The following is an extract from Barry Rubin and Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Yale University Press, forthcoming February 2014).
JERRY: Well here’s your chance to try the
opposite. Instead of tuna salad and being intimidated by women, chicken
salad and going right up to them.
GEORGE: Yeah, I should do the opposite, I should.
JERRY: If every instinct you have is wrong, then the opposite would have to be right.
GEORGE: Yes, I will do the opposite. I
used to sit here and do nothing, and regret it for the rest of the day,
so now I will do the opposite, and I will do something! – Seinfeld “The Opposite”
In 1939 a World War loomed in Europe. The
British–which ruled Palestine as a mandate–were desperate to soothe
Arab views and keep them on their side during the impending war. It did
not care what the Jewish Zionists said; it was going to dictate- as the
Americans want to today- the parameters of a peace agreement. Note the
similarity to today, but with Iran in the place of Germany. Here is now
why its diplomacy will not work. The Arab states had rejected the
British concessions, hence the foreign minister Ramsay MacDonald
embarked on another round of concessions to them.
Warning signals of coming war multiplied
daily. The London Conference had been planned as Britain was appeasing
Hitler. The Nazis occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia during its
sessions. The opening day, February 7, 1939, was marked by Italian
threats to attack Egypt from Libya, coupled with a German general’s
touring fortifications near the Libya-Egypt border.58 In this
context, the Middle East’s immense strategic significance was at the
center of British policymakers’ thoughts. This meant making the Arabs
happy. British forces in the area, no matter how strong, would be
insufficient if local populations revolted. But once Palestine was
amicably resolved, they reasoned, they need not fear a pro-German Arab
fifth column or Islamist rebellion.59
Yet the Arab stance made any
solution impossible. During pre-conference Arab consultations in Cairo,
the states agreed that Palestine’s Arabs would have the decisive voice
in the London talks and governments would support whatever they–that is,
al-Husaini–wanted. That enabled al-Husaini to set the guidelines to
ensure that the talks failed. He demanded a total ban on Jewish
immigration and land purchases plus rapid creation of an independent
Arab Palestine under his rule. For al-Husaini, and thus for all of the
Arab leaders, it would be all or nothing.60
In London, Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, and MacDonald
shuttled between Zionist and Arab delegations, which met separately
except on three occasions. Making no secret of his desperation for
appeasement, Chamberlain assured Arab delegations of Britain’s desire to
maintain and strengthen friendship with them, while MacDonald noted
that trouble in Palestine would echo throughout the region.
MacDonald frankly presented
the reasons behind British policy. The likelihood of war necessitated
surrender to Arab demands as long as such concessions made London feel
more secure. Halifax was blunt: “Gentlemen, there are times when the
most ethical consideration must give way to administrative necessity.”
MacDonald gave the details. Egypt commanded the Suez Canal route to
Asia; Alexandria was the only naval base suitable for defending the
eastern Mediterranean. Iraq controlled air and land passage to Asia and
was Britain’s main source of oil. A hostile Saudi Arabia would threaten
British strategic routes. In the event of war, all of these places must
be on Great Britain’s side.61
Moshe Sharett, a Zionist
leader, tried to counter these arguments. If the Palestine question were
settled, he said, Arab governments would merely raise more demands. In
the event of war with Germany, Jewish support would be more reliable
than Arab pledges. Ben-Gurion added that whatever happened in Palestine,
Arab governments would follow their own interests. The Jewish leaders
dismissed promises of being protected in an Arab-ruled Palestine,
pointing out that the regimes did not even protect Jews in their own
countries and insisting that events in Europe made it impossible for
them to abandon demands for Jewish immigration.62
The British didn’t care.63
Instead, the British government, believing war would begin within
months, offered to accept virtually all the Arab governments’ demands.
It proposed a Palestine constitutional conference be held in six months
followed by the creation of a Palestine executive council on which Arabs
would have 60 percent of the seats. In addition, the council could stop
all Jewish immigration in five years.64
While the Zionists considered
walking out, Arabs celebrated this news, but that didn’t last long. The
Palestine Arab delegation quickly rejected this plan. Instead it
demanded the immediate establishment of a Palestine government and a ban
on all Jewish immigration or land purchases, with full independence to
follow within three years. The Arab states were frustrated, and even
some of the grand mufti’s followers wanted to accept, but al-Husaini
wouldn’t budge. Trapped by their earlier promises, Arab government
delegations fell into line. Indeed, not trusting as-Said to concur,
Iraq’s government recalled him and sent radical Foreign Minister Taufiq
as-Suwaidi instead.65
In response to the Arab
rejection, MacDonald embarked on another round of concessions to them.
