Ted Belman
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Vol. 14, No. 20
- The current political and military upheavals in the Middle East are producing new and far-reaching demographic realities.
- The communities in Syria are consolidating as the Alawite-Shiite components gain strength; the Sunnis are leaving for Lebanon and undermining Hizbullah’s status; in Jordan the relative weight of the Palestinians has declined and the “Jordan is Palestine” threat has diminished; and the West Bank is undergoing emigration pressures which will certainly be copied in Gaza if emigration is allowed.
- Some minority communities in the Levant and in Libya are expressing a positive attitude toward Israel and repudiating pan-Arabism.
- Syria is being transformed from a Sunni to a Shiite country not only demographically but also in religious terms.
- The Syrian ethnic-cleansing policy also includes the Palestinians in Syria. The regime is systematically destroying the refugee camps in Syria as one way to “cause (Sunni) emigration.”
The regime of Bashar Assad in Syria
held general elections on June 3, 2014.1 Apart from the
regime’s “victory” after three years of a bitter war, a key aim behind the
elections was to entrench the demographic changes that have occurred in Syria
during the war, making it more of a country of Alawites, Shiites, and
minorities and less of a Sunni country. That was achieved by denying the
right of participation in the elections to the refugees who have fled – the
overwhelming majority of whom are Sunnis.
The refugee movements will not only
alter the composition of Syria, but also of its neighbors Lebanon and Jordan,
to which most of the refugees have fled. The recognized leadership of the
Syrian opposition, the Syrian National Coalition, announced that if Assad
himself ran in the elections, it would boycott them.2 At some
point, the SNC leadership considered participating in the elections – if a
formula could have emerged for a new transition government in Damascus without
Assad and that would have allowed the refugees to return. Assad refused to
consider the proposals at the two failed Geneva conferences on Syria.3
As for Syria itself, about three
million of its pre-war population of 22 million have fled the country, most of
them Sunnis.4 Five million have abandoned their homes for other
places within Syria,5 meaning that more than one-third of the
citizens of Syria have left their homes. Even though the Alawite-Shiite
elements are still minorities, they are increasingly powerful ones and have
been depleted less by the refugee crisis.
The war has not only precipitated the
large-scale flight of refugees. After the Syrian army returned to the outskirts
of Damascus and took over rebel areas, it announced a “rehabilitation program.”
This was, in fact, aimed at destroying densely populated Sunni neighborhoods
that supported the rebels and fracturing these neighborhoods’ social
composition, all under the guise of “rehabilitation.”6
The Assad regime has no intention to
allow the refugees to return, evident in its plan to issue new identity cards
to Syrian citizens and thereby invalidate the refugees’ citizenship.7
The aims of Assad and his Shiite allies
in the war emerge clearly from their actions. They not only expel the Sunnis
but also destroy the Syrian mosques of historical importance to them, while
reinforcing the religious edifices of the Shiites so that the Sunnis cannot
damage them.8 In other words, Syria is being transformed from a
Sunni to a Shiite country not only demographically but also in religious terms.
The ethnic cleansing that Assad and his Shiite allies are performing is also a
“religious” cleansing, aimed at permanently changing the nature of the country
and consolidating the “Shiite crescent.”
Iran’s Religious Aggression
Syrian opposition sources have
privately explained9 that Saudi Arabia is extremely concerned
about the tashayyu phenomenon in
Syria, that is, Iran’s aggressive mission to convert Sunnis into Shiites.
According to these sources, the Saudis have budgeted enormous sums to fight
this phenomenon, and it is one of the reasons they are supporting the violent
Salafi groups in their savage assault on the Shiites.
A senior figure in the Syrian
opposition, Haitham al-Maleh, told Al Rai
of Kuwait10 that there is an agreement between the Assad regime
and Iran on transforming Syria into a Shiite country; that in Sunni areas that
Assad’s army has reconquered, Iran is setting up Shiite religious centers (hawzat) of the Iranian kind; and that
Assad’s intelligence service is taking part in this missionary effort by
exerting pressure on the Sunni population and its religious leaders.
