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It seems illogical that mass protests should force an elected president
from office, especially only a year into a four-year term. But democracy
in Egypt, such that it exists, has not been institutionalized, in large
part because President Mohamed Morsi failed to govern via consensus.
His November 22 constitutional declaration asserting unchecked executive
authority and its subsequent withdrawal, which he used to push an
Islamist constitution to ratification, permanently alienated Egypt's
non-Islamist masses, and they are now fighting his autocratic tactics
not in the ballot box, but in the streets.
Popular mistrust of political institutions, however, would not normally
be sufficient reason to remove an elected leader from office. Egypt's
recent history suggests as much: Mass protests have erupted here
repeatedly since Hosni Mubarak was ousted two-and-a-half years ago, and
the result was never regime change. That was largely because the police
and military responded to the protests with often deadly crackdowns,
sapping the protests of their energy and turning off the
non-participating public, which wanted nothing more than a return to
stability and thus blamed the protesters for the violence.
But now, for the first time since the start of Egypt's January 2011
uprising, there is virtually no chance that state authorities will
intervene to put down the anti-Morsi protests. In fact, security forces
appear to be actively encouraging them. The police have participated
from day one, with uniformed officers marching in solidarity against the
very president to whom they supposedly report, winning cheers from the
crowds along the way. Meanwhile, a military helicopter air-dropped
Egyptian flags over the anti-Morsi protests. And the generals'
announcement on Monday that Morsi had 48 hours to put forth a roadmap
for navigating out of the current crisis encouraged the demonstrators,
who overwhelmingly believe that the military will side with them against
the elected president.
With the military following through on its ultimatum, Morsi's ouster is
nearly certain. There are only two things that could get these jubilant
protesters to leave the public squares.
The first is simply protest-fatigue. But for the moment, this seems
unlikely. Morsi's opponents have been blessed with weather that is
uncommonly comfortable by Egyptian standards -- with highs in the low to
mid-90s, rather than regularly breaking 100. And the protesters have
typically waited until dusk to really ramp up their major activities.
This is why the protests could even continue through Ramadan, the
month-long holiday that begins next week: demonstrations could proceed
after the ritual sundown break-fasts.
Second, the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies -- particularly the
U.S.-designated terrorist organization al-Gamaa al-Islamiya -- could
respond to the protests with violence, and thereby do what the police
have refused to do, only much more brutally. This is a more likely
scenario: The Brotherhood, after all, deployed its cadres against
anti-Morsi protesters on December 5, killing seven people and also
torturing their opponents. And in recent days, the Muslim Brotherhood
has suggested it might organize its cadres into formations, and equip
them with clubs and helmets. On Tuesday, these makeshift units ran laps
around the Brotherhood's main protest site at Rabaa El-Adawiya chanting,
"Strength, determination, faith, Morsi's men are everywhere!"
Yet far from projecting strength, the existence of these units only
reinforces Morsi's utter powerlessness. Moreover, the fact that some of
the would-be combatants are armed with tree branches gives the entire
operation a certain Lord of the Flies quality. But more importantly,
these units -- and the Brotherhood's protests more broadly -- are
completely outnumbered given the massiveness of the opposition's
outpouring. So while violence is inevitable given what's at stake for
the Brotherhood, it will be hard for Morsi's allies to leverage the kind
of violence that ends the protests and thereby saves his presidency.
Which is why Morsi's hours are improbably numbered.
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Eric Trager is a Next Generation Fellow at The Washington Institute.
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