m smarter or more charming than they were,” which today seems to be what President Barack Obama is saying—or didn’t try hard enough—how could anyone have tried harder than President Bill Clinton? Or perhaps there’s some brilliant solution that will make the conflict over east Jerusalem go away and somehow square quite a lot of circles.
These are the moderate peace processers.
Then there are those who think that it has been Israel or U.S. support for Israel which has stopped the Arab states that desperately want to solve the issue. This urgent effort has been sort of hard to find but a blend of ignorance, avid reading of Arab propaganda, wishful thinking, and anti-Israel (or anti-Jewish) thinking in wildly differing proportions makes the mirage take on three dimensions.
These are the extremists who often end up as allies, or at least enablers, of radical Islamist movements and terrorists.
Yet none of this is Realist thinking. Realist thinking analyzes the objective and perceived interests of the regimes. Things like:
--Needing the conflict in demagogic terms to mobilize support for even relatively moderate regime which are corrupt, repressive, and bad at improving their people’s lives.
There is little or no hope of democracy—that’s where the Bush administration went wrong--but plenty of possibility for Islamist revolution. Rulers know it and want to avoid it.
--Consequently, regimes have to prove how militant they are in fighting the battle against Israel while, at the same time, going too far for peace would promote internal upheaval.
--The conflict is useful in inter-state relations. For the strong, they have used it to try to subjugate weaker states, while the weaker states have rejected such absorption in the name of the most effective way of struggling against Israel. Using the conflict, some states get aid and alliances most useful for them.
--And for the revolutionaries, the Israel issue has been of great benefit. But the problem here is that they win either way. If the relative moderates demonize Israel and justify the conflict, the masses are being prepared further for the radicals’ message. And they can ask: Why haven’t the regimes wiped Israel off the map?
But if the regimes move toward peace, the revolutionaries declare them to be traitors and have an even better chance at overthrowing them. Certainly, at least, that’s what the rulers believe.
--Of course, Iran and Syria are trying to use the conflict to gain regional hegemony. But look, for example, at the state-controlled Egyptian media and see how the regime uses the stirring up hatred at Israel as a scapegoat and distraction. That doesn’t mean the hatred isn’t sincere, of course, but it does explain the intensity of the obsession and why the conflict is far more unsolvable than it “should” be.
All of this doesn’t mean that leaders and regimes act “irrationally” but on the basis of a different set of rational considerations adapted to their situations. If you’ve never been a dictator of an Arabic-speaking state, perhaps you should make some effort to understand how they view the world differently without being brainwashed into thinking that way yourself.
I’ve developed all these ideas a lot more in my books, along with multiple examples and proofs, but the basic point should be clear: Realism does explain Middle East politics but it must be based on realistic assessments of the structure of societies, polities, ideologies, and regimes.
Fools rush in where angels fear to tread. And since so much of the Middle East is a quagmire, you can imagine what happens next.
http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2009/05/realism-must-be-realistic-why-so-many.html
Barry Rubin
I’m a Realist. In international affairs, Realists are people who believe that countries act according to their interests. But who decides the interests in dictatorships? Answer: The ruling regimes. And those interests are defined according to the regime’s interests: what keeps it in power, what allows it to mobilize support and keep down opponents, what profits the ruling class and its allies in material terms? Here’s where much misunderstanding arises. Many academics, journalists, and diplomats can’t help but assume that radicalism and regional instability are against the national interests of Middle East countries. Since these things exist to a high degree, there must be something wrong with the situation, something that can be fixed, something—most important of all—that the regimes want to fix.
And that brings them to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The view is that continuation of the conflict is against the interests of the regimes and therefore, according to their national interests, they want to fix it as soon as possible.
Why, then, hasn’t the problem been solved? If such thinkers conclude that the villain is a group of extremists and terrorists taking advantage of the conflict or simple gridlock based on a lack of creative thinking, or various other things, they believe that a vigorous peace process is needed and can work fairly quickly and easily.
But in that case, how come previous peace processes have failed? This is explained by saying that the practitioners weren’t good enough--“I’m smarter or more charming than they were,” which today seems to be what President Barack Obama is saying—or didn’t try hard enough—how could anyone have tried harder than President Bill Clinton? Or perhaps there’s some brilliant solution that will make the conflict over east Jerusalem go away and somehow square quite a lot of circles.