Not only would Jewish immigration be under Arab veto after five years,
but even before that time it would be limited to a total of seventy-five
thousand people. The proportion of Arabs on the executive council would
be raised from 60 to 66 percent. There could be no doubt that the
result would be an Arab-ruled Palestine. At this point, Ben-Gurion
whispered to a colleague, “They have called this meeting . . . to tell
us to give up.”66
The Arab side was on the
verge of victory; no Jewish state could ever be created. Yet again the
Arabs stood firm on rejection.67 On March 15, Hitler seized
the rest of Czechoslovakia, marking another step toward international
confrontation. Two days later the London Conference ended in failure.
Still, the European crisis,
wrote British High Commissioner to Egypt Sir Miles Lampson on March 23,
“makes it all the more essential that [a] rapid end should be put to
disturbances in Palestine.” The Arab states, except for Iraq, also still
wanted a quick deal.68 So despite the breakdown, Arab
delegations again met in Cairo to propose a new basis for agreement.
Arab leaders were still optimistic. How could such a favorable offer be
turned down? Egypt’s ambassador assured the British Foreign Office that
with his country endorsing this plan, the grand mufti Amin al Husaini,
the leader of the Palestinians, could not interfere.
The Arab states proposed some
changes in the British plan intended to assure that the result would be
an Arab-ruled Palestine as soon as possible. According to this
counteroffer, a Palestinian state would be established within ten years
and consultations with Arab governments would be held if this schedule
could not be met. Jewish immigration would be reduced and the Jewish
population of Palestine would be frozen at 33 percent. Palestinian
ministers would be chosen to prepare for independence.
The British gave in on almost
every point. Chamberlain explained, “We are now compelled to consider
the Palestine problem mainly from the point of view of its effect on the
international situation. . . . If we must offend one side, let us
offend the Jews rather than the Arabs.”69 It seemed as if
al-Husaini’s radical policy and move toward Germany had succeeded in
generating enough leverage to make the British surrender. But London
wanted a long interim period. What would be the point of turning over
Palestine immediately to al-Husaini only to see him support the Germans?
So they wanted to make al-Husaini wait until the European crisis would
be resolved. At that point, if he became the head of an independent Arab
Palestine there would be little harm to British strategic interests.
On April 28, after talking
with Arab negotiators, Lampson reported that the exchanges “are going
more favorably than expected.”70 The main point still
blocking a deal was the Arab side’s demand–which the British knew came
from the grand mufti–that an Arab government would start running the
country within three years.71
C. W. Baxter, head of the
Foreign Office’s Eastern Department, wrote that the Arab states had come
to terms “on all the most difficult outstanding points.”72
Lampson agreed that there was ‘“substantial agreement . . . on all the
main issues.” But, both men explained, the Arab states must persuade the
Palestine Arabs to agree. The Egyptians were confident of success, with
Prime Minister Mahmud claiming he would simply invite the grand mufti
to Cairo and “make him toe the line.”73
On May 17, 1939, Mahmud and
Ali Mahir, soon to be his successor, met the Palestinian Arab delegation
to talk them into agreeing. Mahir told them that they should accept the
British plan. The reason the Jews were so much against it was that it
so favored the Arab side. This was a tremendous opportunity; the best
deal the Arabs could ever obtain. Cooperation with Britain was better
than being “at the mercy of the Jews.” Once the Palestine Arabs had a
state, sympathetic Arab regimes would help ensure their total control.74
Winning an independent state,
Mahir continued, required training administrators, preparing for
defense, and achieving international “legitimacy.” A transitional
period, Mahir suggested, was an advantage, not a trap. The best way to
triumph was to advance step by step, as in a war in which “One army is
vacating some of its front trenches. Would you refrain from jumping into
them and occupying them?”
But the Palestine Arab leaders retorted, “If we accept, the revolution will end.”
