Is Israel Facing War with Hizbullah and Syria?

David Schenker
The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Vol. 9, No. 22 6 April 2010
www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=283&PID=0&IID=3647&TTL=Is_Israel_Facing_War_with_Hizbullah_and_Syria?


Concerns about Israeli hostilities with Hizbullah are nothing new, but based
on recent pronouncements from Syria, if the situation degenerates, fighting
could take on a regional dimension not seen since 1973.

On February 26, Syrian President Bashar Assad hosted Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Damascus.
Afterward, Hizbullah's online magazine Al Intiqad suggested that war with
Israel was on the horizon. Raising tensions further are reports that Syria has provided Hizbullah with
the advanced, Russian-made, shoulder-fired, Igla-S anti-aircraft missile,
which could inhibit Israeli air operations over Lebanon in a future
conflict. The transfer of this equipment had previously been defined by
Israeli officials as a "red line."

In the summer of 2006, Syria sat on the sidelines as Hizbullah fought Israel
to a standstill. After the war, Assad, who during the fighting received
public assurances from then-Prime Minister Olmert that Syria would not be
targeted, took credit for the "divine victory."

Damascus' support for "resistance" was on full display at the Arab Summit in
Libya in late March 2010, where Assad urged Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas
to abandon U.S.-supported negotiations and "take up arms against Israel."

After years of diplomatic isolation, Damascus has finally broken the code to
Europe, and appears to be on the verge of doing so with the Obama
administration as well. Currently, Syria appears to be in a position where
it can cultivate its ties with the West without sacrificing its support for
terrorism.



In February 2010, tensions spiked between Israel and its northern neighbors.
First, Syrian and Israeli officials engaged in a war of words, complete with
dueling threats of regime change and targeting civilian populations. Weeks
later, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah pledged to go toe-to-toe with
Israel in the next war.1 Then, toward the end of the month, Israel began
military maneuvers in the north. Finally, on February 26, Syrian President
Bashar Assad hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah for
an unprecedented dinner meeting in Damascus.

Concerns about Israeli hostilities with Hizbullah are nothing new, but based
on recent pronouncements from Damascus, if the situation degenerates,
fighting could take on a regional dimension not seen since 1973. In January
and February, Syrian officials indicated that, unlike during the 2006
fighting in Lebanon, Damascus would not "sit idly by" in the next war.2
While these statements may be bravado, it's not difficult to imagine Syria
being drawn into the conflict.

The Israeli government has taken steps to alleviate tensions, including,
most prominently, Prime Minister Netanyahu issuing a gag order forbidding
his ministers to discuss Syria.3 Still, the situation in the north remains
volatile. Within a three-day span in mid-March: the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) fired at Israeli jets violating Lebanese airspace;4 four Lebanese
nationals were charged with spying for Israel against Hizbullah;5 and
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi told the Knesset
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the Shiite militia was "building
up its forces north of the Litani (river)." Currently, according to
Ashkenazi, the border was calm, "but this can change."6

It's easy to see how the situation could deteriorate. Hizbullah retaliation
against Israel for the 2008 assassination of its military leader Imad
Mugniyyeh could spark a war. So could Hizbullah firing missiles in
retribution for an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. The
transfer of sensitive Syrian technology to the Shiite militia could also
prompt an Israeli strike. Regrettably, even if Israel continues to try and
diffuse tensions in the north, given the central role Tehran has in
determining Hizbullah policy, a third Lebanon war may be inevitable.



Martyrs Month Pronouncements

In mid-February, Hizbullah held the annual commemoration for its pantheon of
heroes, a week of celebrations marking the organization's top three
martyrs - founding father Ragheb Harb, Secretary General Abbas Mussawi, and
military leader Imad Mugniyyeh. On February 16 - Martyred Leaders Day -
Nasrallah gave a speech where he defined a new, more aggressive posture
toward Israel, upping the ante in the militia's longstanding "balance of
terror" strategy. Promising parity with Israeli strikes on Lebanon,
Nasrallah threatened:

If you [Israel] bomb Rafik Hariri international airport in Beirut, we will
bomb Ben-Gurion airport in Tel Aviv. If you bomb our docks, we will bomb
your docks. If you bomb our oil refineries, we will bomb your oil
refineries. If you bomb our factories, we will bomb your factories. And if
you bomb our power plants, we will bomb your power plants.7
With current estimates suggesting that Hizbullah now possesses in excess of
40,000 missiles and rockets, Nasrallah's threats have some resonance.
Raising tensions further are reports that Syria has provided Hizbullah with
the advanced, Russian-made, shoulder-fired, Igla-S anti-aircraft missile,
which could inhibit Israeli air operations over Lebanon in a future
conflict.8 The transfer of this equipment had previously been defined by
Israeli officials as a "red line."9 It is unclear whether such a
transgression remains a casus belli.