These are the moderate peace processers.
Then there are those who think that it has been Israel or U.S. support for Israel which has stopped the Arab states that desperately want to solve the issue. This urgent effort has been sort of hard to find but a blend of ignorance, avid reading of Arab propaganda, wishful thinking, and anti-Israel (or anti-Jewish) thinking in wildly differing proportions makes the mirage take on three dimensions.
These are the extremists who often end up as allies, or at least enablers, of radical Islamist movements and terrorists.
Yet none of this is Realist thinking. Realist thinking analyzes the objective and perceived interests of the regimes. Things like:
--Needing the conflict in demagogic terms to mobilize support for even relatively moderate regime which are corrupt, repressive, and bad at improving their people’s lives.
There is little or no hope of democracy—that’s where the Bush administration went wrong--but plenty of possibility for Islamist revolution. Rulers know it and want to avoid it.
--Consequently, regimes have to prove how militant they are in fighting the battle against Israel while, at the same time, going too far for peace would promote internal upheaval.
--The conflict is useful in inter-state relations. For the strong, they have used it to try to subjugate weaker states, while the weaker states have rejected such absorption in the name of the most effective way of struggling against Israel. Using the conflict, some states get aid and alliances most useful for them.
--And for the revolutionaries, the Israel issue has been of great benefit. But the problem here is that they win either way. If the relative moderates demonize Israel and justify the conflict, the masses are being prepared further for the radicals’ message. And they can ask: Why haven’t the regimes wiped Israel off the map?
But if the regimes move toward peace, the revolutionaries declare them to be traitors and have an even better chance at overthrowing them. Certainly, at least, that’s what the rulers believe.
--Of course, Iran and Syria are trying to use the conflict to gain regional hegemony. But look, for example, at the state-controlled Egyptian media and see how the regime uses the stirring up hatred at Israel as a scapegoat and distraction. That doesn’t mean the hatred isn’t sincere, of course, but it does explain the intensity of the obsession and why the conflict is far more unsolvable than it “should” be.
All of this doesn’t mean that leaders and regimes act “irrationally” but on the basis of a different set of rational considerations adapted to their situations. If you’ve never been a dictator of an Arabic-speaking state, perhaps you should make some effort to understand how they view the world differently without being brainwashed into thinking that way yourself.
I’ve developed all these ideas a lot more in my books, along with multiple examples and proofs, but the basic point should be clear: Realism does explain Middle East politics but it must be based on realistic assessments of the structure of societies, polities, ideologies, and regimes.
Fools rush in where angels fear to tread. And since so much of the Middle East is a quagmire, you can imagine what happens next.
Fatah-Hamas Rivalry Threatens Israel-PA Negotiations
Yehudah Lev Kay PA Dispute Threatens Negotations
Fatah and Hamas met for a fifth round of unity discussions in Cario on Sunday, but PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas is prepared for the possibility that they won’t succeed.
Abbas warned Hamas last week that if the talks fail, he will move ahead with forming a new PA government in Judea and Samaria that won’t include the Gaza-based Hamas terrorist group.
In addition, Abbas traveled to Damascus last Thursday, home to Hamas’ leader Khaled Mashaal. According to Sunday’s A-sharq Al-awast newspaper, Abbas’ visit included a warning to Mashaal that if his group doesn’t come to an agreement with Fatah, he may have to leave Syria for Iran.
Israel says that negotiating with the PA is hindered by the lack of unity between Fatah and Hamas. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is likely to make this point to U.S. President Barack Obama in their discussions on the Israel-PA negotiations on Monday in Washington.
Egypt, who has hosted the unity talks since Hamas and Fatah formally broke ranks in 2007, fears the negotiations are not bearing fruit and has started to put pressure on the two sides. “By the beginning of July, an agreement must be signed,” Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman said.
Hamas insists that the negotiations are serious and ongoing. “We are discussing with Fatah all issues besides recognizing the Zionist entity,” a Gaza based spokesperson said.
The head of the Fatah delegation, Azzam Al-Ahmad, claimed there were three main issues at stake, “the election system, security during the transitional period in Gaza, and a joint security force.”
He said he was surprised at Suleiman’s warning, but explained that the Egyptian official insisted that PA unity was crucial admitting that “no progress could be achieved in the [Israeli- peace process before ending the rivalry” between Fatah and Hamas.
