According to the report, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has instructed his ministers to draft proposals on how to cope with a nuclear Iran. The report was later denied by a senior Prime Minister's Office official, Israel Radio reported.
The agency quoted a source close to Olmert as saying there were "long-term ramifications to be addressed, like how to maintain our deterrent and military response capabilities, or how to off-set the attrition on Israeli society that would be generated by fear of Iranian nukes."
Minister Ami Ayalon refused to discuss specific policy issues, but told Reuters that there was a need for a three-point strategy against Iran.
"First, we must make clear that this is a threat not just to Israel, but to the wider world. Second, we must exhaustively consider all preventive options. And third, we must anticipate the possibility of those options not working," Ayalon said.
According to foreign media sources Israel's defense strategy is based on the assumption that it is the only nation in the Middle East to possess nuclear weapons.
Iran has denied accusations that it is after nuclear weaponry, stating that its atomic research was a means of acquiring nuclear energy capabilities. However, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has on numerous occasions called for Israel's destruction.
Israel has supported international efforts to stop Iran's atomic development through UN Security Council sanctions, and several Israeli officials have also hinted that Israel could attack Iran's nuclear facilities if diplomacy fails.
Reuters reported that Israel was developing its defense systems to fend off a possible Iranian attack. It added that Israel was constructing a fleet of German-made submarines which could possibly carry nuclear missiles, sending a clear message that there would be retaliation for any Iranian attack.
We are a grass roots organization located in both Israel and the United States. Our intention is to be pro-active on behalf of Israel. This means we will identify the topics that need examination, analysis and promotion. Our intention is to write accurately what is going on here in Israel rather than react to the anti-Israel media pieces that comprise most of today's media outlets.
Saturday, November 17, 2007
Israel to freeze West Bank settlement expansion'
TEL AVIV (AFP) - Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will announce a freeze in West Bank settlement expansion as a gesture towards the Palestinians at a US peace meeting this month, a senior official said Thursday. The move is one of several gestures towards Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that the Israeli premier plans to make during the one-day meeting expected to take place in Annapolis, Maryland, on November 27.
"The prime minister will declare a freeze to settlement expansion at Annapolis. In reality, we haven't touched the settlements for over 18 months," the official told AFP on condition of anonymity.
Israeli and Palestinian teams are currently engaged in intensive talks in a bid to hammer out a joint declaration outlining a solution to the Middle East conflict which they hope to present at the Annapolis meeting.
The US talks are aimed at offering the backing of the international community - and pro-Western Arab states in particular - to a hoped-for revival in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Palestinians want the pre-meeting document to address core issues of the conflict - borders, the fate of refugees, settlements and the status of Jerusalem - while Israelis prefer a more general statement of shared principles.
Olmert has vowed to proceed with peace talks on the basis of the 2003 roadmap peace plan, which calls on Israel to freeze settlement growth and to withdraw from outposts established after March 2001.
Israel also intends to carry through its commitment to dismantle the outposts, the official said, "but the question of its timing is still to be decided, because we want to do this in coordination with the settlers." In addition to the settlement freeze, Olmert will also announce the release of "hundreds" of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, but only those who have not been involved in Israelis.
Israel has released hundreds of Palestinians in recent months as gestures of goodwill towards Abbas, but continues to hold more than 11,000 Palestinians in its jails.
Olmert is also likely to authorise the transport of goods out of the Gaza Strip, where the Islamist Hamas movement seized power last June, ousting Fateh movement.
"We will try to strengthen Gaza's economy in a way that will clearly give the credit to Abbas," the official said.
Israel has reduced to a minimum the transfer of goods into and out of Gaza since the Hamas takeover, but Olmert has said the Jewish state will not allow a humanitarian crisis to develop in the impoverished Palestinian territory.
"The prime minister will declare a freeze to settlement expansion at Annapolis. In reality, we haven't touched the settlements for over 18 months," the official told AFP on condition of anonymity.
Israeli and Palestinian teams are currently engaged in intensive talks in a bid to hammer out a joint declaration outlining a solution to the Middle East conflict which they hope to present at the Annapolis meeting.
The US talks are aimed at offering the backing of the international community - and pro-Western Arab states in particular - to a hoped-for revival in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Palestinians want the pre-meeting document to address core issues of the conflict - borders, the fate of refugees, settlements and the status of Jerusalem - while Israelis prefer a more general statement of shared principles.
Olmert has vowed to proceed with peace talks on the basis of the 2003 roadmap peace plan, which calls on Israel to freeze settlement growth and to withdraw from outposts established after March 2001.
Israel also intends to carry through its commitment to dismantle the outposts, the official said, "but the question of its timing is still to be decided, because we want to do this in coordination with the settlers." In addition to the settlement freeze, Olmert will also announce the release of "hundreds" of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, but only those who have not been involved in Israelis.
Israel has released hundreds of Palestinians in recent months as gestures of goodwill towards Abbas, but continues to hold more than 11,000 Palestinians in its jails.
Olmert is also likely to authorise the transport of goods out of the Gaza Strip, where the Islamist Hamas movement seized power last June, ousting Fateh movement.
"We will try to strengthen Gaza's economy in a way that will clearly give the credit to Abbas," the official said.
Israel has reduced to a minimum the transfer of goods into and out of Gaza since the Hamas takeover, but Olmert has said the Jewish state will not allow a humanitarian crisis to develop in the impoverished Palestinian territory.
Palestinian Politics and the Annapolis Meeting
Mohammad Yaghi
The huge turnout of an estimated 250,000 Fatah supporters at a November 12 Gaza rally commemorating the third anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death reflects not only the worsening economic conditions since Hamas's June takeover , but also the factional rivalry over who is authorized to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians at the upcoming Annapolis peace meeting. Since it is unable to provide services to Palestinians in Gaza, Hamas is using the meeting to delegitimize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), threaten the delicate security situation in the West Bank, and solidify its own domination of Gaza. Meanwhile, Fatah seeks to restore its influence in Gaza, challenge Hamas's claims of authority, and protect its control of the West Bank.
Renewed Tensions in Gaza
Motivated by the dire situation in Gaza and nostalgia for a better life, politically unaffiliated men and women of all ages joined Fatah's activists in the November 12 rally. They were eager to send a clear message to Hamas that its control of Gaza must end. Fearing escalating protests, Hamas gunmen fired on the crowd, killing at least eight and injuring dozens.
Much of the tension that Hamas has faced is due to its failure to lift the economic siege of Gaza, which has bankrupted the private sector and left an additional 80,000 people without work. The price of goods continues to rise, and border crossings remain closed even to students, the sick, and Mecca pilgrims. The Ramallah-based government headed by Salam Fayad has retained some influence in Gaza and managed to dampen the economic crisis by paying the salaries of PA officials in Gaza. A recent poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre indicated that 43 percent of Palestinians believe Fayad's government has performed better than the Hamas government, while 25 percent think the opposite. Hamas's only achievement -- restoring a measure of order and internal security in Gaza -- has been due more to its monopoly on arms than the allegiance of the population.
These poll results and the large turnout at the November 12 rally should not be viewed as an indication that Fatah has overcome its internal problems. Rather, it is a sign that the population is increasingly eager to be rid of the Hamas government. Fatah's weakness was shown when its officials in Gaza spent hours disputing who would address the rally before settling on Ahmed Hilis, the group's de facto leader in Gaza since Muhammad Dahlan's departure. Hilis did not mention Annapolis or President Mahmoud Abbas in his speech, but he did criticize Hamas for its coup and declared "Gaza will remain for Fatah."
The Ongoing Question of Legitimacy
As tensions in Gaza mount, Hamas is using the Annapolis initiative to challenge Abbas's right to negotiate on behalf of Palestinians. According to Hamas, the PLO -- whose chairman (Abbas) is legally responsible for political negotiations -- is a dead body. In fact, the PLO's national council has not met in nine years, its executive committee members are not elected, and it does not represent the distribution of political power among Palestinians. Hamas has issued a number of public rebukes about the illegality of any agreements reached at Annapolis and has also taken concrete measures aimed at undercutting Abbas, the Fayad government, and the PLO.
On November 7, Hamas held a Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) session by reaching a quorum with the authorization of its thirty-five imprisoned members. Hamas legislators asserted that Abbas's decrees since June 2007 are void, including his appointment of Fayad to head the Palestinian Authority (PA). They threatened to dismiss Fayad from the PLC and declared that it never gave Abbas the mandate to negotiate with Israel.
In addition to this challenge, Hamas plans to hold a conference in Damascus that will coincide with the Annapolis conference in an attempt to demonstrate that the majority of Palestinian factions oppose negotiations with Israel. Hamas has invited all Palestinian factions to participate, and many Arab parliamentarians and journalists have already accepted, including some Fatah members who live abroad. Consequently, there is deep concern within Fatah that this Hamas-led conference will lay the foundation for establishing a new Palestinian representative body that will try to supplant the PLO. If Syria attends the Annapolis meeting, however, it will significantly weaken the impact of a parallel Hamas-led effort in Damascus, if not cancel it altogether.
Fatah has attempted to counter these measures by calling the November 7 PLC session unconstitutional, and it is preparing a number of legal changes that will increase Abbas's authority and flexibility in dealing with the deadlocked legislature. These amendments will permit the president to dissolve the PLC, call for new elections or a public referendum, and create a presidential deputy. Fatah has also sent senior representatives to Damascus to try to prevent the Hamas conference. None of these measures will likely resolve the ongoing crisis of legitimacy that began after Hamas's 2006 election victory. Instead, they indicate that the Hamas/Fatah dispute will increase in intensity as confrontations in Gaza mount and international diplomatic efforts progress. Hamas's June takeover of the territory and Fatah's increasingly harsh rhetoric regarding the coup indicate that the prospects of a renewed unity government deal along the lines of the February Mecca accord are extremely low.
Destabilizing the West Bank
The West Bank is another arena for potential Fatah-Hamas rivalry. In the past month, a number of Hamas leaders issued public threats regarding a possible repeat of the Gaza takeover in the West Bank. Several factors undermine the seriousness of these threats, however. For example, as a result of Israel's continued military presence in the West Bank and PA crackdowns on Hamas's military capabilities, the group does not have nearly the force it was able to marshal in Gaza. At the same time, pragmatists within Hamas, such as former prime minister Ismail Haniyeh and his aides, have been marginalized in recent months, and the head of its military wing, Muhammad Deif, declared that Hamas "is ready for offense." Although an overt Hamas uprising in the West Bank remains implausible, the group is most likely preparing for operations against Israeli targets, top PA officials, and security personnel to coincide with the Annapolis meeting, with the objective of destabilizing the West Bank.
The PA has undertaken some important efforts recently to counter this threat, arresting Hamas activists and associated criminal elements in the territory and negotiating amnesty agreements with elements of the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigades in exchange for movement restrictions and disarmament. Discouraging signs remain, however: Abbas travels in an armored car within his own compound, and police in Nablus are still struggling to end the anarchy there.
Conclusion
The push for diplomatic progress at Annapolis has already exacerbated the confrontation between Fatah and Hamas. As the meeting approaches and final-status negotiations begin, Palestinian violence may increase and possibly erupt in the West Bank. Moreover, diplomatic prospects have raised the stakes of the debate over who has the political legitimacy to negotiate with Israel. Regardless of what transpires in Annapolis, the PA views implementing the Quartet Roadmap's phase-one security requirements as essential to demonstrating its credibility and authority.
Because of the ongoing Hamas challenge and the prospect for further escalation, efforts to strengthen the PA's capabilities and improve daily life will become even more critical in the coming weeks. For this reason, the December international donors meeting in France, which will be hosted by French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner and special Middle East envoy Tony Blair, should prepare immediate projects to help bolster Abbas and Fayad and not simply launch a process that delays any forthcoming funds until several months in the future.
Mohammad Yaghi is a Lafer international fellow with The Washington Institute and a columnist for the Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.
The huge turnout of an estimated 250,000 Fatah supporters at a November 12 Gaza rally commemorating the third anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death reflects not only the worsening economic conditions since Hamas's June takeover , but also the factional rivalry over who is authorized to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians at the upcoming Annapolis peace meeting. Since it is unable to provide services to Palestinians in Gaza, Hamas is using the meeting to delegitimize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), threaten the delicate security situation in the West Bank, and solidify its own domination of Gaza. Meanwhile, Fatah seeks to restore its influence in Gaza, challenge Hamas's claims of authority, and protect its control of the West Bank.
Renewed Tensions in Gaza
Motivated by the dire situation in Gaza and nostalgia for a better life, politically unaffiliated men and women of all ages joined Fatah's activists in the November 12 rally. They were eager to send a clear message to Hamas that its control of Gaza must end. Fearing escalating protests, Hamas gunmen fired on the crowd, killing at least eight and injuring dozens.
Much of the tension that Hamas has faced is due to its failure to lift the economic siege of Gaza, which has bankrupted the private sector and left an additional 80,000 people without work. The price of goods continues to rise, and border crossings remain closed even to students, the sick, and Mecca pilgrims. The Ramallah-based government headed by Salam Fayad has retained some influence in Gaza and managed to dampen the economic crisis by paying the salaries of PA officials in Gaza. A recent poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre indicated that 43 percent of Palestinians believe Fayad's government has performed better than the Hamas government, while 25 percent think the opposite. Hamas's only achievement -- restoring a measure of order and internal security in Gaza -- has been due more to its monopoly on arms than the allegiance of the population.
These poll results and the large turnout at the November 12 rally should not be viewed as an indication that Fatah has overcome its internal problems. Rather, it is a sign that the population is increasingly eager to be rid of the Hamas government. Fatah's weakness was shown when its officials in Gaza spent hours disputing who would address the rally before settling on Ahmed Hilis, the group's de facto leader in Gaza since Muhammad Dahlan's departure. Hilis did not mention Annapolis or President Mahmoud Abbas in his speech, but he did criticize Hamas for its coup and declared "Gaza will remain for Fatah."
The Ongoing Question of Legitimacy
As tensions in Gaza mount, Hamas is using the Annapolis initiative to challenge Abbas's right to negotiate on behalf of Palestinians. According to Hamas, the PLO -- whose chairman (Abbas) is legally responsible for political negotiations -- is a dead body. In fact, the PLO's national council has not met in nine years, its executive committee members are not elected, and it does not represent the distribution of political power among Palestinians. Hamas has issued a number of public rebukes about the illegality of any agreements reached at Annapolis and has also taken concrete measures aimed at undercutting Abbas, the Fayad government, and the PLO.
On November 7, Hamas held a Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) session by reaching a quorum with the authorization of its thirty-five imprisoned members. Hamas legislators asserted that Abbas's decrees since June 2007 are void, including his appointment of Fayad to head the Palestinian Authority (PA). They threatened to dismiss Fayad from the PLC and declared that it never gave Abbas the mandate to negotiate with Israel.
In addition to this challenge, Hamas plans to hold a conference in Damascus that will coincide with the Annapolis conference in an attempt to demonstrate that the majority of Palestinian factions oppose negotiations with Israel. Hamas has invited all Palestinian factions to participate, and many Arab parliamentarians and journalists have already accepted, including some Fatah members who live abroad. Consequently, there is deep concern within Fatah that this Hamas-led conference will lay the foundation for establishing a new Palestinian representative body that will try to supplant the PLO. If Syria attends the Annapolis meeting, however, it will significantly weaken the impact of a parallel Hamas-led effort in Damascus, if not cancel it altogether.
Fatah has attempted to counter these measures by calling the November 7 PLC session unconstitutional, and it is preparing a number of legal changes that will increase Abbas's authority and flexibility in dealing with the deadlocked legislature. These amendments will permit the president to dissolve the PLC, call for new elections or a public referendum, and create a presidential deputy. Fatah has also sent senior representatives to Damascus to try to prevent the Hamas conference. None of these measures will likely resolve the ongoing crisis of legitimacy that began after Hamas's 2006 election victory. Instead, they indicate that the Hamas/Fatah dispute will increase in intensity as confrontations in Gaza mount and international diplomatic efforts progress. Hamas's June takeover of the territory and Fatah's increasingly harsh rhetoric regarding the coup indicate that the prospects of a renewed unity government deal along the lines of the February Mecca accord are extremely low.
Destabilizing the West Bank
The West Bank is another arena for potential Fatah-Hamas rivalry. In the past month, a number of Hamas leaders issued public threats regarding a possible repeat of the Gaza takeover in the West Bank. Several factors undermine the seriousness of these threats, however. For example, as a result of Israel's continued military presence in the West Bank and PA crackdowns on Hamas's military capabilities, the group does not have nearly the force it was able to marshal in Gaza. At the same time, pragmatists within Hamas, such as former prime minister Ismail Haniyeh and his aides, have been marginalized in recent months, and the head of its military wing, Muhammad Deif, declared that Hamas "is ready for offense." Although an overt Hamas uprising in the West Bank remains implausible, the group is most likely preparing for operations against Israeli targets, top PA officials, and security personnel to coincide with the Annapolis meeting, with the objective of destabilizing the West Bank.
The PA has undertaken some important efforts recently to counter this threat, arresting Hamas activists and associated criminal elements in the territory and negotiating amnesty agreements with elements of the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigades in exchange for movement restrictions and disarmament. Discouraging signs remain, however: Abbas travels in an armored car within his own compound, and police in Nablus are still struggling to end the anarchy there.
Conclusion
The push for diplomatic progress at Annapolis has already exacerbated the confrontation between Fatah and Hamas. As the meeting approaches and final-status negotiations begin, Palestinian violence may increase and possibly erupt in the West Bank. Moreover, diplomatic prospects have raised the stakes of the debate over who has the political legitimacy to negotiate with Israel. Regardless of what transpires in Annapolis, the PA views implementing the Quartet Roadmap's phase-one security requirements as essential to demonstrating its credibility and authority.
Because of the ongoing Hamas challenge and the prospect for further escalation, efforts to strengthen the PA's capabilities and improve daily life will become even more critical in the coming weeks. For this reason, the December international donors meeting in France, which will be hosted by French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner and special Middle East envoy Tony Blair, should prepare immediate projects to help bolster Abbas and Fayad and not simply launch a process that delays any forthcoming funds until several months in the future.
Mohammad Yaghi is a Lafer international fellow with The Washington Institute and a columnist for the Palestinian daily al-Ayyam.
Haneyya: Al-Aqsa is in danger and only through unity that we can liberate it
GAZA, (PIC)-- The elected Prim Minster, Ismail Haneyya, made a televised speech on Thursday to the nation in which he addressed the latest developments in the Palestinian arena. "Today marks the 19th anniversary since the declaration of independence [at the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers] and none of the rights of the Palestinian people have been restored despite Palestinian concessions that touched the Palestinian historic rights [..] The Israeli aggression against our people everywhere continues [..] and the Israeli aggressions against Jerusalem and the Blessed Aqsa continue.." he said at the start of his speech condemning the visit made by right wing members of the Knesset the area of Haram al-Sharif and continued Israeli excavations near the Aqsa Mosque.
