Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall
Jerusalem Issue Briefs Vol. 13, No. 28
Unlike
in earlier rounds, this time there have been direct negotiations
between the United States and Iran. Today Iran comes to the negotiations
with the West in incomparably better geostrategic circumstances than in
2003, when it temporarily suspended uranium enrichment to further
advance its nuclear program, then in its infancy. Iran is not entering
the nuclear negotiations out of weakness, but, rather, from a position
of strength.
In
Iran’s view (which some of the Gulf States share), America’s regional
status and deterrent power are in continuing decline. Given Iran’s sense
of power linked with both domestic and regional stability, it comes to
the negotiations in a mood of confidence verging on hubris.
Khamenei’s
statement that “some of the events in Rouhani’s visit to New York were
inappropriate,” which has been interpreted as criticism of his telephone
conversation with Obama, and his harsh words about America’s “true
nature” generally, have prompted a wave of declarations in favor of
continuing to chant “Death to America.” The commander of the
Revolutionary Guard, Mohammad Ali Jafari, called the Rouhani-Obama chat
“a tactical error and a big mistake….If there are to be additional
errors the revolutionary forces will take the necessary measures.”
Iran
now controls the nuclear fuel cycle and can, whenever it decides, break
out to build a bomb in a few months, while maintaining its past conduct
of exploiting the irresolution and divisions that prevail in the West.
Developing
nuclear weapons, or the ability to produce them within a short time,
continues to be a central goal of the Iranian regime. After ten years of
talks in various settings, Iran remains determined to maintain and
advance its nuclear achievements, perhaps with substantial tactical
concessions in return for the easing of sanctions.
Iran
believes that nuclear weapons will buy it the sort of immunity from
attack that North Korea now enjoys. It also seeks long-term stability so
that it can promote its revolutionary objectives abroad and assume its
place in the regional and international power equation as the one who
sets the agenda and influences the reshaping of the Middle East in a way
that counters and curbs U.S. influence.
Direct U.S.-Iran Talks Begin
This
week a further round of talks began between Iran and the West. Unlike
in earlier rounds, this time there have been direct negotiations between
the United States and Iran, occurring behind the scenes of the talks
between Iran and the P5+1 group (the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council plus Germany).1 Although the telephone conversation
between Obama and Rouhani, which transpired at the end of the Iranian
president’s visit to the UN General Assembly, is still provoking anger
in Iran, it has also aroused hopes that “this time” – ten years after
the repeatedly failed negotiations began – there is room for success.
That
conversation, and the direct U.S.-Iran meeting on the sidelines of the
Geneva meeting, marked the apex of the Iranian charm offensive, which
appears to have been well prepared even before Rouhani was elected as
the Iranian president. Rouhani and his team (primarily Foreign Minister
Zarif), who are experienced at negotiating with the West, have returned
to center stage of the negotiations as they exploit – so far with
considerable success from their standpoint – the various tools at their
disposal in the international media and the social networks (Rouhani and
the foreign minister have active Facebook and Twitter accounts). Iran
is transmitting catchy messages to the Western ear like “win-win
diplomacy,” “heroic flexibility,” and other stock phrases of the
international discourse, while also making use of leaks to the top
newspapers. High expectations have again been stirred in the West, which
is clutching the rope of diplomacy proffered by the “moderate Rouhani.”
Following the Geneva meetings, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney
said in his daily briefing that Iran brought to the table “a new
proposal with a level of seriousness and substance that we had not seen
before.”
Rouhani Reveals His Strategy
During
his election campaign Rouhani boasted of how, as nuclear negotiator in
2003-2005, he had toyed with the West. In the course of the negotiations
Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment, which was then at its
inception.