Backing the Iranian efforts in Syria
may be a new Shiite expeditionary army of 150,000 soldiers recruited
predominantly in Iran and Iraq, according to a recent report.11
The latest elections will also re-shift
the demographic composition of the population within Syria. As noted, refugees
have not only fled from Syria but from place to place within it. The displaced
persons from religious and ethnically mixed areas are now crowding into the
original locations of their communities, where they sense more security.12
Demographic Changes among the Palestinians
The Syrian ethnic-cleansing policy also
includes the Palestinians in Syria. Al-Quds
al-Arabi, a pan-Arab daily, reported from Syria that the Assad regime told
the PLO that the Palestinian refugees who fled the Yarmouk refugee camp in
Damascus will not be allowed to return, and that the regime is systematically
destroying the refugee camps in Syria as one way to “cause (Sunni) emigration.”
One of the reasons the Assad regime decided to demolish the camps was that
400,000 Syrian Sunni refugees had taken shelter in the Yarmouk camp.13
In contrast to Syria, Lebanon is
becoming more Sunni and less Shiite –
and dramatically so. The Lebanese website Lebanon
Debate reported14 that, while official UN statistics state that
20 percent of Lebanon’s four million residents are Syrian refugees, the actual
number reaches 40-50 percent. Worse yet, these are embittered people who seek
revenge. The site quotes the Lebanese president saying behind closed doors that
the Syrian refugees in Lebanon are an existential threat to the country. The
radical Sunni influence in Lebanon has indeed been strengthened by the
infiltration of Al-Qaeda members among the Palestinian refugees from the
destroyed camps in Syria, especially the Yarmouk camp.15
Meanwhile the Palestinian refugees are
settling into the Lebanese refugee camps. There they fall under the sway of
Salafi terrorist elements, while transferring the internal conflicts of the
Syrian camps to the Lebanese ones.
The influx of refugees from Syria to
Jordan, which is ongoing, comes in addition to the previous influx of refugees
from Iraq. That means the Palestinian percentage of the Jordanian population is
declining, and indeed it is now doubtful whether it can still be asserted that
Jordan has a Palestinian majority.
Hizbullah fights in Syria, Grows Weaker in Lebanon
The growth of the Sunni population in
Lebanon has also spelled trouble for Hizbullah, exposing it to Sunni terror on
one hand and undermining its status in the Lebanese Shiite community on the
other. The more Assad cleanses Syria of Sunnis, the weaker Hizbullah’s hold on
the Lebanese population. There are reports that Hizbullah is aware of the
problem and trying to recruit Iraqi Shiites into its ranks.16
Before the revolt against Assad
erupted, there was already a large influx of Iraqi Shiites into Syria. Their
number can be roughly estimated at 500,000, and some reports say the Assad
regime is giving them Syrian identity cards and settling them alongside the
Druze in Hauran.17
The process of emptying Syria of its
Sunnis, then, comes at the expense of the Shiite community of Lebanon. A
million Sunni refugees from Syria have already settled in Sunni areas of
Lebanon and put an end to the parity with the Shiites which stood at 27 percent
each, with the remaining population consisting of Druze and Christian
denominations.18 Furthermore, the growing infiltration of
Salafi Islamist Sunni elements into Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps
threatens to disrupt the camps – and Lebanon — further.19
The PLO is now under Salafi assault
within the camps. Senior Palestinian figures have been assassinated, and
attacks on PLO offices occur routinely.20 This has forced the
predominately Sunni PLO to coordinate the securing of its facilities with
Hizbullah, now that the Shiite organization views Al-Qaeda’s presence in the
camps as a common threat to itself and the PLO.21
With the Salafis attacking both the PLO
and Hizbullah, the coordination between the two is a tactical necessity. The
organization absorbing the demographic shockwaves is Hizbullah, which finds
itself under a terror offensive in its own power center in Beirut. One result
is that Shiites who moved to Beirut from southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley
are returning home, and Hizbullah’s rivals within the Shiite community are
stepping up their criticism of the organization.22
Particularly worth paying attention to
