Israel: The Israeli Navy and Iran

The Israeli submarine Dolphin surfaces
Stratfor

Summary

Israeli submarines and surface combatants reportedly have been transiting the Suez Canal since June, with the latest passage occurring July 14 when two Israeli corvettes entered the Red Sea. The recent activity has been characterized as unprecedented, although it is thought to have been planned for some time. While the move may merely be a reminder to Iran that Israel is capable of unilateral military action, the Israeli navy faces real limitations conducting operations off the Iranian coast.The Israeli Saar 5-class corvettes Eilat and Hanit passed through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea July 14, according to Egyptian port authorities. Reports claim that the Hanit, which was struck by an antiship missile off the coast of Lebanon in 2006, also crossed into the Red Sea through the canal and returned to the Mediterranean in June. In addition, on July 3, an Israeli Dolphin-class submarine transited the canal (on the surface) for maneuvers in the Gulf of Aqaba, near Eilat. The sub returned two days later, ending a deployment that allegedly was planned months in advance.

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi reportedly ordered the transits before the Egyptians arrested on July 9 some 25 al Qaeda-linked militants suspected of planning attacks on ships passing through the Suez Canal, and after an assessment that Egyptian authorities had addressed the threat against shipping in the canal (as reported, the sequence of events does not entirely add up).

Image removed by sender. map: israel's naval access to iran

While Ashkenazi’s original deployment plan reportedly predates the Iranian elections, it is certainly no coincidence that the Suez transits are being repeated and played up in the regional press. They can serve a political role by supplementing Israel’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric about the clerical regime and its nuclear ambitions, reminding Iran that Israel also has the means to strike from the sea.

Most of the Israeli navy is based on the Mediterranean coast at Haifa and Ashdod. There is also a small and vulnerable naval installation at Eilat that hosts patrol boats used to combat local smuggling. The Israeli navy is the smallest of the three branches of the IDF, consisting of some 9,500 active officers and sailors (about a third of the latter are conscripted) and operating three diesel-electric submarines and three corvettes (all of the Saar 5 class). The remainder of the fleet is composed of patrol and coastal combatants. This severely limits Israel’s naval options in the Gulf of Oman — nearly 2,500 nautical miles from Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba and more than 2,500 nautical miles from the larger Israeli naval stations on the Mediterranean coast.

Without underway replenishment or a nearby port, the Saar 5-class corvettes would likely be operating at or beyond the limits of their endurance in the Gulf of Oman (Israel does not officially have any underway replenishment ships and it would have difficulty finding a friendly port in the neighborhood). While the corvettes are known to train with Israel’s naval commandos and their capability to embark a helicopter could be useful, they have only limited land-attack capability. In addition, weight and financial constraints have reportedly prevented these ships from being fully armed with their planned complement of weapon systems.

This leaves Israel’s small submarine fleet. Specially built in Germany for Israel, each boat has four larger 650mm torpedo tubes in addition to the standard six 533mm tubes. These are thought to be for an indigenous submarine-launched cruise missile, probably nuclear-capable. In other words, these submarines are a part of the Israeli nuclear deterrent and therefore a national asset of strategic significance.

Unlike the Saar 5-class corvettes, these submarines could reach the Gulf of Oman and remain on station for a period of time before returning — perhaps as long as a week to several weeks. However, these are small boats with 30-man crews and limited weapons capacity (a mix of about 20 torpedoes, Harpoon antiship missiles and cruise missiles). A good portion of this capacity would be dedicated to antisubmarine and antiship weapons for self-defense, so each submarine would likely only be able to launch a handful of cruise missiles.

And the target set for a cruise-missile strike would also be limited. Because of its range, cruise missiles launched from Israeli subs in the Gulf of Oman would be able to reach only a few hundred miles from their launch points, which would preclude targeting some important nuclear sites as well as Tehran itself.

Generally, cruise missiles — especially those launched from submarines — are also poor at penetrating hardened facilities because of their limited payload. Even one modified for the purpose would likely have less than optimum effect, which would mean that hardened installations like Natanz, where Iran uses cascades to enrich uranium, would likely be left largely intact following a cruise-missile strike (unless, of course, Israel chose to use nuclear warheads, which seems unlikely at this point). Unless Israel had pinpoint, actionable intelligence on unhardened but critical targets within range of its cruise missiles, it is difficult to see how such a strategy would achieve the Israeli objective of eviscerating Iran’s nuclear program.

The limitations of capacity and range also apply to other Israeli sub-attack scenarios, including special operations. Only a small complement of naval commandos could be embarked aboard each sub, and without aviation support, they would be limited to targets along the coastline.

Israel could try to impose a limited naval blockade on Iran. If all three submarines are in good operational condition, a rotation could hypothetically establish a continual submarine presence outside the Strait of Hormuz. But submarines are not ideal blockade enforcers unless they intend only to sink ships. They cannot approach and board suspected vessels. This limited menu of submarine options makes escalation of force difficult. And even if Iran attempted to break the blockade (which is unlikely), the submarines would have to fire on merchant traffic with limited magazines of torpedoes and missiles that could not be replenished at sea.

The question is not only one of capability but also of purpose and consequence. A limited strike that did not meaningfully set back Iran’s nuclear program would only harden the clerical regime’s resolve. Tehran is likely to take any direct challenges seriously — even a blockade — which could invite new attacks on Israeli territory by Iranian proxy Hezbollah. Even a limited blockade could hurt Iran economically, but it would leave the primary Israeli concern untouched, and Tehran is unlikely to surrender its nuclear program under such indirect Israeli pressure.

But since the Iranian presidential election, the United States, Europe and Russia as well as Israel are rethinking their standing policies on Iran. While this reevaluation is going on, it is important to consider all options that might be on the table and their implications.