He also condemned the Israeli condition that the PA recognises Israel as a Jewish State and stressed that the danger to Jerusalem an to the Aqsa Mosque can only end when occupation ends.
He added that if Israeli politicians are asking for 80 votes in the Knesset instead of sixty to ratify any agreement with regard to Jerusalem, the Palestinian negotiator will require a true Palestinian, Arab and Muslim authorisation to reach any deal regarding Jerusalem, stressing that despite their incessant campaign of Judaization of Jerusalem, the Israelis can never mutilate the holy city's identity neither can they erase it from the Palestinian, Arab and Islamic conscience.
He also stressed that Palestinian unity was the way to liberating Jerusalem expressing his appreciation for the Jerusalem conference held in Istanbul and for the calls made by Sheikh Raed Salah and Archimandrite Attallah Hannah for Palestinian reconciliation.
Then he talked about the Monday events which followed the marking by Fatah supporters of the third anniversary of the death of Yassir Arafat.
"The government agreed to the rally at the time and place requested [as an expression of] loyalty to great leaders and to ask the questions [that have not been answered]: who killed President Arafat? Why was President Arafat killed? There has been a conspiracy to close this serious file so as not to expose the hands behind the assassination of the President..
"The government also agreed to the rally to reinforce the concept of political plurality and out of respect for political and press freedom ..
"The government did not want to deal here [with Fatah] like the PA is dealing with Hamas in the West Bank where [Hamas] is being subjected to a war of eradication."
He also talked about how his government facilitated this rally and similar rallies around the Gaza Strip in coordination with Fatah leadership in the Strip and after promises from the leadership to control their elements.
He expressed his sorrow for the events after the rally and said that a committee has been set up to investigate the events and will report its findings to the government and the people and those responsible for sparking off the unfortunate events will be tried according to the irrespective of their political affiliation, ie no immunity to the police or anyone affiliated with Hamas.
Again he called for Palestinian reconciliation stressing that Hamas calls for this not out of weakness.
He also said that those who are counting on time to break Hamas are mistaken, because Hamas, which takes its patience from the patience of the great Palestinian nation, is not easy to break and no one can force it into a corner.
Then he said that those who think they can break Hamas in the West Bank are also mistaken, because the movement there has been through it all, imprisonment, torture, assassinations and deportations.
And in reply to Abbas's description of Hamas as a gang when he called for ousting it by force in the Gaza Strip he said that Hamas was not a gang and was not thirsty for blood but "Hamas is a religious duty and a national necessity, peaceful towards its people and enemy to those occupying its land."
He called for breaking the siege and for releasing all political prisoners and greeted the martyrs, the prisoners in Israeli occupation jails, not least the detained lawmakers.
He also condemned the Israeli condition that the PA recognises Israel as a Jewish State and stressed that the danger to Jerusalem an to the Aqsa Mosque can only end when occupation ends.
He added that if Israeli politicians are asking for 80 votes in the Knesset instead of sixty to ratify any agreement with regard to Jerusalem, the Palestinian negotiator will require a true Palestinian, Arab and Muslim authorisation to reach any deal regarding Jerusalem, stressing that despite their incessant campaign of Judaization of Jerusalem, the Israelis can never mutilate the holy city's identity neither can they erase it from the Palestinian, Arab and Islamic conscience.
He also stressed that Palestinian unity was the way to liberating Jerusalem expressing his appreciation for the Jerusalem conference held in Istanbul and for the calls made by Sheikh Raed Salah and Archimandrite Attallah Hannah for Palestinian reconciliation.
Then he talked about the Monday events which followed the marking by Fatah supporters of the third anniversary of the death of Yassir Arafat.
"The government agreed to the rally at the time and place requested [as an expression of] loyalty to great leaders and to ask the questions [that have not been answered]: who killed President Arafat? Why was President Arafat killed? There has been a conspiracy to close this serious file so as not to expose the hands behind the assassination of the President..
"The government also agreed to the rally to reinforce the concept of political plurality and out of respect for political and press freedom ..
"The government did not want to deal here [with Fatah] like the PA is dealing with Hamas in the West Bank where [Hamas] is being subjected to a war of eradication."
He also talked about how his government facilitated this rally and similar rallies around the Gaza Strip in coordination with Fatah leadership in the Strip and after promises from the leadership to control their elements.
He expressed his sorrow for the events after the rally and said that a committee has been set up to investigate the events and will report its findings to the government and the people and those responsible for sparking off the unfortunate events will be tried according to the irrespective of their political affiliation, ie no immunity to the police or anyone affiliated with Hamas.
Again he called for Palestinian reconciliation stressing that Hamas calls for this not out of weakness.
He also said that those who are counting on time to break Hamas are mistaken, because Hamas, which takes its patience from the patience of the great Palestinian nation, is not easy to break and no one can force it into a corner.
Then he said that those who think they can break Hamas in the West Bank are also mistaken, because the movement there has been through it all, imprisonment, torture, assassinations and deportations.
And in reply to Abbas's description of Hamas as a gang when he called for ousting it by force in the Gaza Strip he said that Hamas was not a gang and was not thirsty for blood but "Hamas is a religious duty and a national necessity, peaceful towards its people and enemy to those occupying its land."
He called for breaking the siege and for releasing all political prisoners and greeted the martyrs, the prisoners in Israeli occupation jails, not least the detained lawmakers.
Friday, November 16, 2007
Officials to PM: Give nothing unless summit is a success
Despite Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's announcement that he plans to release 400 security prisoners ahead of the peace conference in Annapolis, the defense establishment is recommending that the government refrain from making goodwill gestures to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas until after the summit, The Jerusalem Post has learned. Shin Bet Security Agency officials have also warned that Abbas might be tempted to "blow up" the summit under the pretext that Israel was not making enough concessions, the Post has also learned.
"If he does this, he will secure himself a place in history as a Palestinian leader who, like Yasser Arafat, was unwilling to make concessions to Israel," a senior defense official said, adding, however, that the Shin Bet scenario was just speculation and was not based on concrete intelligence.
The goodwill gestures being considered pending a successful outcome to the summit include releasing prisoners, removing roadblocks and transferring additional territory and West Bank villages to PA security control. The government is also considering a freeze in settlement construction.
"There is no need to make concessions ahead of the summit," a senior security official said. "The Palestinians will quickly forget what we gave them before the summit and it is important to create incentives for Abbas to make the summit work."
According to a senior official, the defense establishment is examining the ramifications of a proposal being drafted to release several hundred prisoners per month after the Annapolis conference. The idea behind the plan, which has yet to be presented to Olmert, is that quiet on the "Palestinian street" - required for fruitful negotiations - can be achieved by releasing a significant number of prisoners every month.
"If the summit is successful and negotiations ensue, then it might be necessary to keep the Palestinians happy and quiet," an official said. "One way to do that is to release prisoners."
There are more than 10,000 Palestinian security detainees in Israeli prisons. The releases would be dependent on a cessation of terrorism and a commitment by the freed prisoners not to return to terrorism.
"If these conditions are not met, then we won't release additional prisoners," the senior official said.
The defense establishment is considering a request by the PA to transfer armored jeeps to the Palestinian security forces in the West Bank. Earlier this month, the PA deployed 300 policemen in Nablus, and has close to 20,000 policemen in the West Bank.
According to defense officials, the PA security forces are being effective in cracking down on Hamas in Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm, and as a result the terrorist group has begun to transfer its operations out of the larger cities and into nearby villages.
The Shin Bet and the office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories favor transferring the armored vehicles to the PA forces, while the IDF's Military Intelligence and Planning Division oppose the idea.
"If he does this, he will secure himself a place in history as a Palestinian leader who, like Yasser Arafat, was unwilling to make concessions to Israel," a senior defense official said, adding, however, that the Shin Bet scenario was just speculation and was not based on concrete intelligence.
The goodwill gestures being considered pending a successful outcome to the summit include releasing prisoners, removing roadblocks and transferring additional territory and West Bank villages to PA security control. The government is also considering a freeze in settlement construction.
"There is no need to make concessions ahead of the summit," a senior security official said. "The Palestinians will quickly forget what we gave them before the summit and it is important to create incentives for Abbas to make the summit work."
According to a senior official, the defense establishment is examining the ramifications of a proposal being drafted to release several hundred prisoners per month after the Annapolis conference. The idea behind the plan, which has yet to be presented to Olmert, is that quiet on the "Palestinian street" - required for fruitful negotiations - can be achieved by releasing a significant number of prisoners every month.
"If the summit is successful and negotiations ensue, then it might be necessary to keep the Palestinians happy and quiet," an official said. "One way to do that is to release prisoners."
There are more than 10,000 Palestinian security detainees in Israeli prisons. The releases would be dependent on a cessation of terrorism and a commitment by the freed prisoners not to return to terrorism.
"If these conditions are not met, then we won't release additional prisoners," the senior official said.
The defense establishment is considering a request by the PA to transfer armored jeeps to the Palestinian security forces in the West Bank. Earlier this month, the PA deployed 300 policemen in Nablus, and has close to 20,000 policemen in the West Bank.
According to defense officials, the PA security forces are being effective in cracking down on Hamas in Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm, and as a result the terrorist group has begun to transfer its operations out of the larger cities and into nearby villages.
The Shin Bet and the office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories favor transferring the armored vehicles to the PA forces, while the IDF's Military Intelligence and Planning Division oppose the idea.
A record in Hamas violent suppression of Fatah in the Gaza Strip
On November 12 a rally commemorating the third anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death was held in a central square in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. After the rally confrontations broke out between members of Hamas' security forces and rally participants. Hamas opened fire on the crowd, killing seven pro-Fatah Palestinians and wounding 150, some of them critically.
The memorial rally for Yasser Arafat held in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands (Al-Arabiya TV, November 12).
Overview
1. On November 12 a rally commemorating the third anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death was held in a central square in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. After the rally confrontations broke out between members of Hamas' security forces and rally participants. Hamas opened fire on the crowd, killing seven pro-Fatah Palestinians and wounding 150, some of them critically.
The rally in Gaza City commemorating the third anniversary
of Yasser Arafat's death (Al-Ayyam, November 13).
2. The rally was an impressive show of strength for Fatah in the Gaza Strip and an opportunity to express lack of confidence in the repressive Hamas regime . In an attempt to limit the rally, Hamas deployed hundreds of police in Gaza City and set up many road blocks throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas security personnel prevented thousands of Palestinians from reaching the rally and confiscated flags and pictures of Arafat and Abu Mazen sent from the West Bank to Gaza through the Kerem Shalom Crossing. Abu Mazen and Fatah strongly condemned Hamas and proclaimed three days of national mourning.
3. In our assessment, it was the most serious in the series of continuing confrontations between Fatah and Hamas which began when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip this past June. Since then Hamas has tried to hamper the activities of all those affiliated with Fatah in the Gaza Strip and to use force to suppress all signs of opposition, while Fatah has shown its steadfastness and survivability . 1 A well-organized rally attended by hundreds of thousands of people is an impressive show of strength and was an expression of public protest against the Hamas regime. Holding the rally showed that despite the severe blow dealt by Hamas, Fatah still exists in the Gaza Strip, has support from large sections of the populace which oppose Hamas and its allies, and can organize mass rallies in the face of Hamas attempts to suppress them.
Development of events
4. On November 11 memorial services were held on the eve of the third anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. They were exploited to express support for Abu Mazen and Fatah and to protest the Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip . The main ceremony in the West Bank was in Ramallah and it was attended by tens of thousands of Palestinians. The memorial services in the Gaza Strip also began on November 11. There was a procession in Rafah, a service at Al-Quds Open University in Khan Yunis, and processions in the Nuseirat refugee camp (about 8 km south of Gaza City ) and the northern Gaza Strip ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). The main service was held in a central square of Gaza City on November 12.
5. Hamas tried to disrupt the memorial events . Its operatives confiscated thousands of Fatah flags and pictures of Abu Mazen and Arafat, which had been brought into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing and which were to have been distributed at the rally ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). Hamas operatives and police deployed at the main crossroads and streets and closed the routes leading to the square where the rally was held. Roadblocks were erected along the roads leading to Gaza City to examine IDs and confiscate Fatah flags and pictures (Wafa News Agency, November 12).
The memorial rally for Yasser Arafat held in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands (Al-Arabiya TV, November 12).
Overview
1. On November 12 a rally commemorating the third anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death was held in a central square in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. After the rally confrontations broke out between members of Hamas' security forces and rally participants. Hamas opened fire on the crowd, killing seven pro-Fatah Palestinians and wounding 150, some of them critically.
The rally in Gaza City commemorating the third anniversary
of Yasser Arafat's death (Al-Ayyam, November 13).
2. The rally was an impressive show of strength for Fatah in the Gaza Strip and an opportunity to express lack of confidence in the repressive Hamas regime . In an attempt to limit the rally, Hamas deployed hundreds of police in Gaza City and set up many road blocks throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas security personnel prevented thousands of Palestinians from reaching the rally and confiscated flags and pictures of Arafat and Abu Mazen sent from the West Bank to Gaza through the Kerem Shalom Crossing. Abu Mazen and Fatah strongly condemned Hamas and proclaimed three days of national mourning.
3. In our assessment, it was the most serious in the series of continuing confrontations between Fatah and Hamas which began when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip this past June. Since then Hamas has tried to hamper the activities of all those affiliated with Fatah in the Gaza Strip and to use force to suppress all signs of opposition, while Fatah has shown its steadfastness and survivability . 1 A well-organized rally attended by hundreds of thousands of people is an impressive show of strength and was an expression of public protest against the Hamas regime. Holding the rally showed that despite the severe blow dealt by Hamas, Fatah still exists in the Gaza Strip, has support from large sections of the populace which oppose Hamas and its allies, and can organize mass rallies in the face of Hamas attempts to suppress them.
Development of events
4. On November 11 memorial services were held on the eve of the third anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. They were exploited to express support for Abu Mazen and Fatah and to protest the Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip . The main ceremony in the West Bank was in Ramallah and it was attended by tens of thousands of Palestinians. The memorial services in the Gaza Strip also began on November 11. There was a procession in Rafah, a service at Al-Quds Open University in Khan Yunis, and processions in the Nuseirat refugee camp (about 8 km south of Gaza City ) and the northern Gaza Strip ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). The main service was held in a central square of Gaza City on November 12.
5. Hamas tried to disrupt the memorial events . Its operatives confiscated thousands of Fatah flags and pictures of Abu Mazen and Arafat, which had been brought into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing and which were to have been distributed at the rally ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). Hamas operatives and police deployed at the main crossroads and streets and closed the routes leading to the square where the rally was held. Roadblocks were erected along the roads leading to Gaza City to examine IDs and confiscate Fatah flags and pictures (Wafa News Agency, November 12).
Aerial view of the rally (Palestinian TV, November 12).
Rally participants ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 13).
6. The main rally in the Gaza Strip was held on November 12 at Al-Qutaibah Square (a central square in Gaza City ) in the afternoon. According to minimal estimations, it was attended by at least 250,000-300,000 Palestinians (Fatah spokesman estimate the number at half a million). 2 Thousands of Palestinians came from the northern and southern Gaza Strip. During the rally yellow Fatah flags were waved, slogans praising Arafat were shouted and pictures of Arafat and Abu Mazen were displayed . The main speakers were members of the Fatah leadership in the Gaza Strip , who denounced Hamas and called for the movement to reverse its position regarding its coup. Hamas deployed hundreds of its security forces around the square, who were later involved in the clashes which began when the rally ended.
7. Among the speakers were the following:
1) Ibrahim Abu al-Naja , a member of the revolutionary council, warned that the Palestinian people would not agree to a divided homeland and stressed that Abu Mazen was the legal president of the Palestinian people.
2) Ahmad Khilles , 3 a member of Fatah's steering committee in the Gaza Strip, said that Yasser Arafat left the Palestinian people a legacy of unity and that all Gaza identifies with Yasser Arafat.
3) Zakharia al-Agha' , a member of the PLO executive, spoke for Abu Mazen and said that despite the difficulties facing them, the Palestinians had to continue the legacy of Yasser Arafat. He appealed to Hamas to stop its crimes against the Palestinian people, to preserve Palestinian unity and to turn all its resources against Israel .
8. At the end of the rally there were violent clashes between Fatah activists and Hamas' security forces . People who were there reported that shots were fired, stones were thrown and there were heavy exchanges of fire between Hamas and Fatah. During the clashes the Hamas security forces opened fire on the crowd , killing seven Fatah-affiliated individuals and wounding 150, about ten of them critically (Wafa News Agency, November 12). Additional confrontations broke out at the funeral of one of the victims and six Palestinians were wounded by police gunfire (Ma'an News Agency, November 12).
The memorial rally for Yasser Arafat held in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands (Al-Arabiya TV, November 12).
Overview
1. On November 12 a rally commemorating the third anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death was held in a central square in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. After the rally confrontations broke out between members of Hamas' security forces and rally participants. Hamas opened fire on the crowd, killing seven pro-Fatah Palestinians and wounding 150, some of them critically.
The rally in Gaza City commemorating the third anniversary
of Yasser Arafat's death (Al-Ayyam, November 13).
2. The rally was an impressive show of strength for Fatah in the Gaza Strip and an opportunity to express lack of confidence in the repressive Hamas regime . In an attempt to limit the rally, Hamas deployed hundreds of police in Gaza City and set up many road blocks throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas security personnel prevented thousands of Palestinians from reaching the rally and confiscated flags and pictures of Arafat and Abu Mazen sent from the West Bank to Gaza through the Kerem Shalom Crossing. Abu Mazen and Fatah strongly condemned Hamas and proclaimed three days of national mourning.
3. In our assessment, it was the most serious in the series of continuing confrontations between Fatah and Hamas which began when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip this past June. Since then Hamas has tried to hamper the activities of all those affiliated with Fatah in the Gaza Strip and to use force to suppress all signs of opposition, while Fatah has shown its steadfastness and survivability . 1 A well-organized rally attended by hundreds of thousands of people is an impressive show of strength and was an expression of public protest against the Hamas regime. Holding the rally showed that despite the severe blow dealt by Hamas, Fatah still exists in the Gaza Strip, has support from large sections of the populace which oppose Hamas and its allies, and can organize mass rallies in the face of Hamas attempts to suppress them.