Obama And Israel - When Bibi Met Bammy
Joshuapundit
With Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu scheduled to come to the White for the first time next week, there's been a great deal of speculation regarding the Obama Administration's new strategy in the Middle East the future of the US -Israeli relationship and what it signifies for both countries in the future. There's a new game shaping up in the Middle East, and the pieces are moving with astounding speed.
It's not an exaggeration to characterize the Obama Administration as the most anti-Israel in American history. Many of President Obama's closest advisers, with the possible exception of Dennis Ross can be characterized by hostility to the Jewish state and the belief that the US pressuring Israel to retreat to the pre-1967 borders and using that territory to create a Palestinian state - regardless of its attributes or character - in the soonest time possible while distancing the US from its long standing alliance with Israel is the surest way to curry favor in the Muslim world.
President Obama has made the new attitude in the White House towards Israel clear in a number of ways. Israel has systematically been cut out of the security coordination with the US it enjoyed in earlier days, with the most recent example being Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller's call for Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty, a violation of a US-Israeli agreement that goes back forty years to the Nixon Administration. Under that agreement, the US agreed not to press Israel at the UN or elsewhere for transparency or inspections of its nuclear program and Israel agreed not to test a bomb or declare that it had developed a bomb.
Then there was the nomination of the anti-Israel Chas Freeman to an influential post the Durban II controversy and America’s joining of the the United Nations Human Rights Council — a group that basically is controlled by the Organization of Islamic Conference and obsessively focuses on demonizing Israel at the hands of paragons of human rights like Saudi Arabia and Libya.
Obama's NSA Adviser ( and de facto Secretary of State) General Jim Jones was widely quoted as telling a European foreign minister that America will take a more “forceful hand” towards Israel than previous administrations. And over at the AIPAC convention, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel cornered three hundred of AIPAC's top donors in a closed room and told them that if Israel expected any US help with Iran, they had better cave in to the Saudi Peace ultimatum, while Vice President Joe Biden addressed the convention and said that Israel had better 'stop building settlements' and essentially prepare to submit to Obama's diktats for a Palestinian state.
And to top it all off, Obama went public today. warning Israel not to 'surprise him' with an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. This is just the latest in a series of signals designed to show Israel that the Obama Administration is more than prepared to appease Iran at Israel's expense.
With all this in mind, what is the May 18th meeting between Bibi Netanyahu and Barack Hussein Obama likely to be like? What's going to happen when Bibi meets Bammy?
Unlike Obama, Bibi Netanyahu is a trained diplomat and what we'll likely see is one of two scenarios with the same end result. If things are really contentious behind the scenes, look for a low profile meeting like the one that occurred with Israeli President Shimon Peres last week - no photo-ops, no press conferences, and no joint speeches or statements.
If Netanyahu feels like he emerges with something significant,he may be willing to horsetrade an innocuous statement of support for the 'two state solution' for it, but with enough loopholes so that it doesn't commit him or Israel to anything major..in which case, we'll see a photo-op and a chance for Obama to mouth a few cliches about what a good friend he and his administration are to Israel.
Obama will undoubtedly attempt to get Netanyahu to accede to his demands by threatening to reduce Israel's military aid,cut off Israel's loan guarantees (which cost the US nothing but allow Israel to borrow money at more favorable rates). He may very well brandish the huge majority of the American Jewish vote he got ,or even threaten to revoke Israel's favored nation trading status. He will probably link any assistance on Iran's nuclear weapons with Israeli acquiescence to a Palestinian state on the entire West Bank even if it's ultimately Hamas run.
What Obama wants is some raw Israeli meat to throw at the Arabs when he addresses the Muslim world in Cairo on June 4th, and he expects Netanyahu to provide it - or else.
But the truth of the matter is, in one of those details that change history, Obama may have overplayed his hand.
When push comes to shove, Congress is still mostly pro-Israel..because enough American Jews who are silly Leftys on other issues aren't willing to pull the plug on Israel in the last analysis. And because there's another huge group of American supporters of Israel, evangelical Christians as well as a lot of people who aren't evangelicals but understand that Israel is our friend and ally and the Arabs and Iran aren't.