Meanwhile,
though, it advanced other critical components of its nuclear program
including the uranium-conversion facility (UCF) at Isfahan. Rouhani
intimated that, if elected, he would continue on that same path. As he
put
it:
“The
negotiating team (indeed) agreed to suspend uranium enrichment but was
able to complete all the technology needed for the full nuclear fuel
cycle….The Iranian establishment is well aware that the nuclear
technology was a product of the reformist government [of Khatami]….The
citizens of Iran are well aware that the main components of the nuclear
technology were completed in 2003-2004. In spring 2005 the uranium
conversion facility that supplies the material [UF6] that is fed to the
centrifuges, the underground plant at Natanz, was almost completed, Arak
[the IR-40 heavy water reactor] was completed….All these components
(which are essential to the nuclear
program)
were completed at that time….The fuel cycle was completed (during the
course of the negotiations and while enrichment was suspended).”
As
part of his election campaign Rouhani promised that, if elected, he
would “protect the nuclear technology like all other technology…the
centrifuges will continue to spin as the Iranian nation progresses.”2
On
another occasion, Rouhani said – while denying opponents’ claims that
Iran had suspended its nuclear program completely after acceding to the
2003 Tehran Declaration:
“On
my watch the centrifuge technology developed, and Iran was able to
remove sanctions and avoid tension with the West….We must practice
intelligent diplomacy so as to take the nuclear file out of the Security
Council’s hands and remove the sanctions….During my tenure Iran
succeeded to reach the level of knowledge required to convert yellowcake
to UF6, build the heavy-water reactor at Arak, and increase the number
of centrifuges for enriching uranium to 3,000….President Bush tried to
isolate Iran and instead isolated himself.3”
Even
though subject to harsh sanctions that are damaging its economy and
especially its oil exports and industry, Iran is today in a completely
different situation from that prevailing during the 2003 negotiations
with the West, when it purportedly agreed to suspend its enrichment
program. At that time Iran was affected by the American campaign in Iraq
and feared that the War on Terror would reach its own soil. Even then,
as Rouhani points out, while the suspension was in place, Iran was able
to utilize diplomacy to advance critical components of its nuclear
program. Subsequently Iran capitalized on the knowledge and technology
it had developed during the suspension to make great strides in its
enrichment program. It now had a growing quantity of UF6 from the UCF,
which it had completed during the suspension.
Iran Is Not Entering Negotiations Out of Weakness
Today
Iran comes to the negotiations with the West in incomparably better
geostrategic circumstances than in 2003. Iran is not entering the
nuclear negotiations out of weakness, but, rather, from a position of
strength. In its view (which some of the Gulf states share), America’s
regional status and deterrent power are in continuing decline, the Sunni
Arab world is increasingly divided with no unification processes on the
horizon, disappointment with the United States is intensifying
(especially in light of its irresolution after Syria crossed the “red
line” of chemical-weapons use), and Iran’s strategic ally in Syria –
Bashar Assad – is surviving mainly thanks to Iran’s military, economic,
and propagandistic support (as the IRGC commander reiterated recently).4
Moreover,
as the Middle East is forged anew by revolutions, counterrevolutions,
bloodshed, and chaos, Iran has been viewed since its (surprisingly
quiet) elections as a country marked by confidence in its ability to
maintain domestic stability and also to project power toward its
neighbors amid the leadership vacuum – both Arab and American – that has
emerged in the region. In this vein Ali Saeedi, Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei’s representative in the IRGC, asserted that:
“The
United States has reached the conclusion that no regional equation is
possible without taking into account Iran’s influence in the regional
and international arenas….Its influence is what prompts America’s
apparent readiness to negotiate with us….This influence of ours stems
from our unwavering resolve….The enemy sought to undermine our
resilience in an attempt to damage our influence.5”
Thus
Tehran views its changing geostrategic landscape as congenial to its
aims. Given its sense of power linked with domestic stability, it comes
to the negotiations in a mood of confidence verging on hubris. The
results of the presidential elections, along with the public’s high
expectations that Rouhani and his government can bring about a rapid
economic improvement if the nuclear negotiations with the West succeed
and ties with the United States are renewed, give Rouhani great room to
maneuver and considerable boldness as the talks with the West commence.