Development of events
4. On November 11 memorial services were held on the eve of the third anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. They were exploited to express support for Abu Mazen and Fatah and to protest the Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip . The main ceremony in the West Bank was in Ramallah and it was attended by tens of thousands of Palestinians. The memorial services in the Gaza Strip also began on November 11. There was a procession in Rafah, a service at Al-Quds Open University in Khan Yunis, and processions in the Nuseirat refugee camp (about 8 km south of Gaza City ) and the northern Gaza Strip ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). The main service was held in a central square of Gaza City on November 12.
5. Hamas tried to disrupt the memorial events . Its operatives confiscated thousands of Fatah flags and pictures of Abu Mazen and Arafat, which had been brought into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing and which were to have been distributed at the rally ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). Hamas operatives and police deployed at the main crossroads and streets and closed the routes leading to the square where the rally was held. Roadblocks were erected along the roads leading to Gaza City to examine IDs and confiscate Fatah flags and pictures (Wafa News Agency, November 12).
Aerial view of the rally (Palestinian TV, November 12).
Rally participants ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 13).
6. The main rally in the Gaza Strip was held on November 12 at Al-Qutaibah Square (a central square in Gaza City ) in the afternoon. According to minimal estimations, it was attended by at least 250,000-300,000 Palestinians (Fatah spokesman estimate the number at half a million). 2 Thousands of Palestinians came from the northern and southern Gaza Strip. During the rally yellow Fatah flags were waved, slogans praising Arafat were shouted and pictures of Arafat and Abu Mazen were displayed . The main speakers were members of the Fatah leadership in the Gaza Strip , who denounced Hamas and called for the movement to reverse its position regarding its coup. Hamas deployed hundreds of its security forces around the square, who were later involved in the clashes which began when the rally ended.
7. Among the speakers were the following:
1) Ibrahim Abu al-Naja , a member of the revolutionary council, warned that the Palestinian people would not agree to a divided homeland and stressed that Abu Mazen was the legal president of the Palestinian people.
2) Ahmad Khilles , 3 a member of Fatah's steering committee in the Gaza Strip, said that Yasser Arafat left the Palestinian people a legacy of unity and that all Gaza identifies with Yasser Arafat.
3) Zakharia al-Agha' , a member of the PLO executive, spoke for Abu Mazen and said that despite the difficulties facing them, the Palestinians had to continue the legacy of Yasser Arafat. He appealed to Hamas to stop its crimes against the Palestinian people, to preserve Palestinian unity and to turn all its resources against Israel .
8. At the end of the rally there were violent clashes between Fatah activists and Hamas' security forces . People who were there reported that shots were fired, stones were thrown and there were heavy exchanges of fire between Hamas and Fatah. During the clashes the Hamas security forces opened fire on the crowd , killing seven Fatah-affiliated individuals and wounding 150, about ten of them critically (Wafa News Agency, November 12). Additional confrontations broke out at the funeral of one of the victims and six Palestinians were wounded by police gunfire (Ma'an News Agency, November 12).
Right: Evacuating the wounded (Palestinian TV, November 12).
Left: Participants evacuating a man wounded by Hamas fire (Al-Ayyam, November 13).
9. Following the violent events, the Hamas police carried out a wave of arrests of Fatah activists throughout the Gaza Strip. A Fatah spokesmen claimed that 400 activists were detained and dozens more were ordered to present themselves at police stations for interrogation (Reuters, November 13). According to the Hamas Exectutive Force, no more than 250 were detained (Agence France Presse, November 13). According to Fatah sources, among the detainees were high-ranking former members of the security services, senior Fatah members, and important figures affiliated with Fatah such as mayors, journalists, sheikhs and mosque imams (Firas Website and Wafa News Agency, November 13).
Reactions to the event
10. Immediately after the event Fatah and Hamas accused one another of responsibility. Fatah members claimed that the confrontations began when armed Hamas operatives took to the roofs of the Islamic University and opened fire on the crowd. Hamas members claimed that the gunfire was a response to the provocations of Fatah activists who were carrying weapons in violation of promises expressly made. In any case, it is clear that the casualties resulted from the shooting to participants attending a rally which was Fatah-affiliated and non-violent .
11. Abu Mazen called the event “a cruel crime” and proclaimed three days of national mourning. His office issued a statement deploring the shootings and emphasizing that the rally had been a kind of referendum against Hamas (Wafa News Agency, November 12). Salaam Fayyad's government issued a statement expressing its shock at “the barbaric violence and oppressive mindset and wicked deeds which were seen today by the whole world.” He said that the criminal acts had been carried out in accordance with an official decision made by the high echelons of Hamas and that their purpose had been to frighten civilians, to silence the opposition and impose a repressive, dictatorial regime (Wafa News Agency, November 12).
1 Manifestations of the Hamas-Fatah struggle policy were the events during the holy Muslim month of Ramadan concerning Fatah's mass prayer sessions throughout the Gaza Strip which Hamas suppressed by force (August and September 2007).
2 The large number of participants is a sharp contrast to the smaller number of those at the rally in Ramallah, where there were tens of thousands, somewhat less than last year.
3 Between October 17 and 21 there were violent clashes between the Hamas police and the Khilles clan, one of whose members is Ahmad Khilles, and which is affiliated with Fatah. The clashes led the deaths of seven Palestinians and the wounding of more than 50.
The memorial rally for Yasser Arafat held in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands (Al-Arabiya TV, November 12).
Overview
1. On November 12 a rally commemorating the third anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death was held in a central square in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. After the rally confrontations broke out between members of Hamas' security forces and rally participants. Hamas opened fire on the crowd, killing seven pro-Fatah Palestinians and wounding 150, some of them critically.
The rally in Gaza City commemorating the third anniversary
of Yasser Arafat's death (Al-Ayyam, November 13).
2. The rally was an impressive show of strength for Fatah in the Gaza Strip and an opportunity to express lack of confidence in the repressive Hamas regime . In an attempt to limit the rally, Hamas deployed hundreds of police in Gaza City and set up many road blocks throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas security personnel prevented thousands of Palestinians from reaching the rally and confiscated flags and pictures of Arafat and Abu Mazen sent from the West Bank to Gaza through the Kerem Shalom Crossing. Abu Mazen and Fatah strongly condemned Hamas and proclaimed three days of national mourning.
3. In our assessment, it was the most serious in the series of continuing confrontations between Fatah and Hamas which began when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip this past June. Since then Hamas has tried to hamper the activities of all those affiliated with Fatah in the Gaza Strip and to use force to suppress all signs of opposition, while Fatah has shown its steadfastness and survivability . 1 A well-organized rally attended by hundreds of thousands of people is an impressive show of strength and was an expression of public protest against the Hamas regime. Holding the rally showed that despite the severe blow dealt by Hamas, Fatah still exists in the Gaza Strip, has support from large sections of the populace which oppose Hamas and its allies, and can organize mass rallies in the face of Hamas attempts to suppress them.
Development of events
4. On November 11 memorial services were held on the eve of the third anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. They were exploited to express support for Abu Mazen and Fatah and to protest the Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip . The main ceremony in the West Bank was in Ramallah and it was attended by tens of thousands of Palestinians. The memorial services in the Gaza Strip also began on November 11. There was a procession in Rafah, a service at Al-Quds Open University in Khan Yunis, and processions in the Nuseirat refugee camp (about 8 km south of Gaza City ) and the northern Gaza Strip ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). The main service was held in a central square of Gaza City on November 12.
5. Hamas tried to disrupt the memorial events . Its operatives confiscated thousands of Fatah flags and pictures of Abu Mazen and Arafat, which had been brought into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing and which were to have been distributed at the rally ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). Hamas operatives and police deployed at the main crossroads and streets and closed the routes leading to the square where the rally was held. Roadblocks were erected along the roads leading to Gaza City to examine IDs and confiscate Fatah flags and pictures (Wafa News Agency, November 12).
The memorial rally for Yasser Arafat held in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands (Al-Arabiya TV, November 12).
Overview
1. On November 12 a rally commemorating the third anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death was held in a central square in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. After the rally confrontations broke out between members of Hamas' security forces and rally participants. Hamas opened fire on the crowd, killing seven pro-Fatah Palestinians and wounding 150, some of them critically.
The rally in Gaza City commemorating the third anniversary
of Yasser Arafat's death (Al-Ayyam, November 13).
2. The rally was an impressive show of strength for Fatah in the Gaza Strip and an opportunity to express lack of confidence in the repressive Hamas regime . In an attempt to limit the rally, Hamas deployed hundreds of police in Gaza City and set up many road blocks throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas security personnel prevented thousands of Palestinians from reaching the rally and confiscated flags and pictures of Arafat and Abu Mazen sent from the West Bank to Gaza through the Kerem Shalom Crossing. Abu Mazen and Fatah strongly condemned Hamas and proclaimed three days of national mourning.
3. In our assessment, it was the most serious in the series of continuing confrontations between Fatah and Hamas which began when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip this past June. Since then Hamas has tried to hamper the activities of all those affiliated with Fatah in the Gaza Strip and to use force to suppress all signs of opposition, while Fatah has shown its steadfastness and survivability . 1 A well-organized rally attended by hundreds of thousands of people is an impressive show of strength and was an expression of public protest against the Hamas regime. Holding the rally showed that despite the severe blow dealt by Hamas, Fatah still exists in the Gaza Strip, has support from large sections of the populace which oppose Hamas and its allies, and can organize mass rallies in the face of Hamas attempts to suppress them.
Development of events
4. On November 11 memorial services were held on the eve of the third anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. They were exploited to express support for Abu Mazen and Fatah and to protest the Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip . The main ceremony in the West Bank was in Ramallah and it was attended by tens of thousands of Palestinians. The memorial services in the Gaza Strip also began on November 11. There was a procession in Rafah, a service at Al-Quds Open University in Khan Yunis, and processions in the Nuseirat refugee camp (about 8 km south of Gaza City ) and the northern Gaza Strip ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). The main service was held in a central square of Gaza City on November 12.
5. Hamas tried to disrupt the memorial events . Its operatives confiscated thousands of Fatah flags and pictures of Abu Mazen and Arafat, which had been brought into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing and which were to have been distributed at the rally ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). Hamas operatives and police deployed at the main crossroads and streets and closed the routes leading to the square where the rally was held. Roadblocks were erected along the roads leading to Gaza City to examine IDs and confiscate Fatah flags and pictures (Wafa News Agency, November 12).
Aerial view of the rally (Palestinian TV, November 12).
Rally participants ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 13).
6. The main rally in the Gaza Strip was held on November 12 at Al-Qutaibah Square (a central square in Gaza City ) in the afternoon. According to minimal estimations, it was attended by at least 250,000-300,000 Palestinians (Fatah spokesman estimate the number at half a million). 2 Thousands of Palestinians came from the northern and southern Gaza Strip. During the rally yellow Fatah flags were waved, slogans praising Arafat were shouted and pictures of Arafat and Abu Mazen were displayed . The main speakers were members of the Fatah leadership in the Gaza Strip , who denounced Hamas and called for the movement to reverse its position regarding its coup. Hamas deployed hundreds of its security forces around the square, who were later involved in the clashes which began when the rally ended.
7. Among the speakers were the following:
1) Ibrahim Abu al-Naja , a member of the revolutionary council, warned that the Palestinian people would not agree to a divided homeland and stressed that Abu Mazen was the legal president of the Palestinian people.
2) Ahmad Khilles , 3 a member of Fatah's steering committee in the Gaza Strip, said that Yasser Arafat left the Palestinian people a legacy of unity and that all Gaza identifies with Yasser Arafat.
3) Zakharia al-Agha' , a member of the PLO executive, spoke for Abu Mazen and said that despite the difficulties facing them, the Palestinians had to continue the legacy of Yasser Arafat. He appealed to Hamas to stop its crimes against the Palestinian people, to preserve Palestinian unity and to turn all its resources against Israel .
8. At the end of the rally there were violent clashes between Fatah activists and Hamas' security forces . People who were there reported that shots were fired, stones were thrown and there were heavy exchanges of fire between Hamas and Fatah. During the clashes the Hamas security forces opened fire on the crowd , killing seven Fatah-affiliated individuals and wounding 150, about ten of them critically (Wafa News Agency, November 12). Additional confrontations broke out at the funeral of one of the victims and six Palestinians were wounded by police gunfire (Ma'an News Agency, November 12).
The memorial rally for Yasser Arafat held in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands (Al-Arabiya TV, November 12).
Overview
1. On November 12 a rally commemorating the third anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death was held in a central square in Gaza City , attended by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. After the rally confrontations broke out between members of Hamas' security forces and rally participants. Hamas opened fire on the crowd, killing seven pro-Fatah Palestinians and wounding 150, some of them critically.
The rally in Gaza City commemorating the third anniversary
of Yasser Arafat's death (Al-Ayyam, November 13).
2. The rally was an impressive show of strength for Fatah in the Gaza Strip and an opportunity to express lack of confidence in the repressive Hamas regime . In an attempt to limit the rally, Hamas deployed hundreds of police in Gaza City and set up many road blocks throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas security personnel prevented thousands of Palestinians from reaching the rally and confiscated flags and pictures of Arafat and Abu Mazen sent from the West Bank to Gaza through the Kerem Shalom Crossing. Abu Mazen and Fatah strongly condemned Hamas and proclaimed three days of national mourning.
3. In our assessment, it was the most serious in the series of continuing confrontations between Fatah and Hamas which began when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip this past June. Since then Hamas has tried to hamper the activities of all those affiliated with Fatah in the Gaza Strip and to use force to suppress all signs of opposition, while Fatah has shown its steadfastness and survivability . 1 A well-organized rally attended by hundreds of thousands of people is an impressive show of strength and was an expression of public protest against the Hamas regime. Holding the rally showed that despite the severe blow dealt by Hamas, Fatah still exists in the Gaza Strip, has support from large sections of the populace which oppose Hamas and its allies, and can organize mass rallies in the face of Hamas attempts to suppress them.
Development of events
4. On November 11 memorial services were held on the eve of the third anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. They were exploited to express support for Abu Mazen and Fatah and to protest the Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip . The main ceremony in the West Bank was in Ramallah and it was attended by tens of thousands of Palestinians. The memorial services in the Gaza Strip also began on November 11. There was a procession in Rafah, a service at Al-Quds Open University in Khan Yunis, and processions in the Nuseirat refugee camp (about 8 km south of Gaza City ) and the northern Gaza Strip ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). The main service was held in a central square of Gaza City on November 12.
5. Hamas tried to disrupt the memorial events . Its operatives confiscated thousands of Fatah flags and pictures of Abu Mazen and Arafat, which had been brought into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom Crossing and which were to have been distributed at the rally ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 12). Hamas operatives and police deployed at the main crossroads and streets and closed the routes leading to the square where the rally was held. Roadblocks were erected along the roads leading to Gaza City to examine IDs and confiscate Fatah flags and pictures (Wafa News Agency, November 12).
Aerial view of the rally (Palestinian TV, November 12).
Rally participants ( Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda , November 13).
6. The main rally in the Gaza Strip was held on November 12 at Al-Qutaibah Square (a central square in Gaza City ) in the afternoon. According to minimal estimations, it was attended by at least 250,000-300,000 Palestinians (Fatah spokesman estimate the number at half a million). 2 Thousands of Palestinians came from the northern and southern Gaza Strip. During the rally yellow Fatah flags were waved, slogans praising Arafat were shouted and pictures of Arafat and Abu Mazen were displayed . The main speakers were members of the Fatah leadership in the Gaza Strip , who denounced Hamas and called for the movement to reverse its position regarding its coup. Hamas deployed hundreds of its security forces around the square, who were later involved in the clashes which began when the rally ended.
7. Among the speakers were the following:
1) Ibrahim Abu al-Naja , a member of the revolutionary council, warned that the Palestinian people would not agree to a divided homeland and stressed that Abu Mazen was the legal president of the Palestinian people.
2) Ahmad Khilles , 3 a member of Fatah's steering committee in the Gaza Strip, said that Yasser Arafat left the Palestinian people a legacy of unity and that all Gaza identifies with Yasser Arafat.
3) Zakharia al-Agha' , a member of the PLO executive, spoke for Abu Mazen and said that despite the difficulties facing them, the Palestinians had to continue the legacy of Yasser Arafat. He appealed to Hamas to stop its crimes against the Palestinian people, to preserve Palestinian unity and to turn all its resources against Israel .
8. At the end of the rally there were violent clashes between Fatah activists and Hamas' security forces . People who were there reported that shots were fired, stones were thrown and there were heavy exchanges of fire between Hamas and Fatah. During the clashes the Hamas security forces opened fire on the crowd , killing seven Fatah-affiliated individuals and wounding 150, about ten of them critically (Wafa News Agency, November 12). Additional confrontations broke out at the funeral of one of the victims and six Palestinians were wounded by police gunfire (Ma'an News Agency, November 12).
Right: Evacuating the wounded (Palestinian TV, November 12).
Left: Participants evacuating a man wounded by Hamas fire (Al-Ayyam, November 13).
9. Following the violent events, the Hamas police carried out a wave of arrests of Fatah activists throughout the Gaza Strip. A Fatah spokesmen claimed that 400 activists were detained and dozens more were ordered to present themselves at police stations for interrogation (Reuters, November 13). According to the Hamas Exectutive Force, no more than 250 were detained (Agence France Presse, November 13). According to Fatah sources, among the detainees were high-ranking former members of the security services, senior Fatah members, and important figures affiliated with Fatah such as mayors, journalists, sheikhs and mosque imams (Firas Website and Wafa News Agency, November 13).
Reactions to the event
10. Immediately after the event Fatah and Hamas accused one another of responsibility. Fatah members claimed that the confrontations began when armed Hamas operatives took to the roofs of the Islamic University and opened fire on the crowd. Hamas members claimed that the gunfire was a response to the provocations of Fatah activists who were carrying weapons in violation of promises expressly made. In any case, it is clear that the casualties resulted from the shooting to participants attending a rally which was Fatah-affiliated and non-violent .
11. Abu Mazen called the event “a cruel crime” and proclaimed three days of national mourning. His office issued a statement deploring the shootings and emphasizing that the rally had been a kind of referendum against Hamas (Wafa News Agency, November 12). Salaam Fayyad's government issued a statement expressing its shock at “the barbaric violence and oppressive mindset and wicked deeds which were seen today by the whole world.” He said that the criminal acts had been carried out in accordance with an official decision made by the high echelons of Hamas and that their purpose had been to frighten civilians, to silence the opposition and impose a repressive, dictatorial regime (Wafa News Agency, November 12).
1 Manifestations of the Hamas-Fatah struggle policy were the events during the holy Muslim month of Ramadan concerning Fatah's mass prayer sessions throughout the Gaza Strip which Hamas suppressed by force (August and September 2007).
2 The large number of participants is a sharp contrast to the smaller number of those at the rally in Ramallah, where there were tens of thousands, somewhat less than last year.