These Congressmen will have to stand for re-election before Obama does, and the last thing most of them will want to do is alienate the pro-Israel vote, even in an anti-Israel Obama administration.Obama might target fundraising for pro-Israel groups, but he'd have to significantly alter the law to really effect it. Nor do I think Congress would go along with cutting off Israel's aid entirely.
Oddly enough Obama may have overplayed his hand with the Arabs too. The Arabs, particularly the Saudis are absolutely appalled at the idea of an Iran with nukes. The Eastern part of Saudi Arabia near the Persian Gulf is where the oil is, and it's mostly populated by Shiites who are treated like an underclass there.The Saudis are terrified of the idea that the Iranians might foment unrest there, or use it to blackmail them.
During that summit in Europe Obama attended ( site of the famous bowing incident) back in April, my sources tell me that King Abdullah actually had a fairly forceful conversation with the Chosen One on the sidelines about his Iranian non-policy...to no avail. Egypt's Hosni Mubarak feels the same way, because he's going to be dealing with Hamas' parent organization the Muslim Brotherhood, which is his main political opposition, and he's trying to hand over power to his kid Gamal ( AKA 'Jack') without worrying about an Iranian proxy. That's precisely why the Egyptians have cracked down on Hamas and the weapons smuggling from Iran in a huge way lately.
Prior to meeting with Obama, Bibi Netanyahu met with both Jordan's King Abdullah and Mubarak, and he may have some interesting things to say to President Obama about how the other Arab nations feel about a nuclear Iran and a Palestinian state that might become an Iranian proxy.
With Obama adamantly opposed to assisting Israel with Iran and Turkey more firmly in the Islamist camp every day, I wouldn't be at all surprised if the Saudis gave some covert assistance to Israel in knocking out Iran's nukes. The path to Bushehr and Arak may very well involve a flight over Saudi territory...without the Saudis' 'knowledge', of course. Shimon Peres and Saudi King Abdullah supposedly had a clandestine meeting the other day, although Abdullah denied it after the story slipped out. They may very well have been discussing this if they met.
Afterwards the Sunni autocracies will squawk a great deal about 'Zionist aggression', but behind the scenes they will collectively heave a huge sigh of relief.
Meanwhile the Israelis have been extensively practicing long distance mid air refueling, dogfights in heavy formation against MIG-29's the mainstay of Iran's air force, and mounting strikes on Iranian weapons convoys bound for Hamas at distances as far afield as Sudan.
Obama's strategy with the mullahs involves trading acceptance of their nuclear weapons program and their control of Lebanon via Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian proxies (which will likely occur with the 'election' of June 7th) for Iran's keeping the Shiite militias in Iraq and their Taliban proxies in Afghanistan quiet so that the US can successfully withdraw and retreat from both places. In other words, appeasement and surrender overseas so Obama can concentrate on his domestic agenda.
This has a great deal to do with Obama's dangerous handling of what foreign policy wonks call 'the Northern tier' , the non-Arab Islamic countries of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, but that's a subject I'll get more into at another time.
Faced with the fact that they are facing a basically unfriendly administration and that Obama is going to do nothing whatever to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons, the Israelis will likely do what they have to do on Iran and inform the US shortly before the attack begins. Then they will rope-a-dope and wait things out until 2012, like they did with Carter.
What we'll more than likely see from Obama is allowing the UN to go nuts with anti-Israel resolutions, a colder atmosphere emanating from the White House, a hold on funding for joint weapons projects like the Arrow Missile and a partial cut off of aid, like the F-22 fighter that Israel actually paid substantial money to the US to be privy to the technology and then got screwed out of. Since that was all likely to happen anyway given Obama's basic attitude towards Israel, he's unwittingly given them a go-ahead.They have very little to lose.
Life in Israel with the threat of Iranian nukes hanging over them would be intolerable. I doubt that the present Israeli government is under any illusions about that, and will do something about it.
Obama may very well attempt to initiate a major cut off of military aid,providing public pressure and lobbying by the various defense contractors that benefit are unable to convince Congress not to go along with him. Right now a lot of Israeli gear is US made and that would present a problem for Israel, but not an insurmountable one. Israel got along just fine without it prior to Nixon, who was truly the first US president who really made Israel an ally and gave them significant military gear.
Israel's weapons industry is also much farther along now than it was then, and a cutoff in US military aid, aside from adding to unemployment here in America would simply give them an impetus to make more of their own gear.
