IDF believes in Assad

Bush, Olmert may disagree, but army believes Syria ready for peace, Palestinians aren’t The recent cooling off in the relationship between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak is merely the tip of the iceberg; the one that enjoys wide coverage but is less important.

The mutual public insults they have traded, just like the disagreement over the procedural aspects of their meetings with top security officials, reflect not only the preparations they are making ahead of the competition for the premiership. They also attest to a deep and fundamental strategic disagreement over the question of the track Israel should be focusing its diplomatic efforts on in the coming year.

After IDF strike

IAEA examines Syria bombing site photos / AP and Yitzhak Benhorin

Diplomatic sources say UN experts scrutinizing satellite photos of site attacked by Israeli Air force jets in September; no conclusive results yet. Earlier, Washington Post reported Syria eliminating evidence at site of attack
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Olmert, with the support of the Mossad, National security Council, and also the American Administration, prefers to focus on an attempt to reach an agreement with the Palestinians. The prime minister is willing to put out feelers on the Syrian track, but he is unwilling to enter substantial and binding negotiations.

On the other hand, Barak, who enjoys the firm support of the IDF General Staff and assistance from the Shin Bet internal security service, believes that the gist of the diplomatic effort must be directed to the Syrian track, while the Palestinian channel should be handled cautiously and be kept on the backburner.

According to the security establishment’s assessment, at this time there is a good chance and substantial need to reach a binding peace agreement with Bashar Assad. According to this approach, the latter would be able to deliver the goods in exchange for the territorial and other concessions he’ll be receiving from Israel. On the other hand, according to Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet, even if Mahmoud Abbas signs an agreement, he would not be able to provide Israel with the level of security it requires. Any fundamental Israeli concessions in an agreement signed with him will constitute an opening position for the next round of negotiations – and a source for more international pressure.

“In the 60th year of its existence, the State of Israel finally has to produce permanent borders that come with a clear return address that we can reach understandings with and finalize binding agreements with,” says a very senior security official. “We can reach this state of affairs with Syria at this time; with the Palestinians, not yet.” According to the same source, a peace agreement with Syria will indirectly affect the Israeli-Palestinian arena as well, because it will disconnect Damascus from Iran, Hizbullah, and Hamas.

“If we don’t at least try to reach an agreement with Syria, we’ll be doing ourselves a disservice,” the security official warned. “All of us know what Syria wants and what previous Israeli governments agreed to give it. It’s clear to me that if we have another war today, we’ll win. But this war will cause terrible destruction and victims on both sides, and when it’s over we’ll sit down at the negotiation table with the Syrians and reach an agreement. So why should we join this march of folly?” he wondered, while alluding to Barbara Tuchman’s well-known book, which among other things addresses bloody wars that could have been prevented.

“Why don’t we try to enter negotiations at this point already in order to reach the same result we would be achieving after the war? In my estimate, today Syria is ready for such talks,” the security official said.

Lessons from the bombing
This approach, which as noted contradicts the views of the prime minister, was formulated in the IDF for many months, but received a boost mostly after the aerial assault in Syria. Early this year, Military Intelligence already estimated that Assad means what he says. The question that remained open was whether the Syrian president wanted peace talks with Israel in order to reach a binding peace deal, or whether his only intention was to embark on talks for the sake of talks.

The Mossad, for example, argued that Bashar is interested in dialogue in order to end his isolation and so that the international community ease the pressure on him over matters such as the flow of terrorists from Syria to Iraq and the assassination of former Lebanese PM Hariri. The Mossad estimated that Assad is not ready for genuine peace moves in exchange for an Israeli willingness to withdraw from the Golan Heights. He only wants to talk. However, officials in the IDF’s intelligence branch recently reached the conclusion that Bashar is ready and willing to deliver the goods. This was a result of information that points to the following trends:

1. Syria is uncomfortable with the Iranian bear hug, which manifests itself in all areas of life, including security and economics. Assad is unhappy to serve as a pawn on Tehran’s chessboard on its way to a nuclear bomb.