3 Between October 17 and 21 there were violent clashes between the Hamas police and the Khilles clan, one of whose members is Ahmad Khilles, and which is affiliated with Fatah. The clashes led the deaths of seven Palestinians and the wounding of more than 50.
A Grim Milestone Ignored
The establishment media is seemingly obsessed with “grim milestones” in the War on Terror, as the Associated Press reminds us this past weekend. But in the next week those same establishment media outlets will probably stand mute when yet another “grim milestone” is reached – the10,000th attack by Islamic terrorists and militants since 9/11, which is responsible for approximately 60,000 dead and 90,000 injured.
The chronicler of this bloody tally is Glen Reinsford, editor of TheReligionofPeace.com, who began compiling and updating daily a detailed list of reported incidents of violence and terrorism around the world targeting non-Muslims and Muslims alike. Because of space limitations he only posts the past two months worth of attacks on his websites main page, though he has archived all of the incidents from past years (2001-2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). He also maintains a banner graphic with the updated number of attacks, which people can post on their own websites.
When asked what prompted him to begin such a labor-intensive undertaking, Reinsford identifies the tepid response to Islamic terrorism by otherwise outspoken Muslim groups, with one organization particularly in mind:
The Council on American-Islamic Relations. After 9/11, I kept an eye on them and was quite disgusted by their lack of moral perspective. They complain about issues that affect Muslims which are quite trivial, on average, compared to what is happening in the name of their religion. They do occasionally denounce terror in a general, somewhat ambiguous, sense but there is an obvious lack of passion. Their real interest is themselves.
Reviewing the list of recent incidents, it is surprising how many “smaller” attacks occur daily, which the establishment media pass with only a casual mention. While high profile attacks, like the one last week in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan that killed 75 and wounded at least 100 (many of them school children), receive plenty of attention, smaller incidents, such as the attack last week on a hotel in Baramulla, India that killed one, rarely register with the Western media.
Because Reinsford relies on the establishment media for his numbers, the true number of attacks and their victims are underreported:
In my case, I use published media reports from reputable sources on the Internet, such as the Associated Press. None of the information comes from rumor or word of mouth. Every bit of it can be verified through publicly-available sources. If anything, I undercount the attacks.
In his explanation of his methodology, he notes that he doesn’t include combat-related statistics, and acknowledges that the death toll may increase in the days and months following the attack as victims die from their injuries, which almost never get reported. The list also doesn’t account for the genocide in Darfur committed by the Islamist government in Sudan and their Janjaweed marauding militias, which the UN estimated last year had resulted in 400,000 dead and 2 million displaced.
With such seemingly incomprehensible carnage, I ask Reinsford if there were any particular incidents that stand out, and he identified three (qualifying that he could easily identify 15 more):
· Nadimarg, India (3/23/03), dozens of Hindu villagers roused out of their beds and machine-gunned by Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) Islamists.
· Beslan, Russia (9/3/04), some 350 people slaughtered by Islamic militants - half of them children.
· Malatya, Turkey (4/18/07), three Christian Bible distributors are tied up, tortured for hours then gruesomely murdered by men who acted explicitly in the name of Islam.
For me, a September 2006 Washington Post article stands out concerning an attack targeting Shi’ite women and children stands out, when a Sunni suicide bomber detonated a kerosene fuel bomb filled with ball bearings (for added effect) ripped through a crowd waiting in line to buy fuel. The Post described the horrific scene:
The horrific blast sent women engulfed in flames screaming through the streets. Two preteen girls embraced each other as they burned to death, witnesses said. Later, wailing mourners thronged the scene of the blast, which was strewn with the shoes of victims and a woman's bloodied cloak, and voiced doubt that the reprisal violence would ever end.
While many Muslim organizations in the West expend considerable effort portraying themselves as victims of Western “Islamophobia”, very little is said by those groups about the fact that many of the countless victims of Islamic terrorism are Muslims themselves. There are certainly no public protests by organizations like CAIR in recognition of those Muslims murdered and maimed by Muslims, though they are quick to cite the number of civilians accidentally killed by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan (though Reinsford notes that while 225 Iraqis were killed in collateral damage incidents in 2006, there were 16,791 Iraqi civilians killed by Islamic terrorists that same year).
Reinsford says that the skewed perspective of ignoring the toll Islamic terrorism takes on Muslims stems from a failure by Muslim leaders to recognize the glaring problems that are resident in the heart of their own community:
Yes, most of the victims of Islamic terror are Muslim, yet there is very little outrage on the part of the Islamic world to terror, relative to, say, a Muhammad cartoon or an "insult to Islam" by a public figure. What does this tell us about the priorities of Islam? In fact, sympathies for terrorists run much higher than many people realize. Even those that do truly disagree with violence (and there are many) somehow avoid taking any sort of responsibility for ending it by convincing themselves that it has nothing to do with Islam. Obviously it has everything to do with Islam, and the unwillingness on the part of Muslims in the West to provide moral leadership against Islamic extremism will ensure that the terror continues for a long time.
With some of the biggest figures in the Islamic religious establishment preaching jihad beamed around the globe on Islamic satellite networks, and countless websites offering jihadist tracts, YouTube hosting a veritable smorgasbord of videos documenting terrorist incidents, and Internet forums dedicated to networking would-be jihadists and encouraging violence, it might be that Islamic extremists are a minority, but they clearly have dominated the conversation. And it is doubtful that the situation will change as long as that remains the case.
Fortunately, there are some Islamic leaders willing to speak out consistently and forcefully against Islamic extremism and the non-stop acts of terrorism, but the establishment media rarely gives them notice, let alone a hearing, preferring instead the cacophony of CAIR and those extremists who offer weak condemnations of terrorism, yet defending its justification and denying its true causes.
Meanwhile, the deadly toll continues to roll unnoticed by the establishment media. But Glen Reinsford is still there continuing his grim task keeping us all aware of how pervasive and unrelenting the problem of Islamic terrorism really is.
The chronicler of this bloody tally is Glen Reinsford, editor of TheReligionofPeace.com, who began compiling and updating daily a detailed list of reported incidents of violence and terrorism around the world targeting non-Muslims and Muslims alike. Because of space limitations he only posts the past two months worth of attacks on his websites main page, though he has archived all of the incidents from past years (2001-2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). He also maintains a banner graphic with the updated number of attacks, which people can post on their own websites.
When asked what prompted him to begin such a labor-intensive undertaking, Reinsford identifies the tepid response to Islamic terrorism by otherwise outspoken Muslim groups, with one organization particularly in mind:
The Council on American-Islamic Relations. After 9/11, I kept an eye on them and was quite disgusted by their lack of moral perspective. They complain about issues that affect Muslims which are quite trivial, on average, compared to what is happening in the name of their religion. They do occasionally denounce terror in a general, somewhat ambiguous, sense but there is an obvious lack of passion. Their real interest is themselves.
Reviewing the list of recent incidents, it is surprising how many “smaller” attacks occur daily, which the establishment media pass with only a casual mention. While high profile attacks, like the one last week in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan that killed 75 and wounded at least 100 (many of them school children), receive plenty of attention, smaller incidents, such as the attack last week on a hotel in Baramulla, India that killed one, rarely register with the Western media.
Because Reinsford relies on the establishment media for his numbers, the true number of attacks and their victims are underreported:
In my case, I use published media reports from reputable sources on the Internet, such as the Associated Press. None of the information comes from rumor or word of mouth. Every bit of it can be verified through publicly-available sources. If anything, I undercount the attacks.
In his explanation of his methodology, he notes that he doesn’t include combat-related statistics, and acknowledges that the death toll may increase in the days and months following the attack as victims die from their injuries, which almost never get reported. The list also doesn’t account for the genocide in Darfur committed by the Islamist government in Sudan and their Janjaweed marauding militias, which the UN estimated last year had resulted in 400,000 dead and 2 million displaced.
With such seemingly incomprehensible carnage, I ask Reinsford if there were any particular incidents that stand out, and he identified three (qualifying that he could easily identify 15 more):
· Nadimarg, India (3/23/03), dozens of Hindu villagers roused out of their beds and machine-gunned by Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) Islamists.
· Beslan, Russia (9/3/04), some 350 people slaughtered by Islamic militants - half of them children.
· Malatya, Turkey (4/18/07), three Christian Bible distributors are tied up, tortured for hours then gruesomely murdered by men who acted explicitly in the name of Islam.
For me, a September 2006 Washington Post article stands out concerning an attack targeting Shi’ite women and children stands out, when a Sunni suicide bomber detonated a kerosene fuel bomb filled with ball bearings (for added effect) ripped through a crowd waiting in line to buy fuel. The Post described the horrific scene:
The horrific blast sent women engulfed in flames screaming through the streets. Two preteen girls embraced each other as they burned to death, witnesses said. Later, wailing mourners thronged the scene of the blast, which was strewn with the shoes of victims and a woman's bloodied cloak, and voiced doubt that the reprisal violence would ever end.
While many Muslim organizations in the West expend considerable effort portraying themselves as victims of Western “Islamophobia”, very little is said by those groups about the fact that many of the countless victims of Islamic terrorism are Muslims themselves. There are certainly no public protests by organizations like CAIR in recognition of those Muslims murdered and maimed by Muslims, though they are quick to cite the number of civilians accidentally killed by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan (though Reinsford notes that while 225 Iraqis were killed in collateral damage incidents in 2006, there were 16,791 Iraqi civilians killed by Islamic terrorists that same year).
Reinsford says that the skewed perspective of ignoring the toll Islamic terrorism takes on Muslims stems from a failure by Muslim leaders to recognize the glaring problems that are resident in the heart of their own community:
Yes, most of the victims of Islamic terror are Muslim, yet there is very little outrage on the part of the Islamic world to terror, relative to, say, a Muhammad cartoon or an "insult to Islam" by a public figure. What does this tell us about the priorities of Islam? In fact, sympathies for terrorists run much higher than many people realize. Even those that do truly disagree with violence (and there are many) somehow avoid taking any sort of responsibility for ending it by convincing themselves that it has nothing to do with Islam. Obviously it has everything to do with Islam, and the unwillingness on the part of Muslims in the West to provide moral leadership against Islamic extremism will ensure that the terror continues for a long time.
With some of the biggest figures in the Islamic religious establishment preaching jihad beamed around the globe on Islamic satellite networks, and countless websites offering jihadist tracts, YouTube hosting a veritable smorgasbord of videos documenting terrorist incidents, and Internet forums dedicated to networking would-be jihadists and encouraging violence, it might be that Islamic extremists are a minority, but they clearly have dominated the conversation. And it is doubtful that the situation will change as long as that remains the case.
Fortunately, there are some Islamic leaders willing to speak out consistently and forcefully against Islamic extremism and the non-stop acts of terrorism, but the establishment media rarely gives them notice, let alone a hearing, preferring instead the cacophony of CAIR and those extremists who offer weak condemnations of terrorism, yet defending its justification and denying its true causes.
Meanwhile, the deadly toll continues to roll unnoticed by the establishment media. But Glen Reinsford is still there continuing his grim task keeping us all aware of how pervasive and unrelenting the problem of Islamic terrorism really is.
Expelled Jews hold deeds on Arab lands
The government needs to bring up the issue of hundreds of thousands of Jews who left their homes in Arab countries following the establishment of the State of Israel as part of any future peace agreement with the Palestinians, the president of the World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries said Thursday. About 850,000 Jews fled Arab countries after Israel's founding in 1948, leaving behind assets valued today at more than $300 billion, said Heskel M. Haddad.
He added that the New York-based organization has decades-old property deeds of Jews from Arab countries on a total area of 100,000 sq.km. - which is five times the size of the State of Israel.
Most of the properties are located in Iraq, Egypt and Morocco, Haddad said.
The Baghdad-born Haddad fled Iraq in 1951, and, after a brief stop in Israel, made his way to the United States where he went on to become a prominent New York optometrist.
In an interview, he said that it was imperative for Israel to bring up the issue of the Jews who fled Arab countries at any future peace talks - including those scheduled to take place in Annapolis in the coming weeks - since no Palestinian leader would sign a peace treaty without resolving the issue of Palestinian refugees.
Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians - with estimates ranging from 400,000 to 750,000 - left Israeli-controlled territory in 1948 and 1949, and they, along with their millions of descendants, make up one of the prickliest issues to be dealt with by Israeli and Palestinian negotiators as part of any resolution to the conflict.
Haddad said that the key to resolving the issue rested with the Arab League, which in the 1950s passed a resolution stating that no Arab government would grant citizenship to Palestinian refugees, keeping them in limbo for over half a century.
At the same time, the Arab League urged Arab governments to facilitate the exit of Jews from Arab countries, a resolution which was carried out with a series of punitive measures and discriminatory decrees making it untenable for the Jews to stay in the countries.
"No Jews from Arab countries would give up their property and home and come to Israel out of Zionism," Haddad said.
He said that the Israeli government was "myopic" not to utilize this little-known information, which he said should be part of a package financial solution to solving the issue of Palestinian refugees.
An Israeli ministerial committee on claims for Jewish property in Arab countries, which is currently headed by the Pensioners Minister Rafi Eitan, has been virtually dormant since it was established four years ago.
He added that the New York-based organization has decades-old property deeds of Jews from Arab countries on a total area of 100,000 sq.km. - which is five times the size of the State of Israel.
Most of the properties are located in Iraq, Egypt and Morocco, Haddad said.
The Baghdad-born Haddad fled Iraq in 1951, and, after a brief stop in Israel, made his way to the United States where he went on to become a prominent New York optometrist.
In an interview, he said that it was imperative for Israel to bring up the issue of the Jews who fled Arab countries at any future peace talks - including those scheduled to take place in Annapolis in the coming weeks - since no Palestinian leader would sign a peace treaty without resolving the issue of Palestinian refugees.
Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians - with estimates ranging from 400,000 to 750,000 - left Israeli-controlled territory in 1948 and 1949, and they, along with their millions of descendants, make up one of the prickliest issues to be dealt with by Israeli and Palestinian negotiators as part of any resolution to the conflict.
Haddad said that the key to resolving the issue rested with the Arab League, which in the 1950s passed a resolution stating that no Arab government would grant citizenship to Palestinian refugees, keeping them in limbo for over half a century.
At the same time, the Arab League urged Arab governments to facilitate the exit of Jews from Arab countries, a resolution which was carried out with a series of punitive measures and discriminatory decrees making it untenable for the Jews to stay in the countries.
"No Jews from Arab countries would give up their property and home and come to Israel out of Zionism," Haddad said.
He said that the Israeli government was "myopic" not to utilize this little-known information, which he said should be part of a package financial solution to solving the issue of Palestinian refugees.
An Israeli ministerial committee on claims for Jewish property in Arab countries, which is currently headed by the Pensioners Minister Rafi Eitan, has been virtually dormant since it was established four years ago.
Civil Fights: Ehud Olmert’s misplaced trust
It is too soon to know the full extent of Ehud Olmert's pre-Annapolis concessions. But already, according to press reports that his office has not denied, he has made one concession devastating to Israel's security: accepting Washington as the arbiter of whether the Palestinians have fulfilled their counterterrorism commitments under the road map.
The road map states that as the Palestinians progress on counterterrorism (arresting terrorists, confiscating weapons, reforming their security services, etc.), Israel must dismantle its own counterterrorism measures: For instance, it must remove checkpoints and withdraw the IDF to the September 28, 2000 lines. Clearly, taking these steps before the Palestinian Authority is both willing and able to prevent attacks would leave Israel vulnerable to the same relentless terrorism that characterized the first years of the intifada, before these measures were in place. Thus a premature determination that the PA is in fact willing and able to take over is a recipe for renewed suicide bombings in Israel's heartland.
The crucial question, therefore, is whether the US can be trusted to make this determination in Israel's stead. Since America has long been Israel's staunchest ally, entrusting it with this task might seem unobjectionable. However, there are two reasons why the US cannot be trusted to protect Israel's security needs in this case: Keith Dayton and Condoleezza Rice.
LIEUTENANT General Dayton is the official US security coordinator for the "peace process." His mission includes helping the PA reform its security services and monitoring Palestinian progress on counterterrorism. As Washington's point man for security-related issues, he would naturally be the one to decide whether the PA had in fact fulfilled its counterterrorism responsibilities sufficiently to mandate reciprocal Israeli measures.
Unfortunately, Dayton has proven himself an utterly incompetent judge. This past June, when Hamas launched its takeover of the Gaza Strip, it crushed Fatah's forces in a mere five days. Yet during weeks of preliminary skirmishes, Dayton - virtually alone among journalistic and diplomatic observers - had insisted that Fatah was fighting much better than anyone gave it credit for and would win a decisive clash if one came.
Why Washington did not recall him after this fiasco remains a mystery. What is certain, however, is that a man who so badly overestimated Fatah's will and ability to fight Hamas in Gaza cannot be trusted to correctly estimate its will and ability to fight Hamas in the West Bank. Yet that is precisely what Olmert is trusting him to do: By accepting the US as an arbitrator, Olmert has effectively pledged to withdraw the IDF from much of the West Bank the moment Dayton declares the PA both willing and able to fight terror - even if his judgment is as delusional as it was last summer.
THE SECOND problem is Dayton's boss, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Since she will be responsible for making Israel obey Dayton's decisions, Israel could theoretically appeal to her should it consider these decisions flawed. In practice, however, there is no chance of her accepting such an appeal - because if there is one thing Rice has proved definitively over the past two years, it is that she has no interest whatsoever in Israel's security concerns.
If that assessment seems harsh, consider her behavior over the Agreement on Movement and Access, which she brokered following the August 2005 disengagement.
The agreement was meant to ensure the free flow of goods and people to and from Gaza, including between Gaza and the West Bank. Israel's consent, however, was predicated on the assumption that Fatah, then in sole control of the PA, would work to suppress Gaza-based terror. Instead, rocket fire on southern Israel from Gaza not only continued, but intensified: In 2006, the first full year post-disengagement, the number of rockets launched from Gaza at Israel more than tripled compared to 2004, the last full year pre-disengagement. And Fatah forces made no effort whatsoever to stop this fire.
Israel thus refused to allow regular convoys between Gaza and the West Bank unless and until the PA, which would be responsible for security on these convoys, took serious action against the rocket threat. That was an obviously vital security measure: Because the West Bank, unlike Gaza, is in rocket range of all of Israel's major cities, rocket technology must be kept out; yet with the PA demonstrably unwilling or unable to fight the rocket plague in Gaza, it clearly could not be trusted to ensure that Gaza-West Bank convoys were not used to transfer this technology.