Also, one thing the Israelis know how to do is improvise. In the past, they astounded visiting military visitors by doing things like attaching a captured Soviet T-64 cannon to a Brit Centurion tank chassis with American electronics and making all work somehow. They will do it again, and simply work towards being more self sufficient or buy parts under the table form places like Canada, India or Germany. That's what they did before, when DeGaulle cut them off right before the`67 War.
There's also the very real possibility that seeing the writing on the wall Israel is already looking for some new best friends.Sad, but things go that way sometimes.
Another thing in Israel's favor is that Iran is their major military threat. If they do things right and take out a lot of Iran's oil infrastructure as well as its nukes, Hezbollah and Hamas will not be funded like they are today. And even if Obama does start giving Hamas and Hezbollah top of the line stuff ( he's already started with Hezbollah, via the Lebanese Army) the Israelis have had to deal with enemies before that outnumbered them and were better weaponed than they were and have come out on top. Having nowhere to run to and something to fight for is a pretty powerful edge.
Ultimately, it's all in G-d's hands, and that does make me optimistic - especially given what the Jews and Israel have already somehow survived. If nothing else, at least this time they can defend themselves if they have the will. Or, as they say in Israel, ye heye beseder - it will all work itself out.
With Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu scheduled to come to the White for the first time next week, there's been a great deal of speculation regarding the Obama Administration's new strategy in the Middle East the future of the US -Israeli relationship and what it signifies for both countries in the future. There's a new game shaping up in the Middle East, and the pieces are moving with astounding speed.
It's not an exaggeration to characterize the Obama Administration as the most anti-Israel in American history. Many of President Obama's closest advisers, with the possible exception of Dennis Ross can be characterized by hostility to the Jewish state and the belief that the US pressuring Israel to retreat to the pre-1967 borders and using that territory to create a Palestinian state - regardless of its attributes or character - in the soonest time possible while distancing the US from its long standing alliance with Israel is the surest way to curry favor in the Muslim world.
President Obama has made the new attitude in the White House towards Israel clear in a number of ways. Israel has systematically been cut out of the security coordination with the US it enjoyed in earlier days, with the most recent example being Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller's call for Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty, a violation of a US-Israeli agreement that goes back forty years to the Nixon Administration. Under that agreement, the US agreed not to press Israel at the UN or elsewhere for transparency or inspections of its nuclear program and Israel agreed not to test a bomb or declare that it had developed a bomb.
Then there was the nomination of the anti-Israel Chas Freeman to an influential post the Durban II controversy and America’s joining of the the United Nations Human Rights Council — a group that basically is controlled by the Organization of Islamic Conference and obsessively focuses on demonizing Israel at the hands of paragons of human rights like Saudi Arabia and Libya.
Obama's NSA Adviser ( and de facto Secretary of State) General Jim Jones was widely quoted as telling a European foreign minister that America will take a more “forceful hand” towards Israel than previous administrations. And over at the AIPAC convention, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel cornered three hundred of AIPAC's top donors in a closed room and told them that if Israel expected any US help with Iran, they had better cave in to the Saudi Peace ultimatum, while Vice President Joe Biden addressed the convention and said that Israel had better 'stop building settlements' and essentially prepare to submit to Obama's diktats for a Palestinian state.
And to top it all off, Obama went public today. warning Israel not to 'surprise him' with an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. This is just the latest in a series of signals designed to show Israel that the Obama Administration is more than prepared to appease Iran at Israel's expense.
With all this in mind, what is the May 18th meeting between Bibi Netanyahu and Barack Hussein Obama likely to be like? What's going to happen when Bibi meets Bammy?
Unlike Obama, Bibi Netanyahu is a trained diplomat and what we'll likely see is one of two scenarios with the same end result. If things are really contentious behind the scenes, look for a low profile meeting like the one that occurred with Israeli President Shimon Peres last week - no photo-ops, no press conferences, and no joint speeches or statements.
If Netanyahu feels like he emerges with something significant,he may be willing to horsetrade an innocuous statement of support for the 'two state solution' for it, but with enough loopholes so that it doesn't commit him or Israel to anything major..in which case, we'll see a photo-op and a chance for Obama to mouth a few cliches about what a good friend he and his administration are to Israel.
