The Second Lebanon War: Moshe Yaalon

Security Implications for Israel: Establishing Defensible Borders
Part 6

The Second Lebanon War underscores the importance of strategic depth for Israel's survival. During the war, 90 to 95 percent of the more than four thousand rockets firedbyHizbullahatIsraelicitieswereshort-range,122 mm rockets launched from distances of between six and twenty-two kilometers. These short-range rockets directly threatened nearly two million Israelis, a third of Israel's population. Nearly a million people temporarily fled the north, while more than a million remaining citizens were forced to take cover in bomb shelters. Twelve thousand buildings were hit and estimates of overall damage reached well over $2.5 billion. However, had Israel's ground operation been executed in the first week of the war and a security zone created up to Lebanon's Litani River – approximately twenty kilometers from Israel's northern border – nearly 95 percent of Hizbullah's rockets would have landed in southern Lebanon and not northern Israel.

The conclusion is clear: land is essential to Israel's defense and national security, particularly in the face of short-range rocket attacks that, notwithstanding the separate issue of long-range missiles, continue to be a strategic threat to the Jewish state.

Therefore, Israel's security requirements for strategic depth have far-reaching consequences for the future of the West Bank. Had Hizbullah rockets been launched from the hills of the West Bank under Hamas control, Israel would face an unprecedented existential threat as 70 percent of its civilian population and 80 percent of its industrial capacity is situated below these hilltops along Israel's coastline. Unfortunately, Hamas' control of the Palestinian areas, particularly in the West Bank, could easily result in weapons flowing to Hamas from Iraq and Hizbullah in Lebanon, creating a strategic threat from Israel's eastern front. Given the unstable strategic situation in Lebanon and to Israel's east in Iraq, Syria and the West Bank, Israel must have defensible borders in the West Bank.

It must be emphasized that the West Bank security fence is not a strategic solution to the full range of Palestinian Jihadi terror actions. The fence is only meant to be a tactical measure that has largely succeeded in preventing Palestinian suicide bombers from reaching Israel's major population centers. However, the IDF's anti-terror operations on the ground in the West Bank and against Hamas in Gaza continue to be the major preventative measure against Palestinian terror assaults on Israeli towns and cities. Accordingly, Israel must protect its interests eastward in the Jordan Valley, as well as in the areas surrounding Jerusalem and to the east of Ben-Gurion Airport. Israel must also control territory to the east of the security fence where it is crucial that the IDF's operational strength be preserved in order to protect Israeli population centers along the coast.

Hamas will not reach a territorial compromise with Israel. Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyah has little control. Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mashaal determines policy from Damascus in cooperation with Syria and Iran, which offer financial backing. Moreover, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas is unable to rein in radical Islamists in Gaza who are attacking Israel with Kassam rockets, and Palestinian security forces have failed to stabilize the Palestinian areas of the West Bank.

Therefore, a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not with insight and neither a two-state solution nor further territorial concessions in the West Bank are relevant for the foreseeable future. Israel took substantial risks to achieve a two-state solution, especially since the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords with Yasser Arafat and the PLO. Unfortunately, Israel's bilateral peace process experiment resulted in nearly 1,400 Israelis dead and thousands more wounded. It is imperative, then, that Israel and the West learn the lessons of the political and diplomatic failures opposite the Palestinians.

While Israel's political leadership and public continue to demonstrate willingness for territorial compromise with the Palestinians, Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza was a strategic mistake of the first order. The Gaza withdrawal helped bring about Hamas' victory. It emboldened radical Islamic terror groups, from Hizbullah in Lebanon to radical insurgent groups in Iraq. It strengthened the assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda and the Iranians that Israel can be beaten.

But of even greater consequence, Israel's Gaza pullback and the summer 2006 war with Hizbullah have harmed America's strategic war on terror in the region. The United States and Europe had praised Israel's unilateral withdrawal from both Lebanon in 2000 and the Gaza Strip in September 2005, thus ending Israel's occupation of those areas. According to the international view, Israel's pullbacks edged the region closer to peace and stability. However, fundamentalist Islam interprets Israel's moves differently from the way Western actors read them. Muslim extremists believe that they have defeated Israel, once in Gaza and twice in Lebanon. Now following the summer 2006 war, they are confident that they can defeat Israel in Tel Aviv. They sense that they have destabilized a superpower, and will destabilize the West by defeating Israel.

The free world, then, undermines its own regional interests by pressuring Israel to increase its vulnerability by withdrawing from additional territories in the West Bank, most of which are unpopulated and essential for Israel's defense and national security. Simply stated, Israeli concessions are viewed by radical Islam as the West's weakness.

There is even greater reason for concern today. A second "southern Lebanon" is sprouting up under Israel's feet in both Gaza and the West Bank.41 Hizbullah has strengthened its financial and operational influence in both arenas. Since Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in September 2005, Gaza has become a hotbed of Jihadi terror activity by al-Qaeda, Hizbullah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups. Hizbullah established a forward headquarters in Gaza that activates suicide terrorists there and in the West Bank. While Hizbullah's headquarters has been based in Beirut, since the IDF's destruction of substantial Hizbullah infrastructure in southern Lebanon and in the Dahiya neighborhood in Beirut, Hizbullah operations from Gaza have become a more effective strategy. It is not surprising that Palestinian terrorist tactics after mid-2006 increasingly resembled those adopted by Hizbullah. In fact, a large majority of Palestinians polled after the Lebanon war reported that the tactics employed by Hizbullah against Israel provide an "attractive model" for Palestinian armed resistance.

Iran is also exploiting the Palestinian arena as a platform for the subversion of regimes that are connected to the West, especially in Egypt and Jordan. Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia led unprecedented Arab public criticism of Hizbullah after the first week of the war, blasting Nasrallah for "adventurism." They accused Hizbullah of attempting to drag the entire region into a military confrontation with Israel.

Hamas is also seeking to produce or import longer-range rockets that are more lethal and more accurate. These missiles will have a greater range and will be capable of hitting Israel's southern city of Ashkelon as well as more northern coastal cities. Hamas is also importing shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, weapons that Iran and Syria supplied to Hizbullah in Lebanon.
The Karine-A weapons ship that the Iranians sent to Gaza in 2002, in coordination with PA leader Yasser Arafat, demonstrated more than simply an Iranian interest in supporting the Palestinian Authority's terrorist war with Iranian weapons. The Iranians have been working through Hizbullah and Hamas in Gaza to create a model similar to Hizbullah's Lebanon model, called "Jihad Il Binaya." In the Lebanese model, the same system that supports civil affairs – such as construction, education, health care and welfare – also creates a civilian infrastructure for terror. Through this paradigm, Hizbullah has deepened its connection to the local population. In fact, Hamas police units traveled to Iran for military training following the cease-fire in Lebanon. This unprecedented, direct Iranian penetration into the Palestinian arena may increase the likelihood of a Palestinian civil war and accelerate the deterioration in Gaza and the West Bank.