Rice, however, did not see it that way: She demanded that Israel honor its commitments regardless of whether the Palestinians were honoring theirs. Indeed, she continued pushing this issue up until Hamas kicked Fatah out of Gaza in June. As late as May, she was still promoting Dayton's "benchmark" plan, which called for starting Gaza-West Bank convoys on July 1, even though it required the PA to deploy a revamped security service in Gaza - i.e. one willing and able to fight Gaza-based terror - only by the end of 2007.
In other words, Rice thought Israel should enable convoys to the West Bank six months before PA forces were even in position to keep them from transporting rocket technology, much less demonstrably doing so. The message could not have been clearer: She considered rocket fire on Tel Aviv an acceptable price to pay for Palestinian freedom of movement.
TO HIS credit, Olmert resisted her on this issue. But now, in his desperation to demonstrate "progress" at Annapolis, he has pledged to dismantle Israel's entire security network in the West Bank merely on Dayton's and Rice's say-so. He has thereby created an impossible trap: Either Israel will indeed have to dismantle its security measures prematurely, leaving the country vulnerable to a new wave of suicide bombings, or it will have to mortally insult its closest ally by refusing to accept its decisions even after having promised to do so.
If that is the measure of Olmert's judgment in the pre-Annapolis talks, none of us should be sleeping well at night.
The road map states that as the Palestinians progress on counterterrorism (arresting terrorists, confiscating weapons, reforming their security services, etc.), Israel must dismantle its own counterterrorism measures: For instance, it must remove checkpoints and withdraw the IDF to the September 28, 2000 lines. Clearly, taking these steps before the Palestinian Authority is both willing and able to prevent attacks would leave Israel vulnerable to the same relentless terrorism that characterized the first years of the intifada, before these measures were in place. Thus a premature determination that the PA is in fact willing and able to take over is a recipe for renewed suicide bombings in Israel's heartland.
The crucial question, therefore, is whether the US can be trusted to make this determination in Israel's stead. Since America has long been Israel's staunchest ally, entrusting it with this task might seem unobjectionable. However, there are two reasons why the US cannot be trusted to protect Israel's security needs in this case: Keith Dayton and Condoleezza Rice.
LIEUTENANT General Dayton is the official US security coordinator for the "peace process." His mission includes helping the PA reform its security services and monitoring Palestinian progress on counterterrorism. As Washington's point man for security-related issues, he would naturally be the one to decide whether the PA had in fact fulfilled its counterterrorism responsibilities sufficiently to mandate reciprocal Israeli measures.
Unfortunately, Dayton has proven himself an utterly incompetent judge. This past June, when Hamas launched its takeover of the Gaza Strip, it crushed Fatah's forces in a mere five days. Yet during weeks of preliminary skirmishes, Dayton - virtually alone among journalistic and diplomatic observers - had insisted that Fatah was fighting much better than anyone gave it credit for and would win a decisive clash if one came.
Why Washington did not recall him after this fiasco remains a mystery. What is certain, however, is that a man who so badly overestimated Fatah's will and ability to fight Hamas in Gaza cannot be trusted to correctly estimate its will and ability to fight Hamas in the West Bank. Yet that is precisely what Olmert is trusting him to do: By accepting the US as an arbitrator, Olmert has effectively pledged to withdraw the IDF from much of the West Bank the moment Dayton declares the PA both willing and able to fight terror - even if his judgment is as delusional as it was last summer.
THE SECOND problem is Dayton's boss, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Since she will be responsible for making Israel obey Dayton's decisions, Israel could theoretically appeal to her should it consider these decisions flawed. In practice, however, there is no chance of her accepting such an appeal - because if there is one thing Rice has proved definitively over the past two years, it is that she has no interest whatsoever in Israel's security concerns.
If that assessment seems harsh, consider her behavior over the Agreement on Movement and Access, which she brokered following the August 2005 disengagement.
The agreement was meant to ensure the free flow of goods and people to and from Gaza, including between Gaza and the West Bank. Israel's consent, however, was predicated on the assumption that Fatah, then in sole control of the PA, would work to suppress Gaza-based terror. Instead, rocket fire on southern Israel from Gaza not only continued, but intensified: In 2006, the first full year post-disengagement, the number of rockets launched from Gaza at Israel more than tripled compared to 2004, the last full year pre-disengagement. And Fatah forces made no effort whatsoever to stop this fire.
Israel thus refused to allow regular convoys between Gaza and the West Bank unless and until the PA, which would be responsible for security on these convoys, took serious action against the rocket threat. That was an obviously vital security measure: Because the West Bank, unlike Gaza, is in rocket range of all of Israel's major cities, rocket technology must be kept out; yet with the PA demonstrably unwilling or unable to fight the rocket plague in Gaza, it clearly could not be trusted to ensure that Gaza-West Bank convoys were not used to transfer this technology.
Rice, however, did not see it that way: She demanded that Israel honor its commitments regardless of whether the Palestinians were honoring theirs. Indeed, she continued pushing this issue up until Hamas kicked Fatah out of Gaza in June. As late as May, she was still promoting Dayton's "benchmark" plan, which called for starting Gaza-West Bank convoys on July 1, even though it required the PA to deploy a revamped security service in Gaza - i.e. one willing and able to fight Gaza-based terror - only by the end of 2007.
In other words, Rice thought Israel should enable convoys to the West Bank six months before PA forces were even in position to keep them from transporting rocket technology, much less demonstrably doing so. The message could not have been clearer: She considered rocket fire on Tel Aviv an acceptable price to pay for Palestinian freedom of movement.
TO HIS credit, Olmert resisted her on this issue. But now, in his desperation to demonstrate "progress" at Annapolis, he has pledged to dismantle Israel's entire security network in the West Bank merely on Dayton's and Rice's say-so. He has thereby created an impossible trap: Either Israel will indeed have to dismantle its security measures prematurely, leaving the country vulnerable to a new wave of suicide bombings, or it will have to mortally insult its closest ally by refusing to accept its decisions even after having promised to do so.
If that is the measure of Olmert's judgment in the pre-Annapolis talks, none of us should be sleeping well at night.
What Most Palestinians Believe
Speaking earlier this month at the Saban Forum in Jerusalem, Secretary of State Rice expressed her fear that if "Palestinian reformers" could not "deliver on the hope of an independent state," the "moderate center could collapse forever." She spoke about the need to take "great chances for the sake of peace" in light of "the opportunity that now exists."
"Most Palestinians," Ms. Rice said, "believe that Israel will always be their neighbor and most believe that no Palestinian state will ever be born through violence." It is unlikely that there have been any Palestinian public opinion polls asking the question, "Do you believe Israel will always be your neighbor?" or "Do you believe a Palestinian state will ever be born through violence?"
But there have been several public opinion polls over the last few months asking other questions. The answers cast doubt on whether there is in fact a "moderate center" or whether it would be satisfied with an "independent state" — or, for that matter, whether Fatah and its leaders constitute "Palestinian reformers."
In a joint Palestinian-Israeli public opinion poll in June, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace found that only 60% of Palestinians agreed that, after reaching a permanent agreement on all issues of the conflict, there should be recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people.
In other words, about 40% opposed the recognition of a Jewish state — even after a resolution of "all issues of the conflict." The PCPSR conducted another poll in September, in which 41% opposed recognition of a Jewish state even after the "solution of all the issues of the conflict."
Even the 60% who would recognize a Jewish state — after "solution of all the issues in the conflict" — do not likely have a realistic "solution" in mind. In the PCPSR September poll, only 46% of Palestinians supported a permanent resolution based on the 1967 borders with an equal land swap for Israeli settlements in 5% of the West Bank — a resolution that exceeds even the overly generous Clinton Parameters.
The Jerusalem Media and Communications Center conducted a poll in late August. In that poll, 82% of Palestinians opposed allowing Israel to keep control of major settlement blocs in the West Bank in exchange for equal Israeli land. Nearly 70% wanted the refugee issue resolved by return of all refugees to "their original land," not a new Palestinian state.
Since the "right of return" is a non-starter across the entire Israeli spectrum, this amounts to a super-majority of Palestinians who have no realistic peace proposal in mind.
In the JMCC poll, less than a majority of the Palestinians in the West Bank supported a two-state solution. A total of 43% supported a "bi-national state on all of historic Palestine," "one Palestinian state," or an "Islamic state," and another 8% supported some other solution, or no solution, or didn't know — totaling 51%.
The Palestinian Center for Public Opinion released a poll on September 22, showing that 57% of Palestinians opposed the participation of the Palestinian leadership in the international peace conference called by President Bush.
As for the Palestinian Authority itself, the June PCPSR/Truman Institute poll showed that 54% of the Palestinians saw democracy in the PA as a failed system that cannot be implemented. A large percentage — 41% — wanted the PA dissolved and replaced by either an international trusteeship or a return to full Israeli occupation.
As for the "Palestinian reformers," in the September PCPSR poll more than 80% of Palestinians thought there is corruption in PA institutions under the control of Mahmoud Abbas — and 56% thought it would remain in the future, or increase. Another 7% did not know. Only 36% thought it will decrease.
These polls portray a clearer picture of the alleged "moderate center" and "Palestinian reformers" than the one Ms. Rice pitched to the Israelis. Her assurance about what "most Palestinians believe" is an undocumented article of faith, repeatedly contradicted by the experience of the last seven years, and by the latest polls.
In encouraging Israel to take — once again — "great chances for peace" to provide Palestinians with "hope," Ms. Rice quoted the same proverb the then-governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton, used in his 1992 presidential acceptance speech: "Where there is no vision, the people perish."
The Palestinians do not lack a vision. They adhere to their vision of a "right of return," refusing to recognize the validity of a Jewish state, demanding an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank beyond the defensible borders America has formally assured Israel, and seek to remove all Jews from Judea and Samaria to create an apartheid state. Multiple Palestinian public opinion polls confirm that most Palestinians still have that vision. Moreover, their vision is not simply an "obstacle to peace." It is the cause of the war. But for peace processors peace is always only a few brave steps by Israel away.
Mr. Richman edits Jewish Current Issues.
"Most Palestinians," Ms. Rice said, "believe that Israel will always be their neighbor and most believe that no Palestinian state will ever be born through violence." It is unlikely that there have been any Palestinian public opinion polls asking the question, "Do you believe Israel will always be your neighbor?" or "Do you believe a Palestinian state will ever be born through violence?"
But there have been several public opinion polls over the last few months asking other questions. The answers cast doubt on whether there is in fact a "moderate center" or whether it would be satisfied with an "independent state" — or, for that matter, whether Fatah and its leaders constitute "Palestinian reformers."
In a joint Palestinian-Israeli public opinion poll in June, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace found that only 60% of Palestinians agreed that, after reaching a permanent agreement on all issues of the conflict, there should be recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people.
In other words, about 40% opposed the recognition of a Jewish state — even after a resolution of "all issues of the conflict." The PCPSR conducted another poll in September, in which 41% opposed recognition of a Jewish state even after the "solution of all the issues of the conflict."
Even the 60% who would recognize a Jewish state — after "solution of all the issues in the conflict" — do not likely have a realistic "solution" in mind. In the PCPSR September poll, only 46% of Palestinians supported a permanent resolution based on the 1967 borders with an equal land swap for Israeli settlements in 5% of the West Bank — a resolution that exceeds even the overly generous Clinton Parameters.
The Jerusalem Media and Communications Center conducted a poll in late August. In that poll, 82% of Palestinians opposed allowing Israel to keep control of major settlement blocs in the West Bank in exchange for equal Israeli land. Nearly 70% wanted the refugee issue resolved by return of all refugees to "their original land," not a new Palestinian state.
Since the "right of return" is a non-starter across the entire Israeli spectrum, this amounts to a super-majority of Palestinians who have no realistic peace proposal in mind.
In the JMCC poll, less than a majority of the Palestinians in the West Bank supported a two-state solution. A total of 43% supported a "bi-national state on all of historic Palestine," "one Palestinian state," or an "Islamic state," and another 8% supported some other solution, or no solution, or didn't know — totaling 51%.
The Palestinian Center for Public Opinion released a poll on September 22, showing that 57% of Palestinians opposed the participation of the Palestinian leadership in the international peace conference called by President Bush.
As for the Palestinian Authority itself, the June PCPSR/Truman Institute poll showed that 54% of the Palestinians saw democracy in the PA as a failed system that cannot be implemented. A large percentage — 41% — wanted the PA dissolved and replaced by either an international trusteeship or a return to full Israeli occupation.
As for the "Palestinian reformers," in the September PCPSR poll more than 80% of Palestinians thought there is corruption in PA institutions under the control of Mahmoud Abbas — and 56% thought it would remain in the future, or increase. Another 7% did not know. Only 36% thought it will decrease.
These polls portray a clearer picture of the alleged "moderate center" and "Palestinian reformers" than the one Ms. Rice pitched to the Israelis. Her assurance about what "most Palestinians believe" is an undocumented article of faith, repeatedly contradicted by the experience of the last seven years, and by the latest polls.
In encouraging Israel to take — once again — "great chances for peace" to provide Palestinians with "hope," Ms. Rice quoted the same proverb the then-governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton, used in his 1992 presidential acceptance speech: "Where there is no vision, the people perish."
The Palestinians do not lack a vision. They adhere to their vision of a "right of return," refusing to recognize the validity of a Jewish state, demanding an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank beyond the defensible borders America has formally assured Israel, and seek to remove all Jews from Judea and Samaria to create an apartheid state. Multiple Palestinian public opinion polls confirm that most Palestinians still have that vision. Moreover, their vision is not simply an "obstacle to peace." It is the cause of the war. But for peace processors peace is always only a few brave steps by Israel away.
Mr. Richman edits Jewish Current Issues.
Thursday, November 15, 2007
Olmert's Divided Jerusalem?
Jonathan Schanzer and Asaf Romirowsky
American Thinker | 11/15/2007
"Peace is achieved through concessions . We all know that," said embattled Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to crowd of businessmen last week, implying that parts of Jerusalem could be offered to the Palestinians in exchange for peace.
This is not the first time Olmert indicated that he was willing to split up Israel's capital. Last month, he publicly pondered whether it was really "necessary to also add the Shuafat refugee camp, Sawakra, Walaje and other villages and define them as part of Jerusalem."
Drawing from the history of other desperate Israeli prime ministers who have put Israel up on the auction block, Olmert's time in office is probably near its end.
The prime minister's recent statements can be seen only as a last gasp effort to revive his flatlining premiership. After demonstrating an utter lack of leadership during Israel's confrontation with Hizbullah last summer in Lebanon, few Israelis have any confidence in their prime minister. Indeed, he has miserably low approval ratings (as low as 2% in recent polls), with political challengers circling for the right moment to pounce.
Olmert is now chasing peace with the Palestinians at all costs, in a desperate attempt to secure his place in world history, knowing full well that future Israeli history books will not be kind. This fits a sad but familiar trend of other sputtering Israeli prime ministers in recent history.
Take Israel's current Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Under pressure from the Clinton administration during the July 2000 Camp David talks, he became the first Israeli Prime Minister to officially consider re-dividing Jerusalem. Despite the fact that this infuriated a majority of the Israeli public, as demonstrated in popularity polls, the embattled Barak forged ahead. When the talks ultimately failed, thanks to Yasir Arafat's intransigence, the Palestinians launched the al-Aqsa intifada. Barak was blamed for the violence, leading to an even steeper drop in his popularity. Ariel Sharon went on to win the 2001 elections by a landslide 63 percent.
Barak's plummeting popularity even before the intifada was inextricably linked to the former Israeli commando's willingness to violate Israel's longstanding red lines: no division of Jerusalem, no return to the 1949 borders, no return of Arab refugees, and no foreign army west of the Jordan River. But, faced with a legacy of failure, Barak clung to the notion that a peace deal ceding parts of Jerusalem might ultimately secure his place in history. In the end, it only ensured his defeat.
One can also argue that Shimon Peres, who became prime Minister by default in 1995 after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, also ensured his own demise by dangling Jerusalem as a concession to the Palestinians. An architect of the Oslo process, Peres pushed tenaciously forward toward peace, even when Israel was bloodied by a brutal campaign of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad suicide bombings. Despite the fact that the PA never reigned in Hamas, Peres never stopped pushing for peace. And he never took the question of Jerusalem off the table. Instead, he allowed the Palestinians to hold elections in Jerusalem in 1996, which was largely viewed as a gesture of possible future concessions. Thus, when Benjamin Netanyahu challenged Peres in the next election, he hammered Peres' blind commitment to a failing peace process, and charged that Peres would even surrender control of Jerusalem. This, alone, may have cost Peres the election.
When Olmert, Barak, and Peres raised the specter of Jerusalem, their political shelf lives had all but expired. Indeed, when Israeli politicians discuss the fate of Jerusalem to please the U.S. State Department or Palestinian negotiators, they are indicating to the Israeli public that they have given up on popular support. Instead, they make a last ditch effort to secure their own place in history.
Olmert's recent talk of dividing Jerusalem is a sign that new Israeli elections are almost assuredly around the corner. Refusing to go quietly, he is endangering the unity of Israel's capital just as his moment in history comes to an end.
Jonathan Schanzer is director of policy at the Jewish Policy Center, and editor of inFocus Quarterly. Asaf Romirowsky is an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum and Manager of Israel & Middle East Affairs for the Jewish Federation of Greater Philadelphia.
American Thinker | 11/15/2007
"Peace is achieved through concessions . We all know that," said embattled Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to crowd of businessmen last week, implying that parts of Jerusalem could be offered to the Palestinians in exchange for peace.
This is not the first time Olmert indicated that he was willing to split up Israel's capital. Last month, he publicly pondered whether it was really "necessary to also add the Shuafat refugee camp, Sawakra, Walaje and other villages and define them as part of Jerusalem."
Drawing from the history of other desperate Israeli prime ministers who have put Israel up on the auction block, Olmert's time in office is probably near its end.
The prime minister's recent statements can be seen only as a last gasp effort to revive his flatlining premiership. After demonstrating an utter lack of leadership during Israel's confrontation with Hizbullah last summer in Lebanon, few Israelis have any confidence in their prime minister. Indeed, he has miserably low approval ratings (as low as 2% in recent polls), with political challengers circling for the right moment to pounce.
Olmert is now chasing peace with the Palestinians at all costs, in a desperate attempt to secure his place in world history, knowing full well that future Israeli history books will not be kind. This fits a sad but familiar trend of other sputtering Israeli prime ministers in recent history.
Take Israel's current Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Under pressure from the Clinton administration during the July 2000 Camp David talks, he became the first Israeli Prime Minister to officially consider re-dividing Jerusalem. Despite the fact that this infuriated a majority of the Israeli public, as demonstrated in popularity polls, the embattled Barak forged ahead. When the talks ultimately failed, thanks to Yasir Arafat's intransigence, the Palestinians launched the al-Aqsa intifada. Barak was blamed for the violence, leading to an even steeper drop in his popularity. Ariel Sharon went on to win the 2001 elections by a landslide 63 percent.