Rouhani,
a dyed-in-the-wool scion of the revolution, is now receiving great
credit from the populace that elected him. Along with the promises he
dispensed for a major economic change, the regime has been granting the
media somewhat more leeway and hinting – not without protests by the
conservatives – that certain easements in the dress code are possible.
It also has been freeing political prisoners and human rights activists
(despite a record number of executions since Rouhani was elected),
relenting a bit in the blocking of websites, and appointing reformist
figures from the days of reformist presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami to
senior posts in Rouhani’s government and bureau. All this is intended to
encourage a sense of real change of direction in both domestic and
foreign policy, certainly compared to the Ahmadinejad period. In
actuality, this is the same regime that knows how to adjust to changing
circumstances.
Will Iran Normalize Relations with the U.S.
In
the domestic arena, a formerly taboo subject – normalizing relations
with the United States, the “Great Satan” – is increasingly out in the
open.
There
are reports of restoring air traffic between the two countries and even
setting up an Iran-U.S. Parliamentary Friendship Group.6 The reformist
media, which now senses some leniency and is testing the limits of what
is allowed, offers analyses claiming that renewed ties with America can
lead to a lifting of the sanctions and provide a magic wand for
improving the economy. In this context, calls for “Death to America”
have become a hot topic. Since the Obama-Rouhani telephone chat,
countless figures from all points of the political spectrum have been
addressing this issue and analyzing it from every possible angle.
Khamenei’s
statement that “some of the events in Rouhani’s visit to New York were
inappropriate,” which has been interpreted as criticism of the telephone
conversation, and his harsh words about “America’s true nature”
generally,7
have prompted a wave of declarations in favor of continuing to proclaim
“Death to America.” Consider, for example, the peroration of Ayatollah
Ahmad Khatami, who said in a Friday sermon in Tehran:
“We
see the United States as a lying government, a trickster that breaks
promises. And yet the Americans have forced Iran into negotiations. All
this is lies. The lying American president says they do not want to
change the Iranian regime, and yet they have tried to do so for 35 years
without succeeding. On this, too, the Iranian people’s hatred of
America is based.
If
we want to make a list of the American lies, we will need 70 tons of
paper. That is also why the slogan “Death to America” continues to live
and resound among the citizens. The United States is the Great Satan,
and the Imam [Khomeini], too, said so.
Over
the past 35 years has the United States become a smaller or a greater
Satan If, until recently, in its machinations against Iran the United
States was a “snake,” today it has become a “rattlesnake.”…This slogan
is the secret of the steadfastness of the Iranian people, and the more
America continues its machinations, the more this slogan will prevail
among the citizens of Iran. Our diplomats must do their work, and so
must our Education Ministry, each will do his work; in fact, such
slogans give our senior officials greater room to maneuver so that they
can be tougher in dealing with the United States, and this indeed serves
our foreign policy.
If
one day according to an order of the Supreme Leader, who holds and will
continue to hold the American file, we come to the negotiations and
talks, then too our bitterness toward the United States will not
vanish.8”
Mohammad Javad Larijani, head of the Human Rights Council in the judiciary and brother of the Majlis speaker, stated:
“The
West and the enemies of Iran want to impose liberal-secular democracy
and thus divert the Islamic regime from its ideological course. The
Islamic Revolution is advancing on the path of freeing itself of
infidels and spreading the pure culture of Islam of Muhammad….The
telephone conversation between Obama and Rouhani was a mistake, was not
an appropriate act, and should not have been carried out because Iran
must function without any mistake or error, even the smallest, in its
heroic diplomacy.