Obama will undoubtedly attempt to get Netanyahu to accede to his demands by threatening to reduce Israel's military aid,cut off Israel's loan guarantees (which cost the US nothing but allow Israel to borrow money at more favorable rates). He may very well brandish the huge majority of the American Jewish vote he got ,or even threaten to revoke Israel's favored nation trading status. He will probably link any assistance on Iran's nuclear weapons with Israeli acquiescence to a Palestinian state on the entire West Bank even if it's ultimately Hamas run.
What Obama wants is some raw Israeli meat to throw at the Arabs when he addresses the Muslim world in Cairo on June 4th, and he expects Netanyahu to provide it - or else.
But the truth of the matter is, in one of those details that change history, Obama may have overplayed his hand.
When push comes to shove, Congress is still mostly pro-Israel..because enough American Jews who are silly Leftys on other issues aren't willing to pull the plug on Israel in the last analysis. And because there's another huge group of American supporters of Israel, evangelical Christians as well as a lot of people who aren't evangelicals but understand that Israel is our friend and ally and the Arabs and Iran aren't.
These Congressmen will have to stand for re-election before Obama does, and the last thing most of them will want to do is alienate the pro-Israel vote, even in an anti-Israel Obama administration.Obama might target fundraising for pro-Israel groups, but he'd have to significantly alter the law to really effect it. Nor do I think Congress would go along with cutting off Israel's aid entirely.
Oddly enough Obama may have overplayed his hand with the Arabs too. The Arabs, particularly the Saudis are absolutely appalled at the idea of an Iran with nukes. The Eastern part of Saudi Arabia near the Persian Gulf is where the oil is, and it's mostly populated by Shiites who are treated like an underclass there.The Saudis are terrified of the idea that the Iranians might foment unrest there, or use it to blackmail them.
During that summit in Europe Obama attended ( site of the famous bowing incident) back in April, my sources tell me that King Abdullah actually had a fairly forceful conversation with the Chosen One on the sidelines about his Iranian non-policy...to no avail. Egypt's Hosni Mubarak feels the same way, because he's going to be dealing with Hamas' parent organization the Muslim Brotherhood, which is his main political opposition, and he's trying to hand over power to his kid Gamal ( AKA 'Jack') without worrying about an Iranian proxy. That's precisely why the Egyptians have cracked down on Hamas and the weapons smuggling from Iran in a huge way lately.
Prior to meeting with Obama, Bibi Netanyahu met with both Jordan's King Abdullah and Mubarak, and he may have some interesting things to say to President Obama about how the other Arab nations feel about a nuclear Iran and a Palestinian state that might become an Iranian proxy.
With Obama adamantly opposed to assisting Israel with Iran and Turkey more firmly in the Islamist camp every day, I wouldn't be at all surprised if the Saudis gave some covert assistance to Israel in knocking out Iran's nukes. The path to Bushehr and Arak may very well involve a flight over Saudi territory...without the Saudis' 'knowledge', of course. Shimon Peres and Saudi King Abdullah supposedly had a clandestine meeting the other day, although Abdullah denied it after the story slipped out. They may very well have been discussing this if they met.
Afterwards the Sunni autocracies will squawk a great deal about 'Zionist aggression', but behind the scenes they will collectively heave a huge sigh of relief.
Meanwhile the Israelis have been extensively practicing long distance mid air refueling, dogfights in heavy formation against MIG-29's the mainstay of Iran's air force, and mounting strikes on Iranian weapons convoys bound for Hamas at distances as far afield as Sudan.
Obama's strategy with the mullahs involves trading acceptance of their nuclear weapons program and their control of Lebanon via Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian proxies (which will likely occur with the 'election' of June 7th) for Iran's keeping the Shiite militias in Iraq and their Taliban proxies in Afghanistan quiet so that the US can successfully withdraw and retreat from both places. In other words, appeasement and surrender overseas so Obama can concentrate on his domestic agenda.
This has a great deal to do with Obama's dangerous handling of what foreign policy wonks call 'the Northern tier' , the non-Arab Islamic countries of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, but that's a subject I'll get more into at another time.
Faced with the fact that they are facing a basically unfriendly administration and that Obama is going to do nothing whatever to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons, the Israelis will likely do what they have to do on Iran and inform the US shortly before the attack begins. Then they will rope-a-dope and wait things out until 2012, like they did with Carter.