Barak's plummeting popularity even before the intifada was inextricably linked to the former Israeli commando's willingness to violate Israel's longstanding red lines: no division of Jerusalem, no return to the 1949 borders, no return of Arab refugees, and no foreign army west of the Jordan River. But, faced with a legacy of failure, Barak clung to the notion that a peace deal ceding parts of Jerusalem might ultimately secure his place in history. In the end, it only ensured his defeat.
One can also argue that Shimon Peres, who became prime Minister by default in 1995 after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, also ensured his own demise by dangling Jerusalem as a concession to the Palestinians. An architect of the Oslo process, Peres pushed tenaciously forward toward peace, even when Israel was bloodied by a brutal campaign of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad suicide bombings. Despite the fact that the PA never reigned in Hamas, Peres never stopped pushing for peace. And he never took the question of Jerusalem off the table. Instead, he allowed the Palestinians to hold elections in Jerusalem in 1996, which was largely viewed as a gesture of possible future concessions. Thus, when Benjamin Netanyahu challenged Peres in the next election, he hammered Peres' blind commitment to a failing peace process, and charged that Peres would even surrender control of Jerusalem. This, alone, may have cost Peres the election.
When Olmert, Barak, and Peres raised the specter of Jerusalem, their political shelf lives had all but expired. Indeed, when Israeli politicians discuss the fate of Jerusalem to please the U.S. State Department or Palestinian negotiators, they are indicating to the Israeli public that they have given up on popular support. Instead, they make a last ditch effort to secure their own place in history.
Olmert's recent talk of dividing Jerusalem is a sign that new Israeli elections are almost assuredly around the corner. Refusing to go quietly, he is endangering the unity of Israel's capital just as his moment in history comes to an end.
Jonathan Schanzer is director of policy at the Jewish Policy Center, and editor of inFocus Quarterly. Asaf Romirowsky is an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum and Manager of Israel & Middle East Affairs for the Jewish Federation of Greater Philadelphia.
Settlement Freeze Not Just a Tactic But Full-Fledged Policy
Hillel Fendel
After two years in office, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert met Tuesday afternoon for the first time with representatives of the Council of Jewish Towns in Judea and Samaria (Yesha) and clarified his intentions to continue a freeze on Jewish construction in the region
. Yesha leaders say the public struggle for the Jewish right to build homes in the ancient biblical region will have to be more intense and start sooner than they thought.
Olmert had received numerous requests, over the nearly two years that he has been in office, to meet with leaders of the Jewish settlement enterprise in Judea and Samaria.
Clear Policy, Not Just a Weapon
"If we originally thought that the policy of total freeze on new construction throughout Judea and Samaria was merely a strategy and a weapon with which to pressure us," Yesha Council head Danny Dayan told Arutz-7 afterwards, "we now know that it is a clear policy of surrender to US and Palestinian demands."
"This, of course, places us in an untenable situation, and forces us to begin a firm and uncompromising public struggle, much stronger and sooner than we had expected."
"We also warned the Prime Minister," Dayan said, "of the severe dangers of his diplomatic plans - not only that it would bring Kassam rockets to central Israel, but that it would break the country's social backbone. We said the country could simply not survive another displacement of thousands of citizens, and certainly not of 100,000 or 120,000 Jews living in Judea and Samaria. He did not even flinch at the mention of these numbers, or show in any way that he was not planning such a move."
The meeting took place in the Prime Minister's Jerusalem office, with the following Yesha representatives: Yesha Council head Danny Dayan, deputy head Sarah Eliash, former Council chief Bentzy Lieberman, Har Hevron Regional Council head Tzviki Bar-Chai, and long-time settlement leader Ze'ev (Zambish) Chever.
Wallerstein's View
Before the meeting, former Council head Pinchas Wallerstein similarly said he did not have high hopes for the meeting.
"Olmert will tell them how much he loves the Land of Israel," Wallerstein said, "and that if he could, he would settle everywhere - even though, of course, we all remember his role in giving away Gush Katif.”
Asked what he thought the Yesha leaders are telling Olmert, Wallerstein said, "They have to warn him that his coalition is in danger of falling apart if he continues along this path. To this end, we have to put pressure on Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu. It is only because of the very fear of those parties leaving the coalition that he has already stopped talking about concessions in Jerusalem at the Annapolis summit. Instead of Jerusalem, it now looks like he has turned to the Syrians and giving up the Golan Heights."
Asked how he views the future of the Jewish hilltop satellite villages in Judea and Samaria, Wallerstein did not express optimism: "He [Olmert] won't tear them down in the near future, unless there is some crisis with the Americans or something like that. Essentially, I believe he plans to destroy them, but only when he can get something in return from the Americans or the Palestinians."
The villages in danger include Migron, with its 43 families, Givat Assaf (16), and some 20 others. Many full-fledged Jewish towns in Judea and Samaria today started out as hilltop villages themselves.
After two years in office, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert met Tuesday afternoon for the first time with representatives of the Council of Jewish Towns in Judea and Samaria (Yesha) and clarified his intentions to continue a freeze on Jewish construction in the region
. Yesha leaders say the public struggle for the Jewish right to build homes in the ancient biblical region will have to be more intense and start sooner than they thought.
Olmert had received numerous requests, over the nearly two years that he has been in office, to meet with leaders of the Jewish settlement enterprise in Judea and Samaria.
Clear Policy, Not Just a Weapon
"If we originally thought that the policy of total freeze on new construction throughout Judea and Samaria was merely a strategy and a weapon with which to pressure us," Yesha Council head Danny Dayan told Arutz-7 afterwards, "we now know that it is a clear policy of surrender to US and Palestinian demands."
"This, of course, places us in an untenable situation, and forces us to begin a firm and uncompromising public struggle, much stronger and sooner than we had expected."
"We also warned the Prime Minister," Dayan said, "of the severe dangers of his diplomatic plans - not only that it would bring Kassam rockets to central Israel, but that it would break the country's social backbone. We said the country could simply not survive another displacement of thousands of citizens, and certainly not of 100,000 or 120,000 Jews living in Judea and Samaria. He did not even flinch at the mention of these numbers, or show in any way that he was not planning such a move."
The meeting took place in the Prime Minister's Jerusalem office, with the following Yesha representatives: Yesha Council head Danny Dayan, deputy head Sarah Eliash, former Council chief Bentzy Lieberman, Har Hevron Regional Council head Tzviki Bar-Chai, and long-time settlement leader Ze'ev (Zambish) Chever.
Wallerstein's View
Before the meeting, former Council head Pinchas Wallerstein similarly said he did not have high hopes for the meeting.
"Olmert will tell them how much he loves the Land of Israel," Wallerstein said, "and that if he could, he would settle everywhere - even though, of course, we all remember his role in giving away Gush Katif.”
Asked what he thought the Yesha leaders are telling Olmert, Wallerstein said, "They have to warn him that his coalition is in danger of falling apart if he continues along this path. To this end, we have to put pressure on Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu. It is only because of the very fear of those parties leaving the coalition that he has already stopped talking about concessions in Jerusalem at the Annapolis summit. Instead of Jerusalem, it now looks like he has turned to the Syrians and giving up the Golan Heights."
Asked how he views the future of the Jewish hilltop satellite villages in Judea and Samaria, Wallerstein did not express optimism: "He [Olmert] won't tear them down in the near future, unless there is some crisis with the Americans or something like that. Essentially, I believe he plans to destroy them, but only when he can get something in return from the Americans or the Palestinians."
The villages in danger include Migron, with its 43 families, Givat Assaf (16), and some 20 others. Many full-fledged Jewish towns in Judea and Samaria today started out as hilltop villages themselves.
The Core of Annapolis
David Bedein
FrontPageMagazine.com
In a speech he delivered one week ago in Jerusalem, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert presented his political worldview in advance of the Annapolis conference.
There were two firm statements made by Olmert:
One is that the supreme objective in Annapolis is “to fulfill the vision of two states: The State of Israel—the state of the Jewish people, and the Palestinian state—the state of the Palestinian people.”
The other is that there would be no negotiation over this objective: “We will not negotiate over the State of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. We will not bargain over the Palestinian people’s right to a state of their own.”
Olmert is the first prime minister of Israel to publicly raise, and in such a sharp and clear fashion, the demand to recognize the State of Israel as a Jewish state.
Ostensibly, this is simple and clear: A state for the Jewish people and a state for the Palestinian people, but notice that usually people settle for saying “two states for two peoples” without specifying the Jewish people.
It is interesting to note that in binding international declarations and resolutions, it is rare to have mention of a Jewish state.
The Balfour Declaration of November 2nd, 1917 promised a national home for the Jewish people in the Land of Israel. This declaration was accorded international ratification at the San Remo conference of the League of Nations in 1922, when Great Britain received the mandate to oversee the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The UN inherited and reinforced that resolution in 1946, and, in November 1947, endorsed the establishment of a Jewish state alongside an
Arab state in Palestine.
However, ever since UN Security Council Resolution 242 that was adopted on November 22nd, 1967, which still serves as the main international basis of any Israeli-Arab arrangement, the wording of all international agreements have referred to “recognizing the State of Israel’s existence” or “recognizing the State of Israel’s right to exist,” without stating that this is a Jewish state or the state of the Jewish people.
Indeed, in peace agreements signed between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1993, and in the 1993 and 1995 Oslo accords and in the 2003 road map as well, the definition of the State of Israel as a Jewish state, the state of the Jewish people, does not exist.
However: President George W. Bush, at the Aqaba summit of 2003, was the first senior US official to state explicitly and publicly that a democratic Palestinian state at full peace with Israel would advance the security and prosperity of the State of Israel - as a Jewish state.
The core of the problem is that Arab states and the Palestinians, along with a small minority of Israeli Jews, are not willing to recognize the State of Israel as a Jewish state or the state of the Jewish people. The most that some of them are willing to recognize is the State of Israel’s right to exist. Why?
There are three reasons for this: First, an ideological-psychological reason. Unwillingness to accept the existence of a Jewish state within the Muslim-Arab world. The Arab world did take a very large step forward after 1967, when it was willing to accept the fact of the State of Israel’s existence (unlike beforehand), but no more than this. The second reason lies with the Palestinian refugees and their descendents who have been wallowing in UNRWA United Nations refugee camps since 1948, under the specious premise and promise of the right of return to homes and villages that no longer exist.
Recognition of a Jewish state means, in practical terms, giving up the “right of return” of these refugees and their descendents to Israel. The deeper meaning is Palestinian promotion of the “Jewish sin” which caused their expulsion from their homeland.
The third reason is the growing trend among Israeli Arabs, or as they define themselves, “Palestinian Arab citizens of the State of Israel.” They constitute a quarter of the population of the Palestinian Arab people
currently living within the Land of Israel, and about 300,000-400,000 of them define themselves as refugees (who live in Israel, but were forced to leave their homes in 1948). Their leadership openly declares that they do not recognize the State of Israel as a Jewish state, plain and simple.
The Annapolis conference will provide a litmus test for the Palestinians and for the Arab states:
Are they willing to have a simple call for a two-state vision to issue from there—a state for the Jewish people and a state for the Palestinian people—or are they opposed to this?
On Tuesday, Palestinian Authority spokesman Saeb Erakat rejected Olmert's premise that the Palestinians would have to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
Will Olmert stand by his principles? Stay tuned for Annapolis, November 26th, 2007.
David Bedein is the bureau chief of the Israel Resource News Agency, located at the Beit Agron International Press Center in Jerusalem.
FrontPageMagazine.com
In a speech he delivered one week ago in Jerusalem, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert presented his political worldview in advance of the Annapolis conference.
There were two firm statements made by Olmert:
One is that the supreme objective in Annapolis is “to fulfill the vision of two states: The State of Israel—the state of the Jewish people, and the Palestinian state—the state of the Palestinian people.”
The other is that there would be no negotiation over this objective: “We will not negotiate over the State of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. We will not bargain over the Palestinian people’s right to a state of their own.”
Olmert is the first prime minister of Israel to publicly raise, and in such a sharp and clear fashion, the demand to recognize the State of Israel as a Jewish state.
Ostensibly, this is simple and clear: A state for the Jewish people and a state for the Palestinian people, but notice that usually people settle for saying “two states for two peoples” without specifying the Jewish people.
It is interesting to note that in binding international declarations and resolutions, it is rare to have mention of a Jewish state.
The Balfour Declaration of November 2nd, 1917 promised a national home for the Jewish people in the Land of Israel. This declaration was accorded international ratification at the San Remo conference of the League of Nations in 1922, when Great Britain received the mandate to oversee the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The UN inherited and reinforced that resolution in 1946, and, in November 1947, endorsed the establishment of a Jewish state alongside an
Arab state in Palestine.
However, ever since UN Security Council Resolution 242 that was adopted on November 22nd, 1967, which still serves as the main international basis of any Israeli-Arab arrangement, the wording of all international agreements have referred to “recognizing the State of Israel’s existence” or “recognizing the State of Israel’s right to exist,” without stating that this is a Jewish state or the state of the Jewish people.
Indeed, in peace agreements signed between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1993, and in the 1993 and 1995 Oslo accords and in the 2003 road map as well, the definition of the State of Israel as a Jewish state, the state of the Jewish people, does not exist.
However: President George W. Bush, at the Aqaba summit of 2003, was the first senior US official to state explicitly and publicly that a democratic Palestinian state at full peace with Israel would advance the security and prosperity of the State of Israel - as a Jewish state.
The core of the problem is that Arab states and the Palestinians, along with a small minority of Israeli Jews, are not willing to recognize the State of Israel as a Jewish state or the state of the Jewish people. The most that some of them are willing to recognize is the State of Israel’s right to exist. Why?
There are three reasons for this: First, an ideological-psychological reason. Unwillingness to accept the existence of a Jewish state within the Muslim-Arab world. The Arab world did take a very large step forward after 1967, when it was willing to accept the fact of the State of Israel’s existence (unlike beforehand), but no more than this. The second reason lies with the Palestinian refugees and their descendents who have been wallowing in UNRWA United Nations refugee camps since 1948, under the specious premise and promise of the right of return to homes and villages that no longer exist.
Recognition of a Jewish state means, in practical terms, giving up the “right of return” of these refugees and their descendents to Israel. The deeper meaning is Palestinian promotion of the “Jewish sin” which caused their expulsion from their homeland.
The third reason is the growing trend among Israeli Arabs, or as they define themselves, “Palestinian Arab citizens of the State of Israel.” They constitute a quarter of the population of the Palestinian Arab people
currently living within the Land of Israel, and about 300,000-400,000 of them define themselves as refugees (who live in Israel, but were forced to leave their homes in 1948). Their leadership openly declares that they do not recognize the State of Israel as a Jewish state, plain and simple.
The Annapolis conference will provide a litmus test for the Palestinians and for the Arab states:
Are they willing to have a simple call for a two-state vision to issue from there—a state for the Jewish people and a state for the Palestinian people—or are they opposed to this?
On Tuesday, Palestinian Authority spokesman Saeb Erakat rejected Olmert's premise that the Palestinians would have to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
Will Olmert stand by his principles? Stay tuned for Annapolis, November 26th, 2007.
David Bedein is the bureau chief of the Israel Resource News Agency, located at the Beit Agron International Press Center in Jerusalem.
Rice: Future of Middle East is at stake
"The future of the Middle East is at stake," US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the General Assembly in Nashville of the United Jewish Communities Tuesday, adding that the US would fight in the battle between extremists and moderates for the future of the region. Standing before some 3,500 delegates from US Jewish communities, Rice promised the US would not relent in its efforts to isolate Iran until that country ended its support for extremist violence in the Middle East. "The international community must not allow a state to develop nuclear capability" if it threatens to destroy another member state, she said, asking, "how can the idea of an international community have any meaning if we fail this test?"
She explained that the development of a moderate coalition in response to increasing terrorism and the Iranian threat was a central motivation behind the Bush administration's policy of helping Palestinian moderates to show success in their efforts to create a more prosperous and free Palestinian society.
Rice also defended the democracy-focused strategy for dealing with the Palestinians, which led to the election victory by Hamas that has split the Palestinian areas into separate administrative entities. Hamas is now faced with the responsibility of governance, she said, which has forced it to make the choice between "terror and being a political party. Hamas chose violence," she continued, and is now isolated by the international community.
"Peace between Israel and the Palestinians is in the strategic interest of the United States," she added, and affirmed that the US would staunchly defend "its ally Israel." Rice also said that the new peace initiative, represented in the November 26 Annapolis summit, was fundamentally different from previous attempts. Whereas previous negotiations centered around core issues such as refugees and borders, the Bush administration's strategy centered on "addressing the character of a Palestinian State" and seeking to create a democratic one.
Much speculation centered on what Rice would say to the central plenum of American Jewry regarding Annapolis, especially following her visits this month to Israeli and Palestinian leaders in which she reportedly worked to keep Annapolis from becoming an irrelevant parley. Many delegates said they thought Rice would ask organized American Jewry, which has also been largely skeptical on the potential benefits from Annapolis, to support the meeting and encourage the two sides to substantively discuss the issues.
"We intend to hold a serious and substantive meeting in Annapolis," she declared, saying the meeting would "not replace the road map." She did not say what she expected Annapolis to produce, but told the delegates that "we can and must succeed; failure is not an option."
Rice started her 22-minute speech with her experience in the 1970s helping Russian Jews to integrate into American society. At the time, a Sovietologist-in-training who had just returned from studies in Russia, Rice used her Russian to help communicate with the recent immigrants.
This vignette was one of at least a dozen points at which she had to pause due to energetic clapping.
She explained that the development of a moderate coalition in response to increasing terrorism and the Iranian threat was a central motivation behind the Bush administration's policy of helping Palestinian moderates to show success in their efforts to create a more prosperous and free Palestinian society.
Rice also defended the democracy-focused strategy for dealing with the Palestinians, which led to the election victory by Hamas that has split the Palestinian areas into separate administrative entities. Hamas is now faced with the responsibility of governance, she said, which has forced it to make the choice between "terror and being a political party. Hamas chose violence," she continued, and is now isolated by the international community.
"Peace between Israel and the Palestinians is in the strategic interest of the United States," she added, and affirmed that the US would staunchly defend "its ally Israel." Rice also said that the new peace initiative, represented in the November 26 Annapolis summit, was fundamentally different from previous attempts. Whereas previous negotiations centered around core issues such as refugees and borders, the Bush administration's strategy centered on "addressing the character of a Palestinian State" and seeking to create a democratic one.