In addition to laying out Hizbullah's new targeting strategy, Nasrallah also
discussed his yet unfulfilled pledge to retaliate against Israel for the
2008 killing of Mugniyyeh. Two years ago, immediately after the
assassination, Nasrallah declared an "open war" against Israel, swearing
vengeance for the group's martyred leader. However, to date, the militia's
attempts to strike Israeli targets - in Azerbaijan and Turkey - have
failed.10 During his speech, Nasrallah reiterated Hizbullah's commitment to
retaliate. "Our options are open and we have all the time in the world," he
said, adding, "What we want is a revenge that rises to the level of Imad
Mugniyyeh."11


The Damascus "Resistance" Summit

In recent years, meetings between Assad and Ahmadinejad have been routine
occurrences. It has also been customary for senior Syrian and Iranian
officials to visit their respective capitals - and to sign defense or
economic agreements - immediately following meetings between the Assad
regime and U.S. officials. So it came as little surprise that Ahmadinejad
arrived in Damascus just days after Undersecretary of State William Burns
departed the Syrian capital. The surprising part about his visit was that
Hassan Nasrallah joined the presidents for dinner.

On the day before Nasrallah's visit, Assad and Ahmadinejad made great
efforts to demonstrate that Washington's transparent efforts to drive a
wedge between the thirty-year strategic allies had failed. In a press
conference on February 25, Assad famously mocked U.S. Secretary of State
Hilary Clinton and the administration's gambit to split Syria from Iran,
announced the end of visa requirements for travel between the two states,
and described "support for the resistance [a]s a moral and national duty in
every nation, and also a [religious] legal duty."12 He also said that he
discussed with his Iranian counterpart "how to confront Israeli terrorism."

While the Syria-Iran bilateral meeting and subsequent press conference was
described in some detail by Assad regime insider Ibrahim Humaydi in the
pan-Arab daily Al Hayat, far less is known about what Assad, Ahmadinejad,
and Nasrallah discussed during their dinner meeting the next day. According
to the account in Hizbullah's online magazine Al Intiqad, the meeting was
about "the escalating strategic response of the axis of the
confrontationist, rejectionist, and resistance states" to the U.S.-Israeli
threat.13 Significantly, this article also suggested that war with Israel
was on the horizon.

Resorting to the most extreme decision - that is, launching and setting a
war on its path - will decide the final results. In any case, if reasonable
calculations prevail, they will lead to producing comprehensive and specific
[Israeli] compromises or it will lead to postponing the war which still
waits for its most appropriate time for everyone.14

Based on its analysis of the trilateral summit in Damascus, this Hizbullah
organ seems to be suggesting that a war, while not imminent, is inevitable.


The Weak Link

In the summer of 2006, Syria sat on the sidelines as Hizbullah fought Israel
to a standstill. After the war, Assad, who during the fighting received
public assurances from then-Prime Minister Olmert that Syria would not be
targeted, took credit for the "divine victory."15 Since then, Syria has
upgraded its rhetorical and materiel support for the Shiite militia.16
Damascus has helped Hizbullah to fully rearm, reportedly providing the
militia with cutting-edge Russian weaponry from its own stocks. In this
context, Syrian officials have been increasingly trumpeting their support
for, and loyalty to, the resistance, so much so that the official
government-controlled Syrian press now proclaims that "Syrian foreign policy
depends on supporting the resistance."17

Damascus' support for "resistance" was on full display at the Arab Summit in
Libya in late March 2010. According to reports, at the meeting Assad urged
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to abandon U.S.-supported negotiations
and "take up arms against Israel," imparting his own experience that "the
price of resistance is not higher than the price of peace."18 During his
speech before his fellow Arab leaders, Assad was equally hard-line in his
prescriptions. At a minimum, he said, Arab states should cut off their
relations with Israel. The "maximum" - and presumably preferable - policy
option, he said, would be to support the resistance.19

Despite the rhetoric, however, it's not clear that Syria is presently
itching for a fight with Israel. After years of diplomatic isolation,
Damascus has finally broken the code to Europe, and appears to be on the
verge of doing so with the Obama administration, which recently announced
the posting of a new ambassador and indicated a willingness to revise
sanctions and modify U.S. economic pressures on Damascus.20 Currently, Syria
appears to be in a position where it can cultivate its ties with the West
without sacrificing its support for terrorism.

War would change this comfortable dynamic. In the event of an
Israel-Hizbullah conflagration, pressures on Syria to participate would be
intense. Furthermore, could Syria really watch an Israeli attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities without responding? After so much crowing about its
support for Hizbullah and its regional ilk, could Syria sit out yet another
fight?