So Mahir tried again to
explain reality to them. “Do you believe,” he asked, “that Great Britain
is unable to crush your revolution, with all its modern satanic war
inventions?” Mahmud and Mahir knew the Arab revolt in Palestine had been
defeated by the British. “Is it not better for you, Mahir continued, to
come nearer to the British authorities and get them to forsake the
Jews?” Then the Arabs wouldn’t have to ask London to stop Jewish
immigration, they’d control it themselves and not even a single Jew
could enter the country. Next Mahmud weighed in with a prophetic
warning. If the Palestinian Arabs agreed right now, he insisted, they
could have their way. But soon there would be a war that would put them
in a weaker position. Britain would lose patience and invoke martial
law. Arab countries would be too involved with their own problems to
help.
Again the Palestine Arabs
refused: “When the revolt started, we had aims in view to attain. We
cannot now tell our people, ‘Stop the revolution because we got some
high posts. . . .’”
“You can tell your people,”
Mahir answered, “that you shall be able to control your country’s
government; to stop [British] persecution, deportations, and harsh
measures. You could set Palestine’s budget, limit the Jewish population
to one-third, and justify accepting the deal on the basis of the Arab
governments ‘ advice.” The Palestine Arabs would not even have to sign
anything, but merely to agree verbally to cooperate with a British
government White Paper setting the new policy. None of his arguments
made any headway.
Mahir and Mahmud were right.
The British wanted to satisfy Arab demands as much as possible and thus a
little temporary compromise and patience would have achieved a total
victory for the Arab side. Under these conditions, an Arab Palestine
would have obtained independence within a decade, by 1949 and would have
ruled the entire country from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean
Sea.75 Once Palestine was independent, the Arabs could do
whatever they wanted to Jews there including–as al-Husaini had made
clear–killing them all. If the Palestine Arabs had accepted the British
proposal, taken over the government, and worked with the British, Israel
never would have existed.
Instead, the Palestine Arab
leaders rejected the White Paper, sought total victory, collaborated
with the Germans against the British, and in the end received nothing.
This orientation made inevitable the Arab rejection of partition and a
Palestinian Arab state in 1947; Israel’s creation in 1948; five wars;
the delay of Israel-Palestinian negotiations for forty-five years; and
the absence of a Palestinian state well into the twenty-first century,
generations after the rejection of the 1939 deal.
But in 1939 it was possible
to believe history would take a different course. A like-minded regime
in Germany seemed the world’s strongest power, supported the radical
Arabs, and might soon destroy all of the Arabs’ and Muslims’ enemies.
The growing radical movement believed that millions of Arabs and other
Muslims were about to revolt under its leadership, that soon it would
seize control of Iraq and Egypt, Palestine and Jordan, Saudi Arabia and
Syria. Believing total victory imminent, why should Palestine’s Arabs
make any deal with the British, even one requiring the smallest
compromise? Al-Husaini was set on a revolutionary approach depending on
Germany. Already he was for all practical purposes the Arab world’s
strongest leader. Such was the power of saying “no,” a lesson that would
be fully absorbed by postwar Arab leaders.
While Arab governments
generally understood that Britain’s offer was a great opportunity, they
also knew that radicals would exploit any sign of compromise to inflame
their own people against them. Moreover, they were trapped by their
decision to grant al-Husaini total veto power. Indeed, many wondered
whether the grand mufti might be right. Perhaps the Nazis were the wave
of the future and a more useful ally than the British.76 As a
result, even though all the Arab governments except Iraq wanted a deal
with the British, al-Husaini’s men walked out of the talks, certain that
their ambitions would be met more quickly and fully by violent Arab
revolts combined with Axis victory in the coming war.
At long last, it was London’s
turn to dig in its heels. It told the Arab states that unless further
progress in negotiations was made, it would set its own policy. On May
17 the White Paper proposed that a united Palestine–which everyone knew
meant an Arab-dominated Palestine–would be established in ten years.
Jews could only buy land in a few areas; Jewish immigration would be
strictly limited for five years, after which the Arabs would decide how
many would be admitted, which meant none. Yet on the Arab side only
Transjordan and the an-Nashashibi faction publicly said anything
favorable about the White Paper.77
The Jewish Agency strongly
protested the White Paper as contrary to the mandate’s provisions. Even
the Soviets accused Britain of selling out the Jews for its own benefit.