Much speculation centered on what Rice would say to the central plenum of American Jewry regarding Annapolis, especially following her visits this month to Israeli and Palestinian leaders in which she reportedly worked to keep Annapolis from becoming an irrelevant parley. Many delegates said they thought Rice would ask organized American Jewry, which has also been largely skeptical on the potential benefits from Annapolis, to support the meeting and encourage the two sides to substantively discuss the issues.
"We intend to hold a serious and substantive meeting in Annapolis," she declared, saying the meeting would "not replace the road map." She did not say what she expected Annapolis to produce, but told the delegates that "we can and must succeed; failure is not an option."
Rice started her 22-minute speech with her experience in the 1970s helping Russian Jews to integrate into American society. At the time, a Sovietologist-in-training who had just returned from studies in Russia, Rice used her Russian to help communicate with the recent immigrants.
This vignette was one of at least a dozen points at which she had to pause due to energetic clapping.
PM’s peace plan perilous for Israel'
"Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's peace plan is dangerous and it will cause irreversible damage to Israeli society," representatives of The Council of Jewish Communities in Judea and Samaria (Yesha) and Gaza said after their meeting with Olmert at the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem on Tuesday. The settler leaders protested the government's policy on freezing settlement activity and said it stemmed from US pressure. They said they didn't get concrete answers to their questions to Olmert and that the issue of illegal outpost did not arise during their discussions.
Olmert responded sympathetically to the settler heads. "My feelings about Israel and its land are similar to yours," he said. "I have no doubt that every inch of land, from Jordan to the sea, is part of Israel and linked to its heritage and the history of our people. However, I also know that in order to ensure the future of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, we are forced to make concessions."
"Nevertheless," continued the prime minister, "I can say to you with certainty that there are places that I will never withdraw from, and everyone knows this: the Palestinians, the Americans, because I tell them this very clearly."
Olmert went on to say he felt he was in "a heart-breaking dispute with the settler community which I was part of."
It was Olmert's first meeting with Yesha representatives as prime minister and he said he would conduct "respectful talks" with them in the future.
Olmert responded sympathetically to the settler heads. "My feelings about Israel and its land are similar to yours," he said. "I have no doubt that every inch of land, from Jordan to the sea, is part of Israel and linked to its heritage and the history of our people. However, I also know that in order to ensure the future of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, we are forced to make concessions."
"Nevertheless," continued the prime minister, "I can say to you with certainty that there are places that I will never withdraw from, and everyone knows this: the Palestinians, the Americans, because I tell them this very clearly."
Olmert went on to say he felt he was in "a heart-breaking dispute with the settler community which I was part of."
It was Olmert's first meeting with Yesha representatives as prime minister and he said he would conduct "respectful talks" with them in the future.
PA Arab Squatters Remain on Jerusalem Property
Yitzchak Herskovitz, in his eighties, continues to battle Arab squatters in the courts as yet another eviction was postponed Sunday.
Herskovitz has been in the courts for fifteen years against a clan of PA Arabs who are squatting on a property he owns just below the southern Jerusalem neighborhood of Givat HaMatos, near Beit Tzefafa. Even after multiple rulings in his favor, the return of his property had been repeatedly delayed and called into question.
“The government and courts are responsible for protecting the property rights of their citizens, but they are not doing so.” Herskovitz told Arutz-7. “I do not believe a person can fathom the pain of what this trespassing does to me.”
Earlier this year, on July 2, Herskovitz was given a court order to evict the squatters. At first, the police demanded that he pay for a large number of officers to enforce the order in the face of expected violence. After he paid the sum and dozens of Jewish volunteers showed up to assist in reclaiming the property, police said an injunction had postponed the order due to a legal technicality the Arabs’ lawyer brought to court at the last moment.
Arutz-7’s coverage of the story led to the Knesset Law Committee’s adjustment of the law requiring private citizens to pay the police to enforce a court order, but the eviction has yet to take place.
A new date was eventually set, with Jerusalem District Court Judge Noam Solberg demanding that the Arabs’ lawyer, Mohammad Dahleh, sign an agreement that he would cease the use of delay tactics.
The date was then delayed once more due to a police policy not to carry out evictions during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The new eviction date was finally set for Sunday, November 11, but was again postponed at the last minute – due to yet another loophole found by Dahleh, who had refused to sign the agreement presented by the Judge.
“It was proven without a doubt, with a preponderance of evidence that the Salah clan invaded the Givat HaMatos and Beit Tzefafa area by way of Bethlehem,” Herskovitz says. “It is with a strong desire to seek a peaceful solution to this dilemma that I go to court. Others, I believe, would have taken the law in their own hands.”
Not Only in House Illegally, But Jerusalem Too
The Salah clan, which is squatting in the residence, is not only residing in Herskovitz’s property illegally, but in Jerusalem altogether in contravention of the law. The clan resided in the PA village of Tamra south of Jerusalem until they were forced to leave by the village elders due to criminal activity.
Herskovitz recently made several trips to the relevant Judea and Samaria police and Civil Administration authorities to ascertain whether they had the documents required to enter pre-1967 Israel from PA-controlled areas. He found out that they have no such permission and are in Jerusalem illegally.
Herskovitz alleges that the police know this and refuse to take action against the clan.
He is now demanding that the police file a criminal suit against the squatters. “Even when I win this current case, they will not be punished for their actions,” he says, “because it is a civil trespass suit, whereas their actions are criminal. Their actions are more than mere squatting or trespassing, but their presentation of false documents in court proves their intent is criminal. I believe the State of Israel should give them alternate housing – in jail – so that others will know that trespassers are indeed punished.”
Herskovitz says activists have the ability to influence the police to enforce the law, suggesting Minister of Public Security Avi Dichter be contacted:
Phone: 02 675 3727
Fax: 02 649 6168
(From outside Israel, replace first “0” with “011-972”)
Herskovitz has been in the courts for fifteen years against a clan of PA Arabs who are squatting on a property he owns just below the southern Jerusalem neighborhood of Givat HaMatos, near Beit Tzefafa. Even after multiple rulings in his favor, the return of his property had been repeatedly delayed and called into question.
“The government and courts are responsible for protecting the property rights of their citizens, but they are not doing so.” Herskovitz told Arutz-7. “I do not believe a person can fathom the pain of what this trespassing does to me.”
Earlier this year, on July 2, Herskovitz was given a court order to evict the squatters. At first, the police demanded that he pay for a large number of officers to enforce the order in the face of expected violence. After he paid the sum and dozens of Jewish volunteers showed up to assist in reclaiming the property, police said an injunction had postponed the order due to a legal technicality the Arabs’ lawyer brought to court at the last moment.
Arutz-7’s coverage of the story led to the Knesset Law Committee’s adjustment of the law requiring private citizens to pay the police to enforce a court order, but the eviction has yet to take place.
A new date was eventually set, with Jerusalem District Court Judge Noam Solberg demanding that the Arabs’ lawyer, Mohammad Dahleh, sign an agreement that he would cease the use of delay tactics.
The date was then delayed once more due to a police policy not to carry out evictions during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The new eviction date was finally set for Sunday, November 11, but was again postponed at the last minute – due to yet another loophole found by Dahleh, who had refused to sign the agreement presented by the Judge.
“It was proven without a doubt, with a preponderance of evidence that the Salah clan invaded the Givat HaMatos and Beit Tzefafa area by way of Bethlehem,” Herskovitz says. “It is with a strong desire to seek a peaceful solution to this dilemma that I go to court. Others, I believe, would have taken the law in their own hands.”
Not Only in House Illegally, But Jerusalem Too
The Salah clan, which is squatting in the residence, is not only residing in Herskovitz’s property illegally, but in Jerusalem altogether in contravention of the law. The clan resided in the PA village of Tamra south of Jerusalem until they were forced to leave by the village elders due to criminal activity.
Herskovitz recently made several trips to the relevant Judea and Samaria police and Civil Administration authorities to ascertain whether they had the documents required to enter pre-1967 Israel from PA-controlled areas. He found out that they have no such permission and are in Jerusalem illegally.
Herskovitz alleges that the police know this and refuse to take action against the clan.
He is now demanding that the police file a criminal suit against the squatters. “Even when I win this current case, they will not be punished for their actions,” he says, “because it is a civil trespass suit, whereas their actions are criminal. Their actions are more than mere squatting or trespassing, but their presentation of false documents in court proves their intent is criminal. I believe the State of Israel should give them alternate housing – in jail – so that others will know that trespassers are indeed punished.”
Herskovitz says activists have the ability to influence the police to enforce the law, suggesting Minister of Public Security Avi Dichter be contacted:
Phone: 02 675 3727
Fax: 02 649 6168
(From outside Israel, replace first “0” with “011-972”)
Nasrallah builds case for jihad against Lebanese government
Arab Press
Abu Kais Nasrallah has appealed to Syrian-installed puppet Emile Lahoud to embark on a "national rescue initiative" so that the country does not fall into the hands of "thieves and murderers who are followers of the American-Zionist project". Tuesday, 13 November, 2007 @ 7:30 PM By Abu Kais Nasrallah has appealed to Syrian-installed puppet Emile Lahoud to embark on a "national rescue initiative" so that the country does not fall into the hands of "thieves and murderers who are followers of the American-Zionist project".Nasrallah said his militia will not recognize a president elected outside the "consensus", and will consider him an "usurper".
He added that the presidential election is important because it will determine the role of the army and government in the next period. He said no force on earth can disarm his militia, and that last week's exercises were a "message to the world that the resistance can create a victory that can "alter the face of the region".Nasrallah also warned against privatizing cell phone companies-- which Siniora's government is trying to do-- threatening future bidders that his Iranian-owned militia will "confront them using legal and legitimate means".
Nasrallah, who represents a privatized version of Shia Islam, has his own phone network, and prefers to keep his wiretapping operation undisturbed by giving new licenses or modernizing the service in the land of do as you like.He also called for early elections, and vowed to accept the result of that election and give the current "fake majority" the right to elect a president if they win two thirds of the seats. He said he considers the results of the last parliamentary elections invalid, because the deputies who allied themselves with Hizbullah during the election have not honored their campaign promise of rejecting UNSC 1559 and protecting the "weapons of the resistance". Nasrallah denied rumors of impending clashes erupting between Hizbullah and armed elements in the refugee camps near the southern suburbs. The rumors are, mind you, are being propagated by Damascus-based PFLP-GC leader Ahmad Gibril.The speech, delivered on the occasion of "Martyr's Day", is full of lies and hypocritical claims as usual. It's safe to say that Hizbullah now equates the current Lebanese government and March 14 leaders with the Israeli government. That he hasn't called for jihad against the government seems to be a matter of time. It makes you wonder on what basis Hariri and Berri are meeting. Does Hariri really think he can reach an agreement with people who consider him to be a Zionist thief and murderer?Source: From Beirut to the Beltway
Abu Kais Nasrallah has appealed to Syrian-installed puppet Emile Lahoud to embark on a "national rescue initiative" so that the country does not fall into the hands of "thieves and murderers who are followers of the American-Zionist project". Tuesday, 13 November, 2007 @ 7:30 PM By Abu Kais Nasrallah has appealed to Syrian-installed puppet Emile Lahoud to embark on a "national rescue initiative" so that the country does not fall into the hands of "thieves and murderers who are followers of the American-Zionist project".Nasrallah said his militia will not recognize a president elected outside the "consensus", and will consider him an "usurper".
He added that the presidential election is important because it will determine the role of the army and government in the next period. He said no force on earth can disarm his militia, and that last week's exercises were a "message to the world that the resistance can create a victory that can "alter the face of the region".Nasrallah also warned against privatizing cell phone companies-- which Siniora's government is trying to do-- threatening future bidders that his Iranian-owned militia will "confront them using legal and legitimate means".
Nasrallah, who represents a privatized version of Shia Islam, has his own phone network, and prefers to keep his wiretapping operation undisturbed by giving new licenses or modernizing the service in the land of do as you like.He also called for early elections, and vowed to accept the result of that election and give the current "fake majority" the right to elect a president if they win two thirds of the seats. He said he considers the results of the last parliamentary elections invalid, because the deputies who allied themselves with Hizbullah during the election have not honored their campaign promise of rejecting UNSC 1559 and protecting the "weapons of the resistance". Nasrallah denied rumors of impending clashes erupting between Hizbullah and armed elements in the refugee camps near the southern suburbs. The rumors are, mind you, are being propagated by Damascus-based PFLP-GC leader Ahmad Gibril.The speech, delivered on the occasion of "Martyr's Day", is full of lies and hypocritical claims as usual. It's safe to say that Hizbullah now equates the current Lebanese government and March 14 leaders with the Israeli government. That he hasn't called for jihad against the government seems to be a matter of time. It makes you wonder on what basis Hariri and Berri are meeting. Does Hariri really think he can reach an agreement with people who consider him to be a Zionist thief and murderer?Source: From Beirut to the Beltway
Abbas bamboozled again
Arab Press
Khalid Amayreh in Occupied East Jerusalem
While Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas is acting tough toward Hamas, probably in order to impress Israel and her guardian-ally, the United States , the way he has been running the “peace show” with the Zionist occupiers is characterized by utter flaccidity, striking naivety and excessive stupidity.
Indeed, after months of high-pitched and seemingly cordial meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, a man known more for his deceitfulness and criminality than for his proneness to peace, Abbas has apparently decided to revert to the dormant “roadmap,” the American-sponsored plan for “peace” between the Zionist state and the Palestinians.
A few weeks ago, Palestinian officials in Ramallah, from Abbas to his un-elected Prime Minister Salam Fayadh to the numerous other spokespersons and hangers-on, issued a plethora of statements warning that the PA wouldn’t attend the Annapolis conference, slated to take place in Maryland later this month, unless Israel agreed to a detailed timetable for the creation of a Palestinian state.
Now, surprisingly, or perhaps unsurprisingly, the PA leadership has forgotten all of these conditions and warnings and seems to have settled for the implementation of the deformed hodgepodge known as the roadmap.
For those who have forgotten or don’t know, the roadmap speaks of the creation of a viable Palestinian state but makes no mention of a full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. The plan, which some pundits claim was originally envisaged by Israel and her American Jewish operatives in Washington, called for the creation of a temporary state, with temporary borders, with no right of return and with major Jewish colonies in the West Bank, especially in E. Jerusalem, eventually annexed to Israel .
In other words, the roadmap is a corrupted carbon copy of the originally corrupt and vague Oslo Accords.
And as was the case with the Oslo agreement, the roadmap is suffering from the same monumental vagueness which is usually manipulated in favor of the powerful party, e.g. Israel .
In fact, a fleet examination of the roadmap reveals that there are two roadmaps, not one: The one adopted and interpreted by the PA, which is seen as a scheme that would lead to ending the Israeli occupation and creation of a viable and genuine Palestinian state on 100% of the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. And then there is the Israeli roadmap, which would perpetuate Israeli occupation, control and apartheid while giving the appearance of a mutually-accepted peace.
So, one would wonder which roadmap whose implementation PA officials have agreed would be the basis of future peace talks with Israel?
I have struggled to obtain a credible answer from the Ramallah-based officials, but to no avail.
So, what is that supposed to suggest? Are these people in Ramallah inebriated, or under the influence of something?
Forget what they say in their bombastic speeches and fiery statements to the largely pliant Palestinian media, since they say quite the opposite to the Israeli and western media. These people simply can’t be trusted.
As we all know, Israel has been insisting that the pledges George Bush made to Ariel Sharon in 2004, that Israel would have the right to annex major settlements in the West Bank in the context of a final-status solution, are part and parcel of the roadmap. And how about the 14 reservations Israel appended to its formal acceptance of the roadmap in 2003? Are they also part of it?
So, we ask our Palestinian leaders and negotiators: Are these infamous pledges part of the roadmap? If yes, then you are no better than cheap stupid quislings working, knowingly or unknowingly, for the enemy, which qualify you for a treatment and a fate befitting traitors. And if not, then why are you embracing a plan you don’t know what it is and what it means and implies?
Finally, Abbas has been telling Arab and western media that he would be willing to trade large parts of East Jerusalem, covered by Jewish colonies such as Ma’ali Adomim, Har Homa, Pisgat Ze’ev, etc, for land of the same area and quality?
Well, this is stupidity bordering on treason. Who in his right mind would trade the vicinity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque for a real estate elsewhere? Are Abbas and his followers out of their minds? Are they adopting the old adage “feed me today, and slaughter me tomorrow”?
Khalid Amayreh in Occupied East Jerusalem
While Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas is acting tough toward Hamas, probably in order to impress Israel and her guardian-ally, the United States , the way he has been running the “peace show” with the Zionist occupiers is characterized by utter flaccidity, striking naivety and excessive stupidity.
Indeed, after months of high-pitched and seemingly cordial meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, a man known more for his deceitfulness and criminality than for his proneness to peace, Abbas has apparently decided to revert to the dormant “roadmap,” the American-sponsored plan for “peace” between the Zionist state and the Palestinians.
A few weeks ago, Palestinian officials in Ramallah, from Abbas to his un-elected Prime Minister Salam Fayadh to the numerous other spokespersons and hangers-on, issued a plethora of statements warning that the PA wouldn’t attend the Annapolis conference, slated to take place in Maryland later this month, unless Israel agreed to a detailed timetable for the creation of a Palestinian state.
Now, surprisingly, or perhaps unsurprisingly, the PA leadership has forgotten all of these conditions and warnings and seems to have settled for the implementation of the deformed hodgepodge known as the roadmap.
For those who have forgotten or don’t know, the roadmap speaks of the creation of a viable Palestinian state but makes no mention of a full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. The plan, which some pundits claim was originally envisaged by Israel and her American Jewish operatives in Washington, called for the creation of a temporary state, with temporary borders, with no right of return and with major Jewish colonies in the West Bank, especially in E. Jerusalem, eventually annexed to Israel .
In other words, the roadmap is a corrupted carbon copy of the originally corrupt and vague Oslo Accords.
And as was the case with the Oslo agreement, the roadmap is suffering from the same monumental vagueness which is usually manipulated in favor of the powerful party, e.g. Israel .
In fact, a fleet examination of the roadmap reveals that there are two roadmaps, not one: The one adopted and interpreted by the PA, which is seen as a scheme that would lead to ending the Israeli occupation and creation of a viable and genuine Palestinian state on 100% of the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. And then there is the Israeli roadmap, which would perpetuate Israeli occupation, control and apartheid while giving the appearance of a mutually-accepted peace.
So, one would wonder which roadmap whose implementation PA officials have agreed would be the basis of future peace talks with Israel?
I have struggled to obtain a credible answer from the Ramallah-based officials, but to no avail.
So, what is that supposed to suggest? Are these people in Ramallah inebriated, or under the influence of something?
Forget what they say in their bombastic speeches and fiery statements to the largely pliant Palestinian media, since they say quite the opposite to the Israeli and western media. These people simply can’t be trusted.