The
Iranian call for “Death to America” can hardly be compared with the
insults the United States hurls at the Islamic regime. In the periods of
Rafsanjani, Khatami, and at the end of the period of Ahmadinejad, there
was much talk about the relationship with the United States, talk that
was not appropriate….Even at the end of the Ahmadinejad period some said
our grievances could be redressed through a direct encounter with the
United States, and even the president [Ahmadinejad] himself was
interested in a one-on-one meeting with Obama.9”
The
great hopes of renewed ties with the United States that the reformist
elements are instilling, and the massive response to this camp’s
euphoria on the part of the conservative camp, will remain in the wings
of the tactical negotiations between Iran and the West and the United
States. Rouhani and the nuclear negotiating team will have to pivot
carefully between, on the one hand, the high expectations for a rapid
economic improvement particularly regarding unemployment and rising
prices, and on the other, the Republican Guard and the Supreme Leader,
who have already criticized the Rouhani-Obama telephone conversation
along with Obama’s meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, which “showed that ultimately the position of the United
States remained as it was, trapped in Israel’s vise.”
Iran Plans to Divide and Rule
During
the negotiations Rouhani and his team, who evidently have been
efficiently planning the charm offensive since Rouhani was elected, will
try as in the past to drive a wedge between Israel and the United
States. (A senior ayatollah, Naser Makarem Shirazi, said the “Zionist
lobby” was the main obstacle to improving Iran’s relations with
America.)10 They will also try to drive a wedge between the United
States and the European states, both those that are and are not taking
part in the negotiations. Meanwhile, even before the negotiations had
started, Britain and Iran were discussing the renewal of diplomatic
ties, and European delegations were arriving in Tehran in hopes of a
political breakthrough that will yield economic opportunities.
Iran
will leverage the economic weight of the companies involved to pressure
the governments to show flexibility in the negotiations.
Iran
believes it has already managed to change the international atmosphere
in its favor. Winds of “diplomacy and compromise” are already blowing in
Europe and the United States as the dismantlement of Syria’s chemical
weapons begins and the OPCW wins the Nobel Peace Prize, providing
further evidence of diplomacy’s benefits. And the buzz of the
Rouhani-Obama chat keeps resonating in the diplomatic airspace,
purifying the atmosphere, even though the Supreme Leader himself and the
commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Mohammad Ali Jafari, were unhappy
with this development. Jafari called it “a tactical error and a big
mistake….If there are to be additional errors the revolutionary forces
will take the necessary measures.” As criticism of relations with
America keeps mounting in Iran, it is hard to see how the Islamic
Republic, which views itself as the only party to have resisted the
United States since the revolution and withstood the pressures, could
now make a 180-degree turn in its policy.
The
telephone conversation, then, emerges as one of Iran’s tactical
measures vis-à-vis the international community. Even though it has
(perhaps) exacted a price from Rouhani domestically, it continues to
serve its purpose: Iran’s renewed legitimacy in the international arena.
Iran is busily wrapping this renewed legitimacy in terms like “heroic
flexibility,” “historic compromise,” “full transparency,” and a “World
Against Violence and Extremism” (WAVE). Iran wants to make the most of
its enhanced regional status (including its influence in Iraq, Syria,
and Afghanistan), along with its nuclear progress. Iran now controls the
nuclear fuel cycle and can, whenever it decides, break out to build a
bomb in a few months, while exploiting the irresolution and divisions
that prevail in the West.
Iran’s Central Goals
With
the renewed negotiations, Iranian officials made clear that Tehran
views uranium enrichment on Iranian soil as a red line on which it will
not compromise. Foreign Minister Zarif said that, while Iran was willing
to allay “reasonable concerns” about its nuclear program, “making use
of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including enrichment on
Iran’s soil, is an inalienable and fundamental right.”11 Before leaving
Tehran for Geneva, Zarif urged “Western governments not to pursue a
lose-win strategy because they need to understand the reality that Iran
has attained such capabilities in nuclear technology that cannot be
eliminated through sanctions and pressure.”12
Even
if Iran agrees to stop enriching uranium to 20 percent, which it claims
is needed to operate the research reactor in Tehran (TRR) and for
purposes of radiological medicine, to remove from its territory about
180 kilograms of 20-percent-enriched uranium it has already amassed
(there may be an additional clandestine quantity), to limit the number
of operative centrifuges, and even to enhance the IAEA’s supervision of
its nuclear facilities (accepting Comprehensive Safeguards and the
Additional Protocol may indicate Iran seriousness)13 and close the Fordo
enrichment site, it still cannot promise to cease development of other,
mainly military, weaponizing aspects of its nuclear program that are
not connected directly to uranium enrichment. As for enrichment itself,
Iran has already shown that it can fully perform the process without
difficulty while even improving it over the years with advanced
centrifuges, even under the vigilant gaze of the IAEA and mounting
sanctions.