is Sheikh Subhi Tufayli, who was one of the founders of Hizbullah and its first
secretary-general. Immediately after the Syrian revolt broke out, he predicted
that the Shiite community – and even Hizbullah itself – would seek to ally with
Israel against the Sunni danger.23 He began to voice opposition
to Iran, including the fundamental vilayet-faqih
ideology of the ayatollah in Tehran, that is, the supremacy of Iran’s Islamic
jurists.24 The Facebook page of his supporters gives the
impression that an inclination exists, not yet ripe, to organize the Arab
Shiites against the Persian Shiites – or, thought of differently, the holy city
of Karbala in Iraq against the holy city Qom in Persia.25
In Jordan the demographic equation is
not related to the Sunni-Shiite balance since Jordan is an overwhelmingly Sunni
country. Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan noted that Iraqi refugees in Jordan
number about a million.26 Although the number of Shiites can be
estimated at about half a million, there is no way the internal demography
among the Iraqi refugees in Jordan can be determined with any precision.
The most politically significant
balancing act within Jordan is the one between the Palestinians and the
original Transjordanians. Some Palestinians settled in Jordan in the wake of
the 1948 Israeli War of Independence, and others went there from the West Bank
in the wake of the Six Day War. Because of the sensitivity of the issue, there
are no official statistics on the proportion of Palestinians in the overall
population. Jordan is very sensitive to the notion of the “alternative
homeland,” whereby Israel would supposedly try to subvert the Transjordanians’
dominant status and solve its own problems with the Palestinians by giving them
a state on the other side of the Jordan River.
The current refugee influx from Syria
is causing the Jordanian government many security, economic, and social
problems. But amid the difficulties of the Iraqi and Syrian refugee waves, at
least on the Palestinian issue their concern has diminished since, as noted,
Palestinians may no longer constitute a majority in the country.
Jordan’s concern about demographic
dangers from the Syrian direction, however, definitely has not diminished.
Well-respected Jordanian journalist Bassam al-Badarin wrote in Al-Quds al-Arabi27 that
Jordan is demanding that the Assad regime take control of the border in the
Daraa area. Damascus, however, is intentionally neglecting that border so that
Syrian refugees can stream into Jordan. Recently the Jordanian air force
attacked vehicles moving from Syria into Jordan – which turned out to be an
Al-Qaeda force on its way to perpetrating a multidimensional terror attack in
Jordan.28 Meanwhile the Syrian refugees have abandoned the camps
built for them in Jordan and are now dispersed throughout the country, becoming
part of its societal fabric.
There are also demographic pressures
within the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank. Amid the deteriorating
economic conditions, many Palestinian young people are seeking to emigrate.29
If the PLO were to try and revive the intifada, it would have trouble
recruiting masses of Palestinian young people to the cause, one senior
Palestinian official claimed.30
Egypt, a country with an ancient
history and Sunni demographic stability, is spared the problems that are
plaguing the Levant. Libya, however, gives indications of what Israel can
expect from the communal demographic trends in the Middle Eastern countries
that border it.
Libya is mired in anarchy as the
Bedouin tribes and Salafi groups prevent the state from organizing itself.
Recognition of Israel as an Ally?
Amid the tribal chaos, however, Libya’s
Berber minority – the Amazigh –
is attempting to consolidate separately. The Amazigh Berbers are estimated
to constitute about 30 percent of the Libyan population.31 Their
leaders make statements with notably pro-Israeli overtones, repudiating the
Arab agenda32 of support for the Palestinians and war against
Israel. In October 2011, at the first world conference of the Amazigh in Tunis,
Amazigh president Fathi Ben Khalifa said, “The interest of the world Amazigh
movement lies with Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East, and the
Palestinian problem is the problem of the Palestinians alone.”33
The minorities in the Levant are likely
to adopt similar positions, and Lebanon’s Subhi Tufayli, as noted, has already
made statements in this vein.