As we all know, Israel has been insisting that the pledges George Bush made to Ariel Sharon in 2004, that Israel would have the right to annex major settlements in the West Bank in the context of a final-status solution, are part and parcel of the roadmap. And how about the 14 reservations Israel appended to its formal acceptance of the roadmap in 2003? Are they also part of it?
So, we ask our Palestinian leaders and negotiators: Are these infamous pledges part of the roadmap? If yes, then you are no better than cheap stupid quislings working, knowingly or unknowingly, for the enemy, which qualify you for a treatment and a fate befitting traitors. And if not, then why are you embracing a plan you don’t know what it is and what it means and implies?
Finally, Abbas has been telling Arab and western media that he would be willing to trade large parts of East Jerusalem, covered by Jewish colonies such as Ma’ali Adomim, Har Homa, Pisgat Ze’ev, etc, for land of the same area and quality?
Well, this is stupidity bordering on treason. Who in his right mind would trade the vicinity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque for a real estate elsewhere? Are Abbas and his followers out of their minds? Are they adopting the old adage “feed me today, and slaughter me tomorrow”?
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Majadle Justifies Destruction of Temple Remains
The Jewish State's first Arab minister, Raleb Majadle, declared Wednesday that as far as Jerusalem's Temple Mount is concerned, Israeli sovereignty is nonexistent and Islam rules. The minister spoke in his official capacity as Minister of Science, Culture and Sport, from the Knesset podium, in response to a parliamentary question by MK Aryeh Eldad (NU/NRP).
MK Eldad's question referred to the unsupervised digging carried out by the Muslim authorities (the "Wakf") on the Temple Mount during the summer, by means of heavy machinery. "I received a series of photographs of digs on the Temple Mount near the Dome of the Rock," the parliamentary question read. "The police are present on the scene but there is no supervision by the Department of Antiquities regarding finds taken out of the digs, and there is a serious concern that they could be destroyed by the Wakf. What will be done in the short term to stop the destruction of the remains of the Temple?"
Speaking before the Knesset plenum, Majadle replied that the digs carried out on the Mount were coordinated, accompanied and supervised by the Antiquities Authority. "I have worked in recent months to create understandings between the Antiquities Authority and the Islamic Wakf because I believe that this is the only way," he said.
MK Eldad asked Majadle pointedly from the plenum floor: "Does Israeli law apply on the Temple Mount or does it not?"
Majadle answered: "In my opinion, certainly not." Eldad reminded him that in answering parliamentary questions he speaks for the entire government, but Majadle was unfazed: "I will say my opinion. Before I am a government minister I am first and foremost a person and a citizen and a Muslim. With all due respect for the law, the law was meant to respect the religion, the person and the citizen and protect him, and not the other way around, enslave him," he explained. "Therefore I say clearly: Al-Aksa, Al-Haram al-Sharif [as the Temple Mount is called by Muslims – ed.], cannot be under the authority of Israeli law."
Eldad interrupted him repeatedly, reminding him that he had sworn allegiance to the State of Israel
"I may be a minister for one, two or ten years but I was born a Muslim and a Muslim I shall die."
and its laws, but Majadle insisted: "I hereby inform you, esteemed MK Eldad, that I may be a minister for one, two or ten years but I was born a Muslim, and a Muslim I shall die. I respect Israeli law... but if there is a contradiction between the law and my deep faith as a Muslim, I announce that I will know what to choose."
Immediately after this exchange, MK Eldad wrote to the Prime Minister demanding that Majadle be fired from the government. In addition, he asked the Attorney General to open a police investigation against him, on suspicion of breach of trust.
Majadle's response was to repeat, this time in writing: "I respect Jewish law and recognize the sensitive situation in the Temple Mount and act accordingly, but I believe as a Muslim that in times of peace the holy places must be outside of the political dispute. My opinion is that they must be administered according to religious laws and not be placed under any earthly sovereign."
MK Eldad's question referred to the unsupervised digging carried out by the Muslim authorities (the "Wakf") on the Temple Mount during the summer, by means of heavy machinery. "I received a series of photographs of digs on the Temple Mount near the Dome of the Rock," the parliamentary question read. "The police are present on the scene but there is no supervision by the Department of Antiquities regarding finds taken out of the digs, and there is a serious concern that they could be destroyed by the Wakf. What will be done in the short term to stop the destruction of the remains of the Temple?"
Speaking before the Knesset plenum, Majadle replied that the digs carried out on the Mount were coordinated, accompanied and supervised by the Antiquities Authority. "I have worked in recent months to create understandings between the Antiquities Authority and the Islamic Wakf because I believe that this is the only way," he said.
MK Eldad asked Majadle pointedly from the plenum floor: "Does Israeli law apply on the Temple Mount or does it not?"
Majadle answered: "In my opinion, certainly not." Eldad reminded him that in answering parliamentary questions he speaks for the entire government, but Majadle was unfazed: "I will say my opinion. Before I am a government minister I am first and foremost a person and a citizen and a Muslim. With all due respect for the law, the law was meant to respect the religion, the person and the citizen and protect him, and not the other way around, enslave him," he explained. "Therefore I say clearly: Al-Aksa, Al-Haram al-Sharif [as the Temple Mount is called by Muslims – ed.], cannot be under the authority of Israeli law."
Eldad interrupted him repeatedly, reminding him that he had sworn allegiance to the State of Israel
"I may be a minister for one, two or ten years but I was born a Muslim and a Muslim I shall die."
and its laws, but Majadle insisted: "I hereby inform you, esteemed MK Eldad, that I may be a minister for one, two or ten years but I was born a Muslim, and a Muslim I shall die. I respect Israeli law... but if there is a contradiction between the law and my deep faith as a Muslim, I announce that I will know what to choose."
Immediately after this exchange, MK Eldad wrote to the Prime Minister demanding that Majadle be fired from the government. In addition, he asked the Attorney General to open a police investigation against him, on suspicion of breach of trust.
Majadle's response was to repeat, this time in writing: "I respect Jewish law and recognize the sensitive situation in the Temple Mount and act accordingly, but I believe as a Muslim that in times of peace the holy places must be outside of the political dispute. My opinion is that they must be administered according to religious laws and not be placed under any earthly sovereign."
What the Palestinians must do
It is essential that the impending regional meeting in Annapolis be successful. Failure at Annapolis would translate into a victory for the extremist elements in Israel, Palestine and throughout the region. Without success at Annapolis the next phase of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship will find a far less forthcoming Israeli government squaring off against an implacable Hamas.
So it is essential that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, his ministers and advisers act now. Israel must create a solid groundwork for permanent status negotiations. We must set the stage for a two-state solution, an end to the occupation, a dramatic redeployment of the settlements into several settlement blocs and, most importantly, we must pursue a relationship based on trust, respect and equality with the Palestinians.
Ehud Olmert must understand that only through such an approach can Israel strengthen Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and the Fatah Party; and doing so is absolutely in our interest.
I have had the privilege of getting to know Abu Mazen and Abu Ala (Ahmed Qurei) well. In addition to what Israel must do to bolster these good men, I believe they can and must do much more to strengthen themselves and their camp.
To insist that strengthening Fatah is the task of Israel alone is paternalistic. Only an internal political process can strengthen the Palestinian peace camp so that it can better manage Palestinian affairs. And nothing can strengthen Abu Mazen more than success at Annapolis.
To that end, the Palestinian leadership must aim for a substantive Annapolis declaration with Israel, offering a timeline for negotiations - say, about one year. So now is the time for the Palestinian side to bite the bullet, to set forth realistic positions in order to find a common platform with Israel.
HERE IS what I believe the Palestinians must do:
· Road map. The Palestinians must implement the first phase of the road map and uproot violence from their midst. The struggle against terrorism and the terrorist infrastructure must be relentless and ongoing. This should be done not as a "goodwill" gesture toward Israel, but because it is in the supreme interest of the Palestinians.
The Palestinian leadership has said it wants a single security force under one wing of its government, without militias or terrorist groups competing for power. Now is the time to act on that stated commitment. Plainly, a single armed force is a precondition for a viable democratic state.
· Borders. The Palestinians rightly insist that the borders of a new Palestinian state should be based on the 1949 armistice lines. However, they should also agree to mutual modifications in order to have Israel retain several settlement blocs in its own territory.
· Right of return. This is without a doubt the most difficult challenge for the Palestinians. Here I urge my Palestinian friends to be pragmatic. Even the most moderate Israelis, myself included, vehemently opposes the influx of millions of Palestinian refugees or their descendents into sovereign Israel.
Palestinians should have the right of return to their own nation state - Palestine. Some would receive compensation and others would be resettled under various refugee programs in a number countries. Israel might permit, in the course of future talks, some refugees to settle on its territory. But the Palestinian leadership must finally tell its people that adhering to the right of return as an ideology would torpedo any hopes for a negotiated settlement with Israel.
· Jerusalem. The Palestinians will justifiably insist on a capital in the Arab-populated neighborhoods of Jerusalem, yet they should agree to postpone the final details of the future of the holy sites to permanent status negotiations.
The Palestinian side should cooperate with Israel in two critical areas: economics and security.
· Only by working together via open borders can we witness an improvement of the existing economic conditions for Palestinians, and of economic growth that would benefit both peoples. Yet for there to be a free flow of people, Israelis must feel certain that their lives will not again be placed in jeopardy by terrorism.
· Security cooperation must be renewed. Israel will not tolerate terror against any Israelis. And terrorism is also a threat on the authority of the Palestinian leadership.
IT IS TIME for both Israelis and Palestinians to pursue a policy of realpolitik. Israel must make painful concessions, and so must the Palestinian side. Israel must strengthen Abu Mazen, and Abu Mazen must strengthen himself and his party. It will be a challenge. But I genuinely believe that both Abu Mazen and Olmert understand the importance of this opportunity, and I hope - for the sake of both our peoples - that our leaders will act accordingly.
Annapolis must be successful. It must provide a solid and implementable basis for real peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, and act as an impetus for regional peace.
The writer is the president of the Peres Center for Peace.
So it is essential that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, his ministers and advisers act now. Israel must create a solid groundwork for permanent status negotiations. We must set the stage for a two-state solution, an end to the occupation, a dramatic redeployment of the settlements into several settlement blocs and, most importantly, we must pursue a relationship based on trust, respect and equality with the Palestinians.
Ehud Olmert must understand that only through such an approach can Israel strengthen Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and the Fatah Party; and doing so is absolutely in our interest.
I have had the privilege of getting to know Abu Mazen and Abu Ala (Ahmed Qurei) well. In addition to what Israel must do to bolster these good men, I believe they can and must do much more to strengthen themselves and their camp.
To insist that strengthening Fatah is the task of Israel alone is paternalistic. Only an internal political process can strengthen the Palestinian peace camp so that it can better manage Palestinian affairs. And nothing can strengthen Abu Mazen more than success at Annapolis.
To that end, the Palestinian leadership must aim for a substantive Annapolis declaration with Israel, offering a timeline for negotiations - say, about one year. So now is the time for the Palestinian side to bite the bullet, to set forth realistic positions in order to find a common platform with Israel.
HERE IS what I believe the Palestinians must do:
· Road map. The Palestinians must implement the first phase of the road map and uproot violence from their midst. The struggle against terrorism and the terrorist infrastructure must be relentless and ongoing. This should be done not as a "goodwill" gesture toward Israel, but because it is in the supreme interest of the Palestinians.
The Palestinian leadership has said it wants a single security force under one wing of its government, without militias or terrorist groups competing for power. Now is the time to act on that stated commitment. Plainly, a single armed force is a precondition for a viable democratic state.
· Borders. The Palestinians rightly insist that the borders of a new Palestinian state should be based on the 1949 armistice lines. However, they should also agree to mutual modifications in order to have Israel retain several settlement blocs in its own territory.
· Right of return. This is without a doubt the most difficult challenge for the Palestinians. Here I urge my Palestinian friends to be pragmatic. Even the most moderate Israelis, myself included, vehemently opposes the influx of millions of Palestinian refugees or their descendents into sovereign Israel.
Palestinians should have the right of return to their own nation state - Palestine. Some would receive compensation and others would be resettled under various refugee programs in a number countries. Israel might permit, in the course of future talks, some refugees to settle on its territory. But the Palestinian leadership must finally tell its people that adhering to the right of return as an ideology would torpedo any hopes for a negotiated settlement with Israel.
· Jerusalem. The Palestinians will justifiably insist on a capital in the Arab-populated neighborhoods of Jerusalem, yet they should agree to postpone the final details of the future of the holy sites to permanent status negotiations.
The Palestinian side should cooperate with Israel in two critical areas: economics and security.
· Only by working together via open borders can we witness an improvement of the existing economic conditions for Palestinians, and of economic growth that would benefit both peoples. Yet for there to be a free flow of people, Israelis must feel certain that their lives will not again be placed in jeopardy by terrorism.
· Security cooperation must be renewed. Israel will not tolerate terror against any Israelis. And terrorism is also a threat on the authority of the Palestinian leadership.
IT IS TIME for both Israelis and Palestinians to pursue a policy of realpolitik. Israel must make painful concessions, and so must the Palestinian side. Israel must strengthen Abu Mazen, and Abu Mazen must strengthen himself and his party. It will be a challenge. But I genuinely believe that both Abu Mazen and Olmert understand the importance of this opportunity, and I hope - for the sake of both our peoples - that our leaders will act accordingly.
Annapolis must be successful. It must provide a solid and implementable basis for real peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, and act as an impetus for regional peace.
The writer is the president of the Peres Center for Peace.
Fatah and Hamas’s pre-Annapolis growls
Monday's fierce clashes between Fatah and Hamas - the worst since the Islamist movement's violent takeover of the Gaza Strip last June - are a reminder of the huge challenges facing Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas on the eve of the US-sponsored peace parley in Annapolis, Maryland. The fighting shows that Fatah and Hamas are far from resolving their bloody power struggle despite reports of Arab and Islamic mediation efforts and secret negotiations between the two parties.
It also shows that Fatah, which managed to bring tens of thousands of Palestinians to a rally marking the third anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death, is still capable of flexing its muscles in the Gaza Strip.
Buoyed by the large turnout, Fatah officials said Monday's clashes were a sign of the growing predicament of Hamas.
They explained that Hamas's "hysterical" response to the rally was a sign of the movement's fear of losing control over the Gaza Strip.
Undoubtedly, the clashes are seen as a PR disaster for Hamas, which is now being accused by some Palestinians of suppressing a "peaceful" rally in honor of Arafat. Scenes of Hamas militiamen opening fire at Fatah supporters and beating them on the streets of Gaza City are likely to alienate many Palestinians.
In the past few days, Fatah has exploited ceremonies to commemorate Arafat to wage a campaign against Hamas. At speeches in Ramallah and Gaza City, Fatah representatives and leaders declared that the countdown for Hamas's "coup" in the Gaza Strip had begun.
"Hamas is isolated and facing a serious crisis," said a senior Fatah official. "That's why they didn't hesitate to open fire at Palestinians participating in the rally in the Gaza Strip.
Monday's bloody events show that Hamas is aware of the growing disillusionment with its rule."
Hamas leaders, on the other hand, are convinced that Fatah, with the help of Israel and the US, is still trying to undermine the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip.
According to Hamas spokesmen, Fatah has been using the Arafat rallies to incite against Hamas. "Fatah is trying to take the Gaza Strip back to the days of anarchy and lawlessness," said Ihab al-Ghissin, spokesman for the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry. "Their goal is to overthrow the legitimate government of Hamas, but they won't succeed."
Another Hamas official, Islam Shahwan, claimed that Fatah gunmen were the first to open fire at Hamas's security forces. He said the gunmen were operating on instructions from the Fatah leadership in Ramallah with the aim of dragging Hamas into a confrontation.
The proposed peace conference in Annapolis has only escalated tensions between Fatah and Hamas, whose leaders have stepped up their attacks on Abbas, warning him against making concessions to Israel at the parley.
Hamas's main argument is that Abbas does not have a mandate to negotiate with Israel over explosive issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the "right of return" for refugees and the borders of the future Palestinian state.
The deepening divisions among the Palestinians cast a serious shadow of doubt over Abbas's ability to deliver at the Annapolis conference.
Moreover, the severe crisis raises questions about Abbas's ability to sell any agreement with Israel to the Palestinian public.
It also shows that Fatah, which managed to bring tens of thousands of Palestinians to a rally marking the third anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death, is still capable of flexing its muscles in the Gaza Strip.
Buoyed by the large turnout, Fatah officials said Monday's clashes were a sign of the growing predicament of Hamas.
They explained that Hamas's "hysterical" response to the rally was a sign of the movement's fear of losing control over the Gaza Strip.
Undoubtedly, the clashes are seen as a PR disaster for Hamas, which is now being accused by some Palestinians of suppressing a "peaceful" rally in honor of Arafat. Scenes of Hamas militiamen opening fire at Fatah supporters and beating them on the streets of Gaza City are likely to alienate many Palestinians.
In the past few days, Fatah has exploited ceremonies to commemorate Arafat to wage a campaign against Hamas. At speeches in Ramallah and Gaza City, Fatah representatives and leaders declared that the countdown for Hamas's "coup" in the Gaza Strip had begun.
"Hamas is isolated and facing a serious crisis," said a senior Fatah official. "That's why they didn't hesitate to open fire at Palestinians participating in the rally in the Gaza Strip.
Monday's bloody events show that Hamas is aware of the growing disillusionment with its rule."
Hamas leaders, on the other hand, are convinced that Fatah, with the help of Israel and the US, is still trying to undermine the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip.
According to Hamas spokesmen, Fatah has been using the Arafat rallies to incite against Hamas. "Fatah is trying to take the Gaza Strip back to the days of anarchy and lawlessness," said Ihab al-Ghissin, spokesman for the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry. "Their goal is to overthrow the legitimate government of Hamas, but they won't succeed."
Another Hamas official, Islam Shahwan, claimed that Fatah gunmen were the first to open fire at Hamas's security forces. He said the gunmen were operating on instructions from the Fatah leadership in Ramallah with the aim of dragging Hamas into a confrontation.
The proposed peace conference in Annapolis has only escalated tensions between Fatah and Hamas, whose leaders have stepped up their attacks on Abbas, warning him against making concessions to Israel at the parley.
Hamas's main argument is that Abbas does not have a mandate to negotiate with Israel over explosive issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the "right of return" for refugees and the borders of the future Palestinian state.
The deepening divisions among the Palestinians cast a serious shadow of doubt over Abbas's ability to deliver at the Annapolis conference.
Moreover, the severe crisis raises questions about Abbas's ability to sell any agreement with Israel to the Palestinian public.