Despite the refusal of any Arab state to approve it, the British White
Paper became the governing document for Palestine during the next six
years. The restrictions on immigration would cost hundreds of thousands
of Jews their lives.
Instead of making a deal with
Britain, by the summer of 1939 virtually every Arab leader except
Abdallah of Transjordan had secretly contacted Germany to offer
cooperation. Most enthusiastic were the radicals in Iraq. When the
relatively moderate Iraqi politician Rustum Haidar said British policy
didn’t give the Arab side everything from fear of international Jewish
financial power, a radical politician responded that it didn’t matter.
Might made right. Force rather than more talk was the answer.78
Egypt’s government, the most
ardent advocate for accepting the White Paper, was the first to denounce
it. In line with the new Arab style of outbidding rivals in militancy,
the Wafd Party–even more moderate and pro-British than the
government–attacked its rejection as being too mild. The fascist Young
Egypt Party started a bombing campaign against Jewish stores.79
Iraq and Saudi Arabia also
rejected the White Paper. Iraqi Foreign Minister Ali Jawdat neatly
showed the Arab governments’ ambiguity on the issue. On the one hand, he
denounced the White Paper, claiming the transition period was too long
and restrictions on Jewish immigration too mild. On the other hand, he
called the White Paper a great Arab victory, and confided privately that
he and as-Said had tried to convince Jamal al-Husaini to accept it.80
The Iraqi regime also tried to calm the passions the radicals were
fomenting. Instructions were issued to newspapers not to publish
anything that might damage Anglo-Iraqi relations. Still, Baghdad would
not cooperate with a request from the moderate Palestinian Auni Abd
al-Hadi to support a pro–White Paper group of Palestine Arabs.81 Only al-Husaini and his hardline stance would ever be allowed to represent the Palestine Arabs.
Blinded by bitterness toward
the British and overestimating German power, the grand mufti had already
taken the road to Berlin. In mid-1939, al-Husaini made his first
request to Canaris to visit the German capital.82 When the
grand mufti left Lebanon for Iraq in October 1939, his triumphalism was
enhanced by his reception in Baghdad, where he was granted refuge and
acclaimed a national hero. Every politician from the prime minister
down, as well as all the political clubs and groups, threw parties in
his honor, events that turned into Pan-Arab, anti-British
demonstrations.83
Nor was this support
expressed only in words. Iraq’s parliament granted the grand mufti
£18,000 a month plus £1,000 a month from secret service funds and a 2
percent tax on government officials’ salaries. More contributions came
from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Although he promised as-Said not to engage
in political activity, the grand mufti played political kingmaker in
Iraq, helping first Taha al-Hashimi and then al-Kailani become prime
minister. He strengthened the radical faction by placing militant
Palestinians and Syrians in teaching jobs and in the government
bureaucracy.84
The difference between
radicals and moderates was well represented by the remark of the
Palestinian Arab delegates in their May 1939 meeting with Egypt’s
leaders, “We cannot now tell our people, ‘Stop the revolution because we
got some high posts. . . .’”But that was precisely what moderate Arab
politicians wanted: not a revolution in Palestine but a solution to
Palestine. And they viewed that as having been achieved in the London
negotiations because Palestinian Arabs would obtain “high posts” and
thus would be running the country.
The story of al-Husaini and the 1939
London Conference would be reenacted by Arafat at the Camp David meeting
in 2000, when Arafat rejected getting a Palestinian state through
negotiations because he preferred the illusory hope of getting it all by
violence.
Now, the moment had come for each Arab
leader to choose between the Anglo-French alliance and the
German-Italian Axis. The radical faction had already decided on Berlin;
even moderate leaders sought to hedge their bets in case the Axis
emerged triumphant. It seems as if the time of von Oppenheim’s old plan
had truly come. But once again a world war would determine the outcome.
Which is why instead of Palestine
celebrating 65 years of an Arab-Palestinian state in 2014 it was facing
occupation, war, and no prospect of anything being changed.
Article printed from Rubin Reports: http://pjmedia.com/barryrubin
URL to article: http://pjmedia.com/barryrubin/2014/01/03/why-is-there-really-no-palestinian-state-the-1-state-solution/
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