The websites of the Kurds also lean in
the pro-Israeli direction. For example, the RUDAW site posted an article
defending Israel’s position on the “blockade of Gaza.”34 The
Kurds in Syria are estimated at 20-30 percent of the population. They, too, are
undergoing a refugee problem stemming from Al-Qaeda’s pressures, but less so
than in the other parts of Syria.35
The current Middle Eastern upheavals
are producing new demographic realities. The communities in Syria are
consolidating as the Alawite-Shiite components gain strength; the Sunnis are
leaving for Lebanon and undermining Hizbullah’s status; in Jordan the relative
weight of the Palestinians has declined and the “Jordan is Palestine” threat
has diminished; and the West Bank is undergoing emigration pressures which will
certainly be copied in Gaza if emigration is allowed.
All this is occurring as minority
communities in the Levant and in Libya are developing a positive attitude
toward Israel and repudiating pan-Arabism.
Notes
4 Annie Slemrod
(former Daily Star correspondent in
Lebanon), lecture to the Israel Council on Foreign Relations, Jerusalem, 18
November 2013.
6 http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=163588&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+AlqudsEditorial+%28Alquds+Editorial%29.
According to Al-Quds al-Arabi, the
Al-Maza Basatin neighborhood is to be destroyed and its residents exiled.
8 Abdel Bari Atwan
also called the war in Syria a “war of the holy places,” and detailed the
destruction of Sunni historical sites and the reinforcement of the site holy to
Shiites in Damascus, Sayyidah Zaynab. http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=69441
9 In telephone
conversations over the past half-year.
10 As quoted on the
Sunni site Al-Bayyina, 1 May 2014. http://www.albainah.net/index.aspx?function=Item&id=5796
12 http://syrianrefugees.eu This site gives
details on the refugee problem within Syria and on the flight from Syria to the
neighboring countries.
15 http://www.lebanondebate.com/details.aspx?id=113365&utm_source=Night+Newsletter&utm_campaign=55933c9d5c-_1_5_2013&utm_medium=email
On how the compromised security in the camps is affecting the intra-Palestinian
struggles, see: http://www.almustaqbal-a.com/index.php/shaker/24901.html
16 Conversation with
members of the Syrian opposition.
17 Ibid.
18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanon,
section on “Religion.”
22 The Amal
organization is setting up training camps for a possible clash with Hizbullah. http://www.lebanondebate.com/details.aspx?id=161834&utm_source=Daily+Newsletter&utm_campaign=2d043ccb00-_2_5_2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_8fdc41c910-2d043ccb00-196764969
23 http://www.watan.com/news/world-news/2012-02-01/2668.
An interview to Watan (Kuwait), 1
February 2012.
24 For example, the
Facebook page of “Lovers of Sheikh Subhi Tufayli” has a headline: “Not the rule
of the jurist over the nation, but the rule of the nation over itself.” https://www.facebook.com/pages/%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%B5%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A/439065922814263
25 Ibid.
27 16 April 2014.
29 On 23 November 2013
the economic annex of the Fatah organ Al-Hayat
al-Jadida, “Hayat wa-Suq,” published an article titled “Feelings of
economic frustration and lack of hope push young generation to emigrate.”
30 Senior Fatah
official Tawfik Tirawi said that actually the “popular intifada” had failed
because of the small number of participants. Interview to Radio Palestine, 20
December 2013.
32 https://www.facebook.com/IM.AMAZIGHH
“I am an Amazigh – not an Arab.”
Publication: Jerusalem Issue
Briefs
Filed Under: Israeli Security, Radical Islam, The Middle East
Tags: Syrian War
- See more at:
http://jcpa.org/article/syrian-war-is-reshaping-the-region/#sthash.UkSdzOlb.dpuf
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