Iran
will demand compensation for its readiness to give up some of its
nuclear assets (but not its capabilities) that are known to the West. If
some of the sanctions are lifted, the rest are likely to dissipate as
well.
Iran
has already proved that it can, in the framework of what it calls its
“resistive economy,” circumvent some of the sanctions, even those
related to its oil industry, and keep exporting oil to China and India
(some of it in return for commodities).
Developing
nuclear weapons, or the ability to produce them within a short time,
continues to be a central goal of the Iranian regime (despite Khamenei’s
purported fatwa against nuclear weapons, which does not appear in any
compilation of the Supreme Leader’s fatwas but is noted by senior
Iranian officials at every opportunity).14 After ten years of talks in
various settings, Iran remains determined to maintain and advance its
nuclear achievements, perhaps with tactical concessions in return for
the easing of sanctions. Iran is not concerned at the moment by its
domestic scene, which, amid the upheavals of the Arab Spring, has been
among the more stable in the region.
Endgame
Iran
continues to strive for a regional hegemonic status. It wants to
supplant the United States and make the most of its own military power
and geostrategic position, along with its oil and gas reserves and the
economic opportunities these offer to both the West and the East. Iran
was a partner to the chemical-weapons deal that was reached in Syria;
the nuclear umbrella Iran aims to provide to its allies is supposed to
compensate for the loss.
Iran
also wields influence in Bahrain, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, countries
where the United States and the West have political, economic, and
military assets. Iran anticipates that nuclear weapons will buy it the
sort of immunity from attack that North Korea now enjoys. It also seeks
long-term stability so that it can promote its revolutionary objectives
abroad (particularly in Bahrain but also in other areas with a Shiite
population) and assume its place in the regional and international power
equation as the one who sets the agenda and influences the reshaping of
the Middle East in a way that counters and curbs U.S. influence.
In
sum, Iran, which has hoodwinked the international community, is
preparing a further campaign as it draws toward the final stages of its
nuclear program. It needs an abatement of pressure so that it can
complete the military components while maintaining the regime’s
stability and promising relief for the economy. Rouhani, who previously
succeeded as a negotiator to buy Iran the time required to complete the
nuclear fuel cycle, now needs to traverse the last mile to the bomb. As
president of Iran, he stands resolute and strong before a divided region
and international community.
* * *
Notes
1.
Abbas Araqchi, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister and number two in the
Iranian nuclear negotiating team, met with Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs Wendy Sherman, head of the U.S. delegation, on October
15, 2013, in Geneva.
7.
“We do not trust them. We consider the government of the United States
of America an unreliable, arrogant, illogical, and hegemonic government
that is badly possessed and dominated by the international Zionist
network….The government of the United States of America is blackmailing
the entire world, appeasing the forged Zionist regime….We do not trust
the U.S. government. We trust our own officials. We are optimists and we
want them [the officials] to take right and firm steps carefully and
considering all aspects. They should not forget national interests and
dignity even for a second.”
8.
14.
+++++
About Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall
IDF
Lt.-Col. (ret.) Michael (Mickey) Segall, an expert on strategic issues
with a focus on Iran, terrorism, and the Middle East, is a senior
analyst at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and the Terrogence
Company.
- See more at:
--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website: www.imra.org.il
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