2. Assad wants to see continued economic development in his country. This growth, which constitutes the main motive for the popular support for his regime vis-à-vis Islamic radicals, has been based to a large extent on revenues from oil fields in northeastern Syria. However, output is declining. Assad needs European and American investments in order to survive economically and politically – and he will only be seeing this should he disengage from the “axis of evil.” Peace with Israel may also grant him the Golan, and also free him from the status of a pariah state that is dangerous to invest in and maintain ties with.

3. The successful bombing of the Syrian nuclear site, according to foreign reports at least, made it clear to Assad that his attempts to acquire such weapons in the aims of reaching strategic equality with Israel are doomed for failure. The bombing also exposed Syria to additional criticism on the part of the international community and further deepened its isolation. Military intelligence officials estimate that this could lead Bashar to follow in the footsteps of Libyan leader Gaddafi. The latter, in a complete turnaround, abandoned his nuclear program upon its exposure and embarked on moves of reconciliation that brought Libya back into the family of nations. The senior security official referred to this by saying: “We must treat Bashar in a manner that would turn him into a repenting Gaddafi, or alternately, present him as a pariah and a danger to regional peace just like Saddam Hussein. In any case, we’ll gain from such move.”

4. The bombing of the site made it clear to the Syrian regime that a confrontation with Israel could be destructive. The regime realized how transparent Syria is to the Israeli intelligence establishment, and how vulnerable its national infrastructure and missile arsenals can be in the face of the Israeli Air Force. At this time Bashar understands that despite the arms deals and military preparations, he is still far from the day where he would be able to force Israel, through missile and rocket barrages, to withdraw from the Golan. On the other hand, a harsh Israeli response could cause him and the Alawite sect to lose their grip on power. Military intelligence officials believe that Bashar has recently sobered up from the belligerent enthusiasm that overcame him in the wake of the Second Lebanon War. At this time he realizes that Syria as a state, as opposed to Hizbullah, cannot afford to get entangled in an all-out confrontation with Israel.

Containment in Gaza, peace with Assad
As a result of these assessments, the security establishment has formulated a strategy that argues for “containment in the Palestinian arena and diplomatic initiative on the Syrian track.” The practical implication of such “containment” is a continued military effort aimed at curbing Palestinian terrorism, alongside economic and diplomatic moves aimed at boosting Mahmoud Abbas’ status. Should sanctions and military activities in Gaza fail to curb the Qassam fire, the IDF will embark on a wide-scale operation in the Strip aimed at destroying terror infrastructure and achieving intelligence supremacy. However, as a condition to such operation, the IDF demands large forces to be used for a lengthy period of time. Otherwise, according to estimates by top military officials, it would be impossible to achieve substantial accomplishments.

Barak and the defense establishment understand that Israel cannot afford to stay away from the Annapolis conference. However, they demand that Israel insist on implementation of the Road Map initiative in all matters pertaining to the dismantling of Palestinian terror infrastructure as a pre-requisite to any diplomatic progress. They also demand that understandings reached at the conference be general and non-binding. The time for a deal with the Palestinians will come after Israel will possess a reliable system for intercepting rockets and missiles, after Hamastan will cease to exist in Gaza, and when Abbas enjoys effective control on the ground.


But before all that, based on the same school of thought, Israel must embark on negotiations with the Syrians. Initially this should be done surreptitiously, through mediators (such as Turkey, for example,) and later openly. Following the Annapolis summit, say those who back talks with Syria, it might be worthwhile to convene a special international summit that would be dedicated to this track. This will provide the international framework and Arab legitimacy for a possible peace agreement between Jerusalem and Damascus. According to foreign media reports, initial contacts are already underway, in preparation for convening such conference in Moscow. For the time being, this approach is getting the cold shoulder from the prime minister and US Administration.