What we'll more than likely see from Obama is allowing the UN to go nuts with anti-Israel resolutions, a colder atmosphere emanating from the White House, a hold on funding for joint weapons projects like the Arrow Missile and a partial cut off of aid, like the F-22 fighter that Israel actually paid substantial money to the US to be privy to the technology and then got screwed out of. Since that was all likely to happen anyway given Obama's basic attitude towards Israel, he's unwittingly given them a go-ahead.They have very little to lose.
Life in Israel with the threat of Iranian nukes hanging over them would be intolerable. I doubt that the present Israeli government is under any illusions about that, and will do something about it.
Obama may very well attempt to initiate a major cut off of military aid,providing public pressure and lobbying by the various defense contractors that benefit are unable to convince Congress not to go along with him. Right now a lot of Israeli gear is US made and that would present a problem for Israel, but not an insurmountable one. Israel got along just fine without it prior to Nixon, who was truly the first US president who really made Israel an ally and gave them significant military gear.
Israel's weapons industry is also much farther along now than it was then, and a cutoff in US military aid, aside from adding to unemployment here in America would simply give them an impetus to make more of their own gear.
Also, one thing the Israelis know how to do is improvise. In the past, they astounded visiting military visitors by doing things like attaching a captured Soviet T-64 cannon to a Brit Centurion tank chassis with American electronics and making all work somehow. They will do it again, and simply work towards being more self sufficient or buy parts under the table form places like Canada, India or Germany. That's what they did before, when DeGaulle cut them off right before the`67 War.
There's also the very real possibility that seeing the writing on the wall Israel is already looking for some new best friends.Sad, but things go that way sometimes.
Another thing in Israel's favor is that Iran is their major military threat. If they do things right and take out a lot of Iran's oil infrastructure as well as its nukes, Hezbollah and Hamas will not be funded like they are today. And even if Obama does start giving Hamas and Hezbollah top of the line stuff ( he's already started with Hezbollah, via the Lebanese Army) the Israelis have had to deal with enemies before that outnumbered them and were better weaponed than they were and have come out on top. Having nowhere to run to and something to fight for is a pretty powerful edge.
Ultimately, it's all in G-d's hands, and that does make me optimistic - especially given what the Jews and Israel have already somehow survived. If nothing else, at least this time they can defend themselves if they have the will. Or, as they say in Israel, ye heye beseder - it will all work itself out.
US official: No new peace plan, for now
Senior White House official says administration sees coming visit by Israeli premier to Washington as opportunity to discuss mutual interests; adds Obama expects Israel, Palestinians to live up to Road Map commitments
Yitzhak Benhorin
Israel News
YBET News
WASHINGTON – White House sources said Saturday that the Obama administration has no interest in drumming up conflict while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is on his Washington visit this week. The US, one source said, does not intend to present the sides with a revised peace plan, and its policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process will be finalized only after Obama's meetings with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.
Summit Meeting
MK: Bibi won't commit to Palestinian state during US trip / Yaheli Moran Zelikovich
Likud member Akonis says establishment of independent Palestinian state will lead to 'second Hamastan'; Erekat says only Obama can compel Israel to accept two-state solution, urges US to 'stop stop dealing with Israel as an above-the-law state'
Full Story
A senior White House official told reporters that the US will insist Israel halt settlement construction and remove non-imperative checkpoints in the West Bank, and that the administration will insist the Palestinians live up to their commitments regarding security matters and the fight against terror.
The subject of Israel living up to its Road Map undertakings will be a key issue in the Israeli premier's meeting with the US president, said the official.
'Opportunity to push 2-state solution'
Netanyahu and Obama are scheduled to meet Monday. Their meeting will be followed by a luncheon, meant to help the two forge a personal connection.
Obama is looking forward to discuss common interests with Netanyahu, said the source, and the meeting is considered an opportunity to push the two-state solution, which Obama believes to be a national security interest for the US.
As for the current link suggested recently between the Palestinian issue and the Iranian threat, the White House official said that the two were linked to a certain extent and that Iran was a cause for concern for the US, Israel and all Arab nations. Obama, he added, is "aware of the urgency of the matter."
As for recent visits by US envoys to Syria, the sources said that the American president was committed to promoting peace between Israel and its neighbors, including Syria and Lebanon.
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