Conclusion

While it's too early to predict the timing or the trigger, on Israel's
northern border there appears to be a growing sense that war is coming. Iran
may have an interest in maintaining Hizbullah's arsenal until an Israeli
strike. Likewise, for Hizbullah, which lately has been playing up its
Lebanese identity in an effort to improve its image at home, waging war on
Israel on behalf of Iran could be problematic. In any event, it is all but
assured that a war on Israel's northern front will be determined, at least
in part, by Tehran.

In early February, Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak told the IDF: "In
the absence of an arrangement with Syria, we are liable to enter a
belligerent clash with it that could reach the point of an all-out, regional
war."21 Regrettably, regardless of what happens between Syria and Israel in
the coming months, the decision of war or peace with Hizbullah may be out of
Israel's hands.


* * *

Notes

* The author would like to thank his research assistant Cole Bunzel for his
excellent assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. "Full Text of H.E. Sayyed Nasrallah Speech on Day of Martyred Leaders,"
http://english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=10225&cid=214.
2. "Syria Will Back Hizbullah Against IDF," Jerusalem Post, January 6, 2010.
Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem echoed this threat in February 2010; see
"Al-Mouallem at Press Conference with Moratinos," SANA, February 4, 2010.
http://www.sana.sy/eng/21/2010/02/04/270781.htm.
3. Attila Somfalvi, "Bibi Tells Ministers to Keep Mum on Syria," Ynet,
February 4, 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3844619,00.html.
Netanyahu also reassured Syria that Israel remained interested in peace.
4. "Lebanese Army Fires on Israeli Warplanes," AFP, March 21, 2010,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/view/20100321-260030/Lebanese-army-fires-on-Israeli-warplanes.
5. "Lebanon Charges Four with Spying for Israel," Press TV, March 20, 2010,
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=121274§ionid=351020203.
6. Amnon Meranda, "Ashkenazi: Hamas Doesn't Want a Flareup," Ynet, March 23,
2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3866883,00.html.
7. "Nasrallah Speech on Day of Martyred Leaders."
8. See, for example, Barak Ravid, "Israel Warns Hizbullah: We Won't Tolerate
Arms Smuggling," Ha'aretz, October 12, 2008,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1009384.html.
9. "Report: Hizbullah Trains on Missiles," UPI, January 17, 2010,
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/International/2010/01/17/Report-Hezbollah-trains-on-missiles/UPI-51221263741141/.
10. See Yossi Melman, "Hizbullah, Iran Plotted Bombing of Israeli Embassy in
Azerbaijan," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2009,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1089204.html. Also Avi Isaacharoff,
"Turkish Forces Foil Attack on Israeli Target," Ha'aretz, December 9, 2009,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1133747.html.
11. "Nasrallah Speech on Day of Martyred Leaders."
12. Ibrahim Humaydi, "Al Asad: Ta'ziz al-'alaqat bayna duwal al-mintaqa
tariq wahid li-l-qarar al mustaqill," Al Hayat, February 26, 2010,
http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/112984.
13. "Qimmat Nejad-Al-Asad-Nasrallah: Ayy hisabat ba'daha?"
http://www.alintiqad.com/essaydetails.php?eid=27878&cid=4.
14. Ibid.
15. "Speech of Bashar Asad at Journalist Union 4th Conference," August 15,
2006,
http://www.golan67.net/NEWS/president%20Assad%20Speech%2015-8-6.htm.
16. In addition to the Igla-S anti-aircraft missile, some unconfirmed
reports indicate that Syria may have transferred some of its Scud-D
missiles - capable of delivering chemical warheads - to Hizbullah.
17. "Junblatt wa-l-Tariq ila Dimashq," Al Watan, March 10, 2010,
http://alwatan.sy/dindex.php?idn=75718. That support for resistance is
central to Syrian foreign policy comes as little surprise: in 2009, Foreign
Minister Walid Mouallem volunteered to join Hizbullah. See "Muallem Says
He's Ready to Join Hizbullah," Gulf News, May 3, 2009,
http://gulfnews.com/news/region/lebanon/muallem-says-ready-to-join-hezbollah-1.248887.
18. "Arab Leaders Support Peace Plan," AP, March 28, 2010,
http://www.jpost.com/middleeast/article.aspx?id=171981.
19. Ziyad Haydar, "Qimmat sirte infaddat 'ala 'ajal...wa bila za'al," As
Safir, March 29, 2010,
http://www.assafir.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=3020&EditionId=1496&ChannelId=34736.
In an interview following the summit, Syrian advisor Buthaina Sha'ban
declared victory for the Syrian position, saying that "an agreement took
place among the Arab leaders in a closed session to support the resistance
and reject normalization" with Israel.
20. Ibrahim Humaydi, "Washington tarfa' mu'aradataha 'udwiyat Suriya fi
munazzimat al-tijara al-'alamiya," Al Hayat, February 24, 2010,.
http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/112646.
21. Amos Harel, "Barak: Without Peace We Could Be Headed for All-Out War,"
Ha'aretz, February 2, 2010